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Abstract 
This thesis has examined Britain’s continuous support for the EU’s enlargement process in 
the period from 1975 to 2014 utilising a Liberal Intergovernmentalist (LI) perspective. The 
research has mainly confirmed the usefulness of LI as a theory, especially its conception of 
national preference formation and its two-level depiction of the EU decision-making 
process. However, the findings below also highlight some challenges for LI. Enlargement 
has continually proved to be a complex issue, which significantly constrains the ability of 
governments (including successive British governments) to make decisions about it using a 
rational, cost-benefit analysis. LI gets around this problem by arguing that in such cases of 
complexity, national policy-makers may fall back on ideological or geopolitical 
preferences and arguments for enlargement, and the evidence from the case studies below, 
confirm this point. But this ‘multi-causal’ approach also appears to both undermine LI’s 
parsimony as a theory, and to raise questions whether it is, in fact, capable of anything 
more than a ‘thick description’.   
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1 Introduction: Britain and EU Enlargement  
1.1 Introduction 
Britain has a reputation for being an ‘awkward’ partner within the EU (George, 1996). For 
example, just after her membership, Britain held a referendum about her EEC membership 
in 1975, and interestingly an EU referendum is still on Britain’s political agenda after 
almost 40 years of membership. In other words, Britain’s relationship with the EU is still 
uncertain (Allen, 2013, p. 109). Therefore, Britain has always been an interesting topic in 
the EU studies, and it is still important to understand Britain within the EU. However, the 
focus of this thesis is not the response of the successive British governments to the 
deepening of the EU, but British policy towards the EU’s enlargement waves since the 
mid-1970s.  
This chapter firstly reviewed the existing literature on Britain’s relations with the EU (plus 
related academic work on enlargement) and through this, made two claims. Firstly, that the 
topic of British policy towards EU enlargement has been largely neglected by scholars: 
indeed, this thesis represents the first fully-fledged study of this subject. Secondly, that not 
only has it been neglected, but that the story of British policy towards EU enlargement 
contains some very interesting questions and intellectual puzzles.  
1.2 Literature Review: Puzzling the Research  
1.2.1 Britain as a Eurosceptic Member 
The overwhelming majority of literature on Britain’s relations with the European Union 
(EU) investigates its attitudes and behaviour towards the deepening of this regional 
organisation. Britain is widely considered to be a Eurosceptical member, constantly 
opposing and trying to frustrate schemes for greater European integration. In his seminal 
work on the subject, Stephen George (1996) argued that Britain has been an “awkward” 
partner in the EU, who joined and persisted with membership for rational reasons but who 
has also constantly challenged supranational trends within the integration process (see also: 
Geddes, 2004, 2015, Forster and Blair, 2002, Seldon, 2007, Schweiger, 2007, Gowland et 
al., 2009, Giddings and Drewry, 2004, Casey, 2009, Markesinis, 2002, Gifford, 2008, 
2014, Wilks, 1996, Wall, 2008, Forster, 2002, Jones, 2007, Schweiger, 2007, Daddow, 
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2013, Usherwood, 2015). According to the literature, Euroscepticism even emerged as a 
new concept in the EU studies to specifically explain Britain’s ‘awkward’ position in the 
European integration process (e.g. Milner, 2000, p. 1, Harmsen and Spiering, 2004, p. 13, 
and Phinnemore and Mcgowan, 2004, p. 210, Vasilopoulou, 2009, p. 225).   
In the literature, Euroscepticism is used as a term particularly to define member states and 
other actors who do not want any further supranational political and economic integration 
and prefer an intergovernmental governance system within the EU (Phinnemore and 
McGowans, 2004, p.210, Alexandre-Collier, 1998, cited in: Forster, 2002, p. 2). However, 
there are many variables that make it impossible to have a clear-cut definition of 
Euroscepticism. For example, as Baker and Seawright (1998, pp. 2-3) highlighted, the 
main British political parties were not distinct blocks in terms of being Eurosceptic or 
Europhile. Both the Conservative and Labour parties had members who were strongly for 
and against Britain’s EU membership/the EU’s further economic and political integration, 
and even pro-Europeans might have negative attitudes towards some specific aspects or 
policies of the EU (ibid.). Additionally, Forster (2002) argued that the reasons behind 
British Euroscepticism might change over time. For example, the British anti-Marketeers 
in the 1970s in time evolved into the British Eurosceptics opposing attempts for further 
political, economic and monetary integration within the EU. From this perspective, the 
latest and current anti-immigration sentiments felt in Britain could also be seen as a newly 
emerging dimension of British Euroscepticism.    
At the same time, when it comes to defining the position of actors towards the European 
integration process, the word ‘Eurosceptic’ is used in contrast to the term ‘pro-European’, 
although again the relationship between these two terms might change according to the 
context, in which they gain meaning. To illustrate, although Margaret Thatcher was 
recognized as one of the most famous Eurosceptics especially after her Bruges speech in 
1988 as a reaction to the increasing supranational projects on the European integration, 
there are many studies defining her government’s position on the European integration in 
the first half of the 1980s as (lukewarm) pro-European (e.g. Jones, 2007, Geddes, 2013, 
Hollowell, 2003, Bradbury, 1996, Garnett and Lynch, 2009, and Vinen, 2009) since she 
supported the European integration process with the aim to drive it in a neoliberal 
intergovernmental way (Schmidt, 1999, p. 188, Worth, 2015, p. 93). As another example, 
Tony Blair was defined as a ‘pro-European’ British leader, but his EU policy also aimed to 
establish an enlarged, outward-looking and intergovernmental European integration 
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(Johnson and Steinberg, 2004, p. 242, Watts and Pilkington, 2005, p. 277, Hyde-Price, 
2007, pp. 99-100), which was similar to the one followed by the former Conservative 
governments (Dorey, 2005, pp. 85-86). Therefore, when ‘pro-European’ as a term is used 
in this research to define British governments’ positions towards the European integration 
process, it mainly represents a support for an outward-looking intergovernmental European 
integration, but not for an inward-looking supranational integration.  
According to the literature, the main reason behind British Euroscepticism was Britain’s 
having a different national structure and national interests from the EU’s continental 
members (see: Painter, 2000, and Spiering, 2004). Particularly, a strong sense of 
sovereignty emerged as the most influential structural factor behind British Euroscepticism 
(e.g. Gifford, 2008, George, 2000, Bulmer and Burch, 1998, Baker, 2001, Wilks, 1996, 
Spiering, 2004, Wellings, 2010, Diamond and Liddle, 2008, Kim, 2005, Gibbins, 2014). 
The literature mainly puts emphasis on the issue that Britain was less enthusiastic than 
some of the other EU member states in terms of directly transferring sovereignty to the EU 
or sharing sovereignty with the EU in many areas. In this regard, Nugent (1996, p. 4) even 
argued that there were other Eurosceptic member states within the EU but none of them 
had as strong an “anxiety about loss of sovereignty” as Britain did. Therefore, as Gifford 
(2010) argued, sovereignty constituted one of the most sensitive issues in Britain’s 
relations “with, and within, the European Union”.   
The literature also contains several arguments trying to explain the reasons why Britain 
had a strong sense of sovereignty regarding her relationship with the EU. Firstly, many 
studies in the literature highlight the importance of British identity as the most influential 
factor behind her strong sense of sovereignty. In short, according to the literature, a 
supranational EU was perceived as a threat to British identity; thus, this perception 
supported the idea of national sovereignty against the supranational attempts within the EU 
(Holmes, 2001, Gifford, 2008, Wall, 2008, Gowland et al., 2009, Geddes, 2004, 2015, 
Schmidt, 2006, Spiering, 2004, 2015, Risse et al., 1999, Crowson, 2007, Cinnirella, 1997, 
Hamilton, 2007). For example, Crowson (2007) found that the British Eurosceptics 
perceived the replacement of the British national currency with the euro as a British 
national identity crisis.   
In this context, British identity could be defined as a unique identity without any 
connection with Europe unlike, for example, French or German identity, which accepts 
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European-ness as an upper identity (Spiering, 2015, p. 20). In this regard, according to the 
literature, Britain’s having a separate geographical location and history from that of 
continental Europe played a dominant role in the differentiation of the British identity from 
a common European identity (Powell, 2002, Schweiger, 2007, Smith, 2006, Dedman, 
2009, Daddow, 2006, Rovisco, 2010). To elaborate, being an island country caused 
Britain’s identity to evolve independently from that of continental European nations 
(Schweiger 2007, Powell, 2002); therefore, it may be paradoxical to be both British and 
European (Powell, 2002). Moreover, Schweiger (2007) also argued that Britain’s imperial 
past contributed a global perspective to the modern British identity; thus, a European 
identity can be part of the British identity but cannot form an upper-identity for Britain. 
Additionally, according to Dedman (2009), there is a strong relationship between Britain’s 
Second World War experiences and her scepticism towards any federal model for Europe 
in the following post-war era because Britain continued to fight against Germany alone 
until the end of the war, prevented a potential German invasion, and maintained her 
national institutions during the war. Therefore, this experience strengthened the sense of 
national pride and independence/sovereignty in the British system, unlike the continental 
countries, and Britain would be more sensitive than continental Europe about her 
sovereignty. 
Furthermore, the literature also considers the adversarial British political system as another 
structural factor in generating British Euroscepticism (e.g. Geddes, 2004, Spiering, 2004, 
Wallace, 1995). This system simply means “a political system dominated by adversarial 
competition between government and opposition” (Moran, 2005, p. 130). In this regard, 
until the Coalition government between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, 
Britain experienced single party governments constituted by either the Labour Party or the 
Conservative Party since the WWII. Consequently, this bipolar party system resulted in an 
adversarial political structure between the ruling and opposition parties, and many 
domestic and foreign policy issues were discussed by these competitors in zero sum terms 
(Budge, McKay and Newton, 2007). As a result, the main British political parties tried to 
benefit from British Euroscepticism to get an advantage over one another. For example, 
Geddes (2004) argued that although the Labour leader Wilson made a second application 
for the EEC membership, he used the EEC membership as a means to challenge the 
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Heath’s Conservative government by criticising the way Heath negotiated during the 
accession process and pledged a renegotiation with the EC in the early 1970s1.  
Last but not least, according to the literature, the Eurosceptic British media had also a 
significant influence over British Euroscepticism (Page, 1996, Gavin and Sanders, 2003, 
Gavin, 2000, Gavin, 2007, Anderson and Weymouth, 2014). According to Geddes (2013, 
p. 36), the Eurosceptic British media especially increased its influence over the British 
political landscape after the 1990s. Carey and Burton (2004) also found that when both a 
British political party and the British newspapers released a similar message about the EU 
at the same time, this common message had a significant influence on the British people. 
For example, according to Liddle (2014, p. 98), the Eurosceptic British media played an 
important role in the waning of Blair’s pro-euro policy in the late 1990s.   
However, the story of European integration involves a widening, as well as a deepening 
process. Viewed from this perspective, Britain emerges as a fervent supporter of the 
widening of the European integration (the EU’s enlargement waves) despite her 
Euroscepticism towards the deepening of the integration. Interestingly, the literature 
review for this thesis could find no book or article dedicated solely to the analysis of 
British policy towards EU enlargement. That said, the more general literature on British 
foreign policy provides some clues as to why Whitehall has been such a keen advocate of 
EU widening. Historically, Britain has adopted a global perspective, most notably through 
the management of her colonies. The British economy has been an ‘open’ one since the 
nineteenth century, in that the manufacturing sector was dependent on international trade 
and the City of London was a global financial centre (Hirst and Thompson, 2000, Schmidt, 
2002; Daddow, 2010, Martell, 2008, Wallace, 1991). In the immediate post-war period, the 
successive British governments failed to join the ‘Common Market’ partly because Europe 
was viewed as one (and arguably the least important) of its three diplomatic ‘circles’ (the 
others being the Empire/Commonwealth and the ‘special’ relationship with the US) 
(Dedman, 2009, Young, 1998, Mauter, 1998, Hollowell, 2003, Williams, 2005, Casey, 
2009, Crowson, 2007). When Britain did join in the 1970s, this globalist perspective 
generated a view that the EU should be governed according to free market principles and 
that its market should be further integrated into the global market by removing/preventing 
                                                 
1 In addition to this adversarial bipolar party struggle, UKIP’s increasing power also started to force the 
Conservative Party to increase its Eurosceptic tone (Ingle, 2008). 
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regulative and protectionist policies within it unlike the continental plans favouring a 
statist, protectionist and regulated market model for the European integration (Geddes, 
2013, pp. 30-31, Fioretos, 2012). At this point, Hooghe (2001, p. 166) also empirically 
found that there was a significant rift between the Anglo-Saxon capitalist model and the 
continental capitalism in Europe. 
Of course, it could be that the reason why there is a dearth of literature on British policy 
towards EU enlargement is because this is where the story ends. Britain’s continued 
support for enlargement is simple to explain: it represents a logical extension of historical 
foreign policy trends, which in turn reflects this ‘globalist’ orientation. When European 
integration came back onto the agenda in the second half of the 1980s, British politicians 
with this globalist orientation supported enlargement as a method for watering down or 
undermining the deepening dimension of the European integration process (e.g. Lippert et 
al., 2001, Wall, 2008, Seldon, 2007, Jones, 2007, Schweiger, 2007, Gowland et al., 2009, 
Mannin, 2010, Butler and Westlake, 2005, Schneider, 2009, Schimmelfennig, 2001, 2003, 
2011, Crowson, 2007, Dorronsoro, 2004, Gillingham, 2003, Niblett, 2007, Anastasakis, 
2004, Williams, 2005, Smith, 2005, Watts and Pilkington, 2005, Sherrington, 2006,  
Dannreuther and Lightfoot, 2014, Gibbins, 2014). However, on further reflection there are 
at least two reasons why British policy in this area might be driven by a more complex set 
of factors.  
First, the explanation above emphasizes continuity: British support for enlargement 
essentially has not altered over the last 40 years. Clearly EU enlargement has not happened 
in one go: it has progressed in successive waves, namely, the Mediterranean enlargement 
(Greece, Portugal, Spain in the 1980s), the EFTA enlargement (Sweden, Finland and 
Austria in 1996); the Eastward enlargement2 (Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic in 2004 and Bulgaria and 
Romania in 2007), and the ongoing further enlargement process (the Western Balkans3 and 
Turkey). However, the period between 1975 and 2014 has witnessed a range of changes, 
both in British politics and in the UK’s external environment. For example, the leftist 
Labour government in the 1970s and the right-wing Conservative government in the 1980s 
might have had different ideological motivations for supporting the Mediterranean 
                                                 
2 This term has been used interchangeably with the big bang enlargement.    
3 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Croatia, but Croatia became a 
member in 2013.  
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enlargement. Additionally, successive British governments supported the EU’s 
enlargement waves in different economic and geopolitical international environments, 
which might have affected the reasons behind Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards 
every single enlargement wave. In other words, the Mediterranean enlargement happened 
in the Cold War context, the EFTA and the Eastward enlargement in the post-Cold 
War/globalized era, and Turkey’s accession process is mostly associated with the era of the 
War on Terror (Seldon, 2008); thus, these different international environments should also 
have an effect on Britain’s pro-enlargement policy. Bearing these changes in mind, it 
would be surprising if British policy towards EU enlargement was driven by precisely the 
same motivations throughout this period. Therefore, this research aimed to 
comprehensively analyse the reasons behind Britain’s support for every single enlargement 
wave. 
A second problem with the argument that British support for enlargement was just a 
method for watering down European integration (widening undermines deepening) is that 
since the 1990s the enlargement process has generated pressure for further European 
integration. Faced with the prospect of a significant increase in membership, EU states 
have attempted to reform their governance structures to cope with this new influx of 
countries. As later chapters will make it clear, the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), the Treaty of 
Nice (2000) and the Lisbon Treaty (2009) have increased the number of policy areas 
subjected to qualified majority voting (QMV) and co-decision making; have centralised 
(on paper at least) power in the hands of a new EU President; and have reduced British 
representation on the European Commission. Put in a different way, British political elites 
should realise, certainly by the end of the 1990s that enlargement (as a dilution strategy) 
might be counter-productive (see also: Wyplosz, 2007, Sjursen, 2006b, Elvert and Kaiser, 
2004, Magone, 2008, Cameron, 2004a, Tatham, 2009, Preston, 1997, Blockmans and 
Prechal, 2007). If so, why did successive British governments persist with this policy? 
In short, this thesis aims to fill a significant gap in the literature by attempting to answer 
the question: why has Britain, as a leading Eurosceptic member, continuously supported 
the EU’s enlargement process from 1975 to 2014? Additionally, the attempt to answer this 
question also implicitly or explicitly answers a number of related questions: Is Britain’s 
support for EU enlargement the result of elite preferences, pressure from societal groups or 
some other factor? Does this constant support reflect similar motives, or have Britain’s 
reasons for backing enlargement changed over time? If Britain’s reasons for supporting 
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enlargement have changed over time, how might we make sense of this change? Before 
discussing the appropriate theory and research methods for tackling these questions, this 
section concludes by discussing some of the broader literature on EU enlargement to see if 
it offers any clues in answering these questions.  
1.2.2 EU Enlargement and Britain: Arguments in the Literature 
Studies on EU enlargement have been dominated by the theoretical debate between 
rationalism and constructivism (Schimmelfennig, 2010, p. 45). The constructivist approach 
mainly argues that a common European identity shared by all the member countries drives 
old members to accept new members to the Union (e.g. unification of the European family) 
(Sjursen, 2006, p. 10, Müftüler-Bac and Mclaren, 2003, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 
2002, Grabbe and Sedelmeier, 2010). For example, Sjursen (2002), Riddervold and Sjursen 
(2006), Fierke and Wiener (1999), Lundgren (2006), Risse (2012), O'brennan (2001), Eder 
and Spohn (2005), Sedelmeier (2005), and Piedrafita and Torreblanca (2005) argued that a 
common European identity played a crucial role in the old members’ support for the EU’s 
enlargement towards the Central and Eastern European countries. In other words, 
according to this constructivist understanding, old members felt a moral obligation to re-
unite Europe after the conflict and devastation of the Second World War, and this feeling 
persisted beyond the end of the Cold War and into the 1990s (Caporaso and Madeira, 
2012).  
Contrary to these constructivist explanations, rationalist studies argue that old members’ 
economic and political considerations, which were determined according to their national 
cost-benefit calculations, played a dominant role in their support for EU enlargement (e.g. 
Skalnes, 2005, Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2002, Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2005, Grabbe 
and Hughes, 1997, Vachudova, 2005). These costs and benefits are usually conceptualised 
in material terms, and include items such as increased prosperity from access to an 
enlarged ‘home market’; increased power in international trade deals as a result of being 
part of a larger regional bloc; direct financial aid, especially in the form of budgetary 
transfers; and more legal protection and certainty, especially in the area of property rights 
and corporate law (Grabbe and Sedelmeier, 2010, Baldwin et al., 1997). Of these 
rationalist approaches, Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI), associated especially with the 
work of Andrew Moravcsik, has undoubtedly been the most influential theoretical 
framework.   
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On the face of it, constructivist explanations do not appear suitable for understanding 
British motives for continually supporting EU enlargement. As discussed earlier in this 
chapter, Britain is widely understood to be a Eurosceptic country, sceptical towards any 
notion of a common European identity and hostile to any increase in the EU’s 
supranational competence. Therefore, any theoretical approach which puts a common 
European identity at the centre of its analysis cannot sufficiently explain Britain’s pro-
enlargement policy. However, LI, giving high priority to the nation state and its national 
interests while explaining the European integration process (see: Moravcsik, 1993, 1994, 
1995), emerged as a theoretical approach which could make the research question more 
understandable and workable. In particular, this thesis is about British policy towards EU 
enlargement, and the research aimed to understand why policy-makers and other groups in 
a particular country (Britain) behave in a particular way over a long period of time (their 
pro-enlargement positions). This is precisely the analytical focus adopted by Moravcsik 
(1998) in his influential book ‘The Choice for Europe’. With these observations in mind, 
LI would appear to be a more suitable choice of theory for investigating the subject matter 
of this thesis.  
The existing literature not only suggested that LI might become an effective theory for the 
research as it puts the interests of member states at the centre of its analysis but also 
suggested that a pro-enlargement policy might be a beneficial one for Britain regarding her 
national interests. In this regard, it could be expected that any explanation of the continual 
British support for EU enlargement must be consistent with her broader sceptical position 
on the European integration. Related to this argument, as the previous section showed, 
Britain’s Euroscepticism is against any attempt/project aiming to create an inward-looking 
supranational European integration. However, Britain evolved as an outward-looking 
nation state, thus also aimed to drive the European integration process towards an outward 
looking intergovernmental way (see also: Parr, 2006, Gibbins, 2014, DTI, 2004). In this 
regard, the EU’s enlargement towards new members has a potentiality to not only make the 
European integration process more intergovernmental but also more outward-looking 
(global). Therefore, it was possible for Britain to develop a pro-enlargement policy in 
parallel with her sceptical position.  
Moreover, many studies in the literature define enlargement as the EU’s best foreign policy 
tool because it has a capacity to solve the security problem in Europe, export democracy 
and liberal market economy principles further, and strengthen the EU as a global actor (e.g. 
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Sjursen and Smith, 2004, Vachudova, 2005, p. 247, Dunay and Lachowski, 2006, p. 36, 
Petrovic, 2013, p. 167, Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014, pp. 55-56, Mehlhausen, 2014, p. 
178). Therefore, the EU’s enlargement towards new members might provide increased 
oppurtunities for Britain to achieve her broader foreign policy objectives (as a foreign 
policy tool) rather than being a simple dilution tool, used to prevent supranational 
tendencies within the EU.  
Firstly, British foreign policy was institutionalized on a collective security understanding 
after the First World War (Turner, 2010, Stoddart, 2012, Sanders, 1990, Clarke, 1998, 
Kavanagh et al., 2006) and the EU’s enlargement towards new members might strengthen 
this collective security policy (see also: Sweeney, 2005). To illustrate, when the 
authoritarian regimes collapsed in the Mediterranean countries in the 1970s, enlargement 
was a highly strategic tool to stabilize and keep those countries under the Western 
collective security system. For example, after a leftist military coup in 1974, Portugal’s 
future became a big security concern in the Cold War context despite its NATO 
membership (Pinto and Teixeira, 2004, Preston, 1997). In another instance, Greece 
withdrew from NATO in 1974 in response to Turkey’s military intervention in Cyprus 
(Ifantis, 2004). Thus, the EEC’s enlargement towards those countries would become a 
strategic measure to keep them within the Western bloc. After the collapse of the Soviet 
bloc at the beginning of the 1990s, the EU’s enlargement policy played a crucial role in 
filling the security gap in Central and Eastern Europe (Cameron, 2007). The EU’s 
enlargement towards the region was also followed by NATO’s expansion. However, the 
EU’s enlargement did not trigger any serious security problem with Russia, compared to 
NATO’s enlargement (Sjursen, 1998, p. 100, Šleivyte, 2010, p. 94). Moreover, as NATO’s 
hard power was limited in solving the civil wars in the ex-Yugoslavian countries; the EU’s 
enlargement policy emerged again as a better solution (O'Brennan, 2006, Juncos, 2005). 
As another important example, Turkey’s EU membership became more important after the 
‘9/11’ terrorist attacks to prevent a clash between the West and the Islamic World 
(Arvanitopoulos, 2009).   
Secondly, another British foreign policy objective was to expand liberal market economy 
principles further (see: Gilpin, 1981, p. 138, Eliassen, 1998, Mccormick, 2012, Peterson, 
1999). Related to this objective, the EU also exports liberal market principles to other 
European countries via enlargement. Particularly, the member states formed a set of 
conditionalities at the Copenhagen European Summit in 1993 known as the Copenhagen 
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Criteria, which made the transition of applicant countries to liberal democracies and 
market economies compulsory for full membership (Barnes and Barnes, 2007, Phinnemore 
and Mcgowan, 2004, Pusca, 2004, Grabbe, 2006, Bieler, 2006). At first glance, this 
ambition might seem to be related to constructivist arguments. However, LI also argues 
that if nation states share the same/similar geopolitical ideology (e.g. liberalism), this 
decreases security risks and increases the chance of economic integration/cooperation 
among them (more economic gains) (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 27). Therefore, according to this 
perspective, nation states might have a tendency to export their geopolitical ideologies 
further.  
Thirdly, as noted in the previous section, Britain has a tendency to perceive herself as a 
global actor. And thus, as enlargement strengthens the EU’s global role (Cosgrove-Sacks, 
2006), Britain might increase her global influence within/via a globally more influential 
EU. In this regard, according to the literature, the EU was a ‘soft power’4 in international 
politics (Peterson and Sjursen, 1998, Cameron, 2007, Dannreuther, 2004, Laïdi, 2008, 
Telò, 2006, Gamble and Lane, 2009, Bindi, 2010, Moravcsik, 2010), and as a soft power, 
the EU had a potentiality to extend liberal democracy and free market economy principles 
to the rest of the world (in parallel with Britain’s above-mentioned foreign policy 
objective) (Nye, 2004, Matlary, 2004). At this point, the further enlargement of the EU 
could strengthen the EU’s soft power capacity in world politics (Nye, 2004, Gavin, 2005, 
Hill, 1998, Whitman and Wolff, 2010, Maier, 2002).  
In addition to its soft power, according to the literature, enlargement could also strengthen 
the EU’s power in the global realpolitik, which was also beneficial for Britain regarding 
her above-mentioned foreign policy objectives. The EU’s enlargement towards new 
members was one of the main dynamics behind its becoming the largest economy in the 
world, and the EU effectively used its economic power to shape global economics 
according to free market principles via bilateral and multilateral agreements (Bava, 2008, 
Heisenberg, 2006). For example, the EU became the main initiator of the Doha Round, 
which was launched in 2001 to develop a more liberal international trade regime through 
the WTO (Ahnlid, 2005, Laidi, 2008). Furthermore, having more members made the EU 
more influential within international organizations (Dedman, 2009). For instance, the EU 
                                                 
4According to Nye (2004), soft power is an ability to affect other countries’ preferences by using attractive 
mechanisms rather than coercion. 
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with its 28 members became a strong bloc in the UN and the WTO. Additionally, 
enlargement contributed new capabilities in foreign affairs to the EU (Smith, 2002). To 
illustrate, the Mediterranean enlargement (Greece, Spain, and Portugal) made the EU more 
active in the Mediterranean region (Gomez, 1998, Tanner, 2004). In the same vein, 
Marshall (2007) argued that the Swedish membership increased the EU’s global influence 
in terms of dispute settlement, environmental issues and human rights5. The Eastward 
enlargement also opened a gate for the EU to become more influential in Eurasia, which 
was historically under Russian hegemony6 (O'Brennan, 2006).   
All in all, the literature on EU enlargement has suggested that LI, with its state-centric 
assumptions, might become a more fruitful theoretical approach for the research rather 
than any EU-centric constructivist approach because, again according to the literature, 
Britain should have her own national reasons for a pro-enlargement policy as a leading 
Eurosceptic member. In this regard, the literature on EU enlargement has also showed that 
the EU’s enlargement waves might be beneficial for Britain in a foreign policy context. 
However, despite this tentative finding, there might be specific reasons behind Britain’s 
pro-enlargement policy towards every enlargement wave. Therefore, the research aimed to 
reveal these potential specific reasons (if any) behind Britain’s pro-enlargement policy by 
studying every enlargement wave in detail. At this point, LI’s methodological 
individualism would also be helpful to design the research to separately study the EU’s 
enlargement waves (see: Moravcsik, 2003, p. 162, Schieder, 2014, p. 109).  
1.3 Conclusion 
The aim of the research is to deeply understand/explain Britain’s pro-enlargement policy 
towards the EU’s enlargement waves from 1975 to 2014. Therefore, the research started 
with an in-depth literature review which searched for useful clues about the research topic. 
Firstly, the literature review showed that there is not any research directly studying this 
topic; therefore, this research has filled a significant gap in the literature. Secondly, 
according to the literature, one tentative answer to the question of why Britain has 
persistently supported the enlargement of the EU is because the successive British 
                                                 
5 For example, the EU formed a dialog based policy on Iran’s nuclear programme as an alternative to 
Israeli/American militarist doctrine.  
6 However, the literature also highlights the point that enlargement resulted in a heterogeneity regarding the 
EU’s priorities in the foreign policy, which might limit the EU members’ ability to form coherent common 
positions in the foreign policy area (e.g. the Iraq war) (Niblett, 2007). 
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governments were motivated to water down the deepening of the European integration 
process. But as noted above, there are reasons for thinking this story might be more 
complex and nuanced. For a start, there have been a number of enlargement waves over a 
period of time, during which British politics and the international environment have 
experienced significant changes. It would be surprising if British politicians supported each 
candidate accession for precisely the same reasons. Moreover, the enlargement of EU has 
actually generated pressure for the further deepening of the integration, seemingly 
undermining the rationale for the policy. Additionally, the literature on EU enlargement 
suggested that enlargement might become a tool for Britain to achieve her foreign policy 
objectives, rather than only a dilution tool to prevent the further deepening of the 
integration. As a result, the literature review showed that it was intellectually interesting to 
study the question: why did Britain as a leading Eurosceptic member continuously support 
the EU’s enlargement process from 1975 to 2014? 
Moreover, the literature review has suggested that, at this stage, a theoretical approach 
putting the nation state and its national interests at the centre of its analysis might provide a 
fruitful theoretical framework for the research because as a leading Eurosceptic member, 
Britain should have her own national reasons for a pro-enlargement policy. In this sense, 
LI with its influential intergovernmental arguments emerged as an appropriate theoretical 
approach to develop an effective theoretical framework, which would make the research 
question more knowable and workable. 
Therefore, the task of the next chapter is to develop an effective theoretical framework, in 
which firstly LI is deeply analysed as a European integration theory, secondly the critiques 
of LI by other approaches are comprehensively studied, and thirdly more specific 
theoretical assumptions derived from LI as a potential answer to the research question are 
formulated, and finally some alternative assumptions about the points where LI is limited 
are also discussed in order to strengthen the theoretical framework. Subsequently, the 
chapter focuses on the aim to develop an effective methodological strategy for the 
research. 
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2 Theory and Methodology 
2.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to develop a sufficient theoretical framework and 
methodological strategy for the research. As noted above, the literature review has 
suggested that a theory which gives analytical priority to member states within the EU 
could provide a sufficient theoretical framework, through which it would be easier to 
understand and analyse the research question: why Britain as a leading Eurosceptic 
member continuously supported the EU’s enlargement process from 1975 to 2014. In this 
regard, LI emerged as an appropriate theory within the EU studies to develop a sufficient 
theoretical framework that would make the research question more knowable and 
methodologically more workable.  
Particularly, the research used a hypothetico-deductive reasoning to answer the research 
question (see: McNeill and Chapman, 2005). Therefore, at the beginning of the research, a 
theoretical framework was developed according to LI’s assumptions and it played a key 
role in making the complexity of the case more intelligible/knowable (Hancké, 2009, 
Cresswell, 2009, Neuman, 2007, Bryman, 2008). In line with this purpose, the first section 
of the chapter focuses on the analysis of LI, in which the main arguments of LI were 
analysed, the potential limits of them were discussed, the appropriateness of LI to explain 
Britain’s pro-enlargement policy was examined, and finally a set of hypothetical 
assumptions derived from LI as potential answers to the research question were 
formulated. While doing so, the potential limitations of LI were also taken into 
consideration and some historical institutionalist explanations were used to strengthen 
them. In the second section, considering LI's methodological strengths and weaknesses, a 
methodological strategy was designed. As the research aimed to test the theoretical 
assumptions derived from LI as potential answers to the research question, the research 
needed empirical in-depth data. Therefore, the research was designed as a qualitative case 
study, which provided the necessary in-depth data, used to test the above-mentioned 
theoretical assumptions (or to deeply analyse Britain’s pro-enlargement policy on the EU’s 
enlargement waves from 1975 to 2014). Moreover, the research case was not only a social 
but also a historical phenomenon; thus, the archival research was chosen as the main data 
collection method to collect the necessary in-depth data.    
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2.2 Theoretical Framework  
2.2.1 Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) 
The European Union is not a fully-fledged system but still an ongoing integration process. 
Thus, the position/condition of the nation-state in this integration process is one of the 
main discussion points of the EU studies, and the literature on the EU studies mostly 
concentrates on the question: whether the European integration weakens, strengthens or 
transforms the nation-state (Börzel, 2002, p. 7). In this regard, Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism (LI), which is mainly formulated by Andrew Moravcsik, argues that 
the European integration is mostly shaped under the control of the member-states and it 
strengthens the nation-state in the interdependent world system (Moravcsik, 1994).  
Particularly, Stanley Hoffman’s (1966) intergovernmental approach constitutes a 
theoretical background for Moravcsik’s Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) (Kaiser, 2007, 
p. 4, George, 1996a, p. 19, Schieder, 2014, p. 115); however, Moravcsik also successfully 
embedded state-centric/intergovernmental explanations in “a liberal theory of  international  
relations and a rationalist analysis of international institutions” (Schimmelfennig and 
Rittberger, 2005, p. 79). At this point, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s (see: 1989, 1998, 
2001) Neoliberal Institutionalist ideas highly affected Moravcsik’s LI (Schimmelfennig, 
2007). For example, according to Moravcsik (2009), Keohane was highly successful in 
analysing the factors that cause changes in the behaviour of nation-states in the 
international system. In this sense, Keohane’s main arguments affecting LI could be given 
as follows:  
Keohane (1984) argued that nation-states try to maximize their interests by doing cost-benefit calculations in 
the international arena like firms in a competitive/free market and this makes them rational actors. Moreover, 
they are egoists like firms because they mainly focus on maximizing their interests (absolute gains) rather 
than considering other nation-states’ relative gains in order to cooperate with other nation-states and their 
utility based actions are independent from each other. From this micro-economics logic, although Neoliberal 
Institutionalism accepts the main realist argument that international system is anarchic, which causes 
uncertainty and disorder for nation-states (Keohane, 1983, Waltz, 1979), it refuses the relative-gains 
problem7 as a realist argument showing why cooperation among nation-states is very hard. Particularly, by 
using Prisoner’s Dilemma Game model, Keohane (1984) argued that nation-states as absolute gain oriented 
rational egoists rationally calculate that cooperation is more profitable than non-cooperation causing 
considerable costs due to the problem of transaction costs originating from nation-states’ sovereignty (e.g. 
customs duty) and the interdependent nature of the international system (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985, 
Keohane, 1983, 1984, 1988).  
                                                 
7 According to realist assumption, nation-states have a tendency to consider the relative gains of other states 
as a security problem in an international cooperation due to the anarchic nature of the international system in 
which today’s partner could be tomorrow’s enemy (Glaser, 1998, Grieco, 1988, Glaser, 2010).  
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With regard to this influence, Moravcsik (2009) mainly benefited from the concept of 
interdependence8, which was developed by Keohane and Nye (1989, 1998, and 2001), 
while formulating LI.  From an economic interdependence perspective, according to LI, 
the European integration could be seen “as a means of co-ordinating policy to manage 
flows of goods, services, factors of production and economic externalities more effectively 
than unilateral policies” (Moravcsik, 1993, pp. 484-485).  
More specifically, Moravcsik (1993) used a ‘two-level game’ model to explain the 
relationship between member states and the EU. According to this model, nation-states 
domestically determine their preferences and then bargain with other states to preserve 
these preferences at the international level (Putnam, 1988). Moreover, Moravcsik (1995, 
2005, and Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis, 1999) added one more angle to this two-level game 
model within the EU context, namely, institutional lock-in to maintain the outcomes of the 
EU level negotiations as a third level in addition to the formation of national preferences 
and the EU level negotiations. Thus, LI uses a multi-causal reasoning to explain the 
relationship between member states and the EU (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 
68).  
At the first level, the member states domestically determine their national preferences. 
Although Moravcsik (1995) put more importance on economic interests, he also benefited 
from geopolitical and ideological concerns while explaining the national preference 
formation level. For example, he argued that “national preferences are constrained by 
microeconomic interests, to be supplanted by geo-political and ideological motivations 
where economic preferences are diffused, uncertain or weak” (Moravcsik, 1995, p. 612).  
Moreover, LI puts a dynamic state-society relationship at the centre of its analysis rather 
than limited interstate relations (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 481, Moravcsik, 1999, p. 270). 
Particularly, Moravcsik (1994, p. 4) used “a principal-agent model” that categorizes 
domestic political actors as two groups, namely, executive power and societal groups. 
According to this model, societal groups put pressure on the executive in line with their 
interests, and in doing so constrain the executive’s behaviour. In turn, the executive 
                                                 
8 As Knorr (1979) argued, interdependence presents mutual dependence between nation-states on different 
things, and these things are valued by nation states; thus, they could be abstract like peace, security, power, 
and knowledge or concrete things like trade goods. On the other hand, interdependence is a dynamic process, 
and nation-states have little or no control on this process despite its being a product of them (Crawford, 
1996).  
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aggregates domestic groups’ ideas/priorities on given issues and arrives at a common 
national preference by finding an optimum point between their interests (if they are 
different) (Moravcsik, 1993, 1997).  
At this point, Moravcsik benefited from Keohane and Nye’s concept: ‘issue-specific 
interdependence’ in order to deeply explain the domestic stage of his two-level game 
approach. According to this understanding, every societal group might have different 
sensitivity or vulnerability regarding a specific issue and this sensitivity or vulnerability 
might push them to put pressure on the executive to protect their interests. In other words, 
domestic interest groups pressure governments “in response to international policy 
externalities” (Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis, 1999, p. 61), and governments “develop 
preferences based on issue-specific concerns about policy externalities […]” (ibid., p.82). 
As a result, issue-specific interdependence might create different motivations for different 
societal groups to decide to support or reject any development in the European integration 
process according to their specific interests. For example, the financial and business 
service sectors were the main supporters of the Single European Act in Britain but the 
industrial and capital-goods exporters were in Germany as a result of their issue-specific 
interests (Moravcsik, 1991).    
On the other hand, if the expected costs of any policy to interest groups are inconsiderable 
or unclear, the executive/government has more autonomy both in the national preference 
formation process and at EU level negotiations (Moravcsik, 1995, together with 
Schimmelfennig, 2009). For example, Moravcsik (1993, p. 494) argued that  
The difficulty of mobilizing interest groups under conditions of general uncertainty about specific winners 
and losers permits the positions of governments,  particularly  larger  ones,  on  questions  of  European  
institutions and common foreign policy, to reflect the ideologies and personal commitments of leading  
executive  and  parliamentary  politicians,  as  well  as  interest-based conceptions of  the  national  interest. 
Furthermore, ‘issue-specific interdependence’ has a dynamic nature, and the priority of a 
nation state might change according to the accumulation of different dynamics 
(endogenous and exogenous changes). For example, Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis (1999) 
pointed out that when the government changed from the Conservatives to the Labours, 
Britain’s position on the Social Charter changed as well in the 1990s. Additionally, 
Moravcsik (1999)  accepted that  transnational interest groups might also have an effect on 
domestic decision making process due to increasing globalization (interdependence) 
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although the EU system still keeps member states as the sole representatives in the history-
making negotiations at EU level (Moravcsik, 1994). 
At the second level, member states bargain to achieve their national preferences 
determined at the national level. According to Moravcsik (1993, p. 499), the EU level 
negotiation setting is non-coercive and information rich, and the transaction costs of the 
negotiations are low; thus, member states could carry out a deliberative negotiation 
strategy to achieve an efficient outcome according to their national preferences. Moreover, 
as noted above, Moravcsik (1993, p. 499) argued that EU level negotiations could be 
viewed as a co-operative game through which member states try to eliminate the 
alternative costs of co-operation (the negative externalities of non-cooperation). However, 
despite this benign environment, the potential outcomes of the EU level negotiations might 
pose negative policy externalities to some member states, and this might make the EU 
level negotiation process tougher. For example, Germany was more vulnerable to the 
immigration from Eastern Europe compared to Britain, who had a stronger control over her 
borders (the negative externalities of the Eastward enlargement to Germany). As a result of 
this, Germany demanded a supranational immigration policy in order to make the return of 
the immigrants to transit countries possible; however, Britain opposed this proposal 
because she had less vulnerability and it was not necessary for Britain to share her 
sovereign power on the immigration issue at the EU level (Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis, 
1999).  
In this regard, according to LI, ‘asymmetric interdependence’ between member states is 
quite influential in determining the outcomes of EU level negotiations (Moravcsik, 1995, 
Moravcsik, 1999b). Particularly, if a member state has a greater advantage over others at 
EU level negotiations, it is highly possible that its preferences would shape the outcomes 
of the negotiations. On the other hand, according to their relative powers (asymmetric 
interdependence), member states might rationally choose a unilateral position or to form a 
coalition with other members to affect the outcomes of EU level negotiations in line with 
their national interests. However, when uncertainty about the breakdown of negotiations or 
time pressure emerges within the negotiation process, “concessions tend to come 
disproportionately from governments for which the failure to reach agreement would be 
least attractive” (Moravcsik, 1993, pp. 504-505). Moreover, reciprocal concessions (as a 
linkage strategy) become more likely if member states have different interests in the 
negotiation process because it would be easier for them to make concessions on issues with 
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low costs, and where the outcome of the negotiation process is decided as a trade-off, 
which might increase the gains of all member states, consolidating a better position 
compared to unilateral and coalitional alternatives. However, according to Moravcsik 
(1993, p. 505), “[t]he major limitation on linkage strategies is domestic opposition” 
because, as noted above, if a potential concession threatens one domestic group’s issue-
specific interests, this group generates political pressure on the executive power to prevent 
it at the domestic level.   
At the third level, member states pool their sovereignty within the EU legal system in order 
to maintain the outcomes of the EU level negotiations. To elaborate, according to LI’s 
principal-agent model, the main function of the EU legal system is to implement and 
protect the outcomes of the negotiations concluded by the member states (Moravcsik, 
1995, 2008). At this point, Moravcsik (1999) distinguished treaty-amending (history-
making) decisions from daily routine decisions within the EU system, and according to 
him, the daily routines could be carried out by the EU institutions after getting 
authorization from the member states. Thus, the EU institutions only implement their daily 
routines according to the agreements between member states and their supranational power 
is limited and under the control of member states. According to Moravcsik (2008, p. 168), 
for example, qualiﬁed majority voting (QMV) mechanism was designed for daily policy 
decisions as an outcome of intergovernmental negotiations. Moreover, if future decisions 
in a field are uncertain, member states could prefer to cooperate further (further 
sovereignty pooling); otherwise, the cost of uncertainty will be higher. For example, the 
autonomy of the European Central Bank or the increasing power of the European Court of 
Justice could be seen in line with this purpose (Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis, 1999, p. 76). 
Additionally, LI accepts a limited supranational influence of the EU institutions on the 
European integration process “only where two conditions are met: national governments 
face high ex-ante transaction costs and significant informational (or ideational) 
asymmetries favour supranational entrepreneurs” (Moravcsik, 1999a, p. 173); however, the 
EU’s institutional set-up is still reversible according to member states’ interests (Paul, 
2012, p. 142).  
In conclusion, LI attaches great importance to the interdependence between member states 
while explaining the European integration process; however, according to LI, it does not 
result in unintended outcomes for member states through spill-over effects, as argued by 
neo-functionalist theories (Moravcsik, 2005). Contrary to this functionalist argument, 
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interdependence presents the purposive choices of member states within the EU structure, 
and as mentioned above, the asymmetric nature of interdependence determines who gains 
what from the outcomes of the EU level negotiations. As a result, the European integration 
process is governed by member states, and the deliberative EU level institutionalization 
even strengthens national governments’ executive power over domestic interest groups at 
the domestic level (Moravcsik, 1994, p. 47) because “where domestic interests are weak or 
divided, EC institutions have been deliberately designed to assist national governments in 
overcoming domestic opposition”. In other words, in their two-level game, national 
governments not only try to use the European integration to achieve their national interests 
but also try to benefit from it to increase their executive autonomy at domestic level where 
domestic groups’ interests are weak or divided (Cram, 2005, p. 23).     
2.2.2 The Critiques of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) 
The debate between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism about the future of the 
European integration constitutes the core of the EU level theoretical debates 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005, p. 4, Schmitter, 1996, p. 2, Schimmelfennig and 
Rittberger, 2005, p. 75). Therefore, the main critique of LI is mostly presented by the 
supranationalist approach in the EU studies literature. To elaborate, the EU studies 
literature has many studies (supranational and multi-level governance approaches) that 
give more importance to the complex nature of the European integration process in which 
member states are not in full control and the EU’s institutions have a significant  influence 
on the integration process (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1997, 1998, Stone Sweet and 
Caporaso, 1998, Sandholtz, 1998, Tallberg, 2003, Kaunert et al., 2014, Kaunert, 2011, 
Rasmussen, 2009, Stone Sweet et al., 2001, Stone Sweet and Brunell, 1998, Caporaso, 
1998, Kohler-Koch and Eising, 1999, Hooghe and Gary, 2003, Bache and Flinders, 2004, 
Marks et al., 1996, Paraskevopoulos, 2001, Jachtenfuchs, 2001, Sverdrup, 2000, Wincott, 
1995).  
Although the supranational approach accepts the initial efficiency of LI’s two-level game 
model (see: Caporaso, 1998), it argues that this model is limited in explaining the 
complexity of the European integration. Firstly, as noted above, LI focuses on domestic 
interest groups as the main influential group affecting national governments. However, the 
supranational governance approach argues that transnational interest groups have an ability 
to organize better than domestic groups; thus, they might present their interests better than 
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domestic groups to affect national governments (Cowles, 2003, p. 104). Moreover, as a 
result of the expansion of transnational exchange (e.g. trade, investment, the development 
of Euro-groups, networks, and associations), domestic groups (e.g. firms) might demand a 
decision making process at the EU level (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998, p. 2). For 
example, Sandholtz and Zysman (1989) argued that business groups bypassed national 
governments and collaborated with the Commission to achieve the Maastricht Treaty, and 
this collaboration played a role in the finalization of the treaty. Hooghe and Keating (1996) 
also argued that the Europeanization of domestic groups and regionalization might 
decrease the importance of the national level decision making (or nation-state).  
At the EU level, the supranational approach argues that LI ignores the influence of the EU 
institutions on the European integration process; thus, its belief in the full control of 
member states over the European integration process is wrong. For example, the European 
Commission has an independent agenda-setting power influencing the integration process 
(Kassim and Menon, 2003, p. 127). According to Pollack (1998, p. 221), weak or 
conﬂicting preferences among member governments, asymmetrically distributed 
information between member governments and the Commission, and a potential 
cooperation between the Commission and subnational/transnational groups on a particular 
issue might strengthen the Commission’s agenda-setting power in the EU level decision 
making. Additionally, although the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was established by 
member states with a set of expectations, it has a capacity to evolve into a more powerful 
supranational institution beyond member states’ expectations (Kassim and Menon, 2003, p. 
127). In concrete terms, the ECJ gradually set up a body of case law which “transformed 
the European legal order in a supranational direction” (Hooghe and Marks, 2001, p. 26) 9. 
The discussions between rationalism and constructivism in the IR discipline have also 
affected the EU studies (Hansen, 2002, p. 4, Checkel and Moravcsik, 2001, p. 219). In the 
IR literature, these discussions are carried out between Rational Choice Institutionalism 
(RI) versus Historical and Sociological Institutionalism (new institutionalist approaches) 
                                                 
9 In addition to the supranational approaches, Institutional Intergovernmentalism also argues that the decision 
making at the EU level is more sophisticated than LI’s formulation although it accepts the supremacy of 
nation-state in the European integration process (Kassim and Menon, 2003, p. 129, Garrett and Tsebelis, 
2001, Garrett and Tsebelis, 1996b, Tsebelis, 1994, Garrett and Tsebelis, 1996a). For example, Garrett and 
Tsebelis (1996b, p. 279) highlight the importance of the EU Commission’s agenda-setting power as an 
important variable that affects the EU level decision making system despite member states’ dominance over 
it. In other words, according to Institutional Intergovernmentalism, nation-state is not the only actor in the 
EU level decision making process unlike what LI argues (Garrett and Tsebelis, 2001, p. 386).  
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(see: Hall and Taylor, 1996, Hall, 2009). In general, Sociological Institutionalism (SI) (or 
Constructivism) poses deeper meta-theoretical and epistemological challenges to Rational 
Choice Institutionalism rather than just theoretical challenges (Aspinwall and Schneider, 
2000). Historical Institutionalism (HI) has also a different meta-theoretical reasoning 
(more constructivist) although it accepts the rational epistemological background of 
Rational Choice Institutionalism (Pollack, 2009). In this regard, Sociological 
Institutionalism and Historical Institutionalism also challenge LI as a rational choice 
institutionalist approach.  
To elaborate, the Sociological Institutionalism (SI) (or Constructivism) challenges LI as a 
rational choice oriented institutionalist approach due to its cost-benefit rationality (logic of 
micro-economics), the principal-agent model, and methodological individualism (Pollack, 
2009, 2006, 2005). Firstly, SI argues that institutions (e.g. business associations, trade 
unions, the NGOs and even nation-states) are social actors; thus, their rationality is 
constrained by the complex social structure in which they exist. Therefore, as Scharpf 
(1997) argues, the complexity of social structure (real life) affects actors’ micro-economic 
oriented cost-benefit calculations. In other words, according to this approach, rationality is 
actually socially constructed and culturally and historically contingent (Schmidt, 2010, p. 
51). Therefore, SI uses the logic of appropriateness10 as an alternative to the logic of 
micro-economics/logic of consequentialism (March and Olsen, 2008).   
From this point of view, LI’s principal agent-model (two-level game model) is limited in 
explaining the European integration process because it ignores the structures in which 
principals and agents exist. For instance, according to Moravcsik’s two level game model, 
at the domestic level, a national preference should be shaped by domestic interest groups 
and the nation-state as an agent should follow this preference at the EU-level; however, the 
nation-state is not only an agent but also a structure in which domestic interest groups exist 
and their rationality is shaped by its historical, ideological, normative institutionalization. 
In the same way, at the EU level, the EU institutions are not just agents through which 
nation-states govern the European integration process, but also a structure in which nation-
states and subnational groups are undeliberately socialized/Europeanised. In the EU studies 
literature, for example, many studies benefit from this constructivist epistemological/meta-
                                                 
10 The logic of appropriateness simply assumes that “people behave according to ‘social norms’ rather than in 
pursuit of individual utility” (Barkin, 2010, p. 55) 
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theoretical position and use ‘undeliberative Europeanization’ as a constructivist theoretical 
output of the ‘logic of appropriateness’ and challenge LI’s rational position on the 
European integration. (e.g. Börzel and Risse, 2003, Risse and Wiener, 1999, March and 
Olsen, 1998, Risse, 2000, 2005, 2009, Checkel, 2005, Christiansen et al., 2001, Wiener, 
2003, Börzel and Risse, 2010, Beyers, 1999).  
Thirdly, LI’s principal agent-model also uses methodological individualism while 
analysing the EU-member state relationship. In general, this approach puts individuals at 
the centre of its social analysis and tries to explain a social behaviour as an aggregation of 
individual choices (Pollack, 2006). In other words, LI has a tendency to understand the 
European integration and its institutions as an output of causal relations between rational 
member states. However, the Constructivist approach argues that as a result of its 
methodologically individualist approach, LI focuses only on member states’ rational 
actions to explain the whole European integration process; that however, it lacks a holistic 
perspective considering member states’ collective behaviours and ignores the EU’s 
institutional structure which also affects member states’ behaviours. As a result, the 
generalizability of its findings is limited (Risse, 2009, Risse, 2000, O'brennan, 2001).  
Historical Institutionalism accepts Moravcsik’s rationalist assumptions (Pollack, 2005, p. 
19); however, it argues that political actors are not only rational but also history dependent 
and embedded in historically evolved institutions (e.g. formal rules, policy structures, or 
social norms). Thus, rational actors form institutions but institutions also affect rational 
actors’ behaviour in a longer time (Zysman, 1992, comments at Conference of 
Europeanists, Chicago; cited in: Thelen, 1999, p. 379). From this perspective, LI’s micro-
economics oriented cost-benefit calculation is limited in a longer term; thus, the rational 
actions taken for short-term political reasons (short-term cost-benefit calculations) might 
produce long-term unanticipated institutional consequences in the European integration 
process (Pierson, 1998). In addition to this, national preferences might change in time due 
to ‘path-dependency’ in the European integration process (Pierson, 1998). According to 
this logic, after rational actors start to follow a new institutionalization as a new path (e.g. 
from the ECSC to the EC to the EU), following this institutionalization becomes less costly 
compared to other alternatives in time. Therefore, this new path is punctuated/locked by 
increasing returns, and in this way, this integration results in dependence for actors to 
follow this new path (path dependence) (Pierson, 1998, 2004, p. 22, 2001, p. 415, 2000, p. 
251, 2003, p. 195). As a result, an early level intergovernmental institutionalisation might 
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result in a ‘lock-in’ effect on the outcome of later principal–agent interactions (in a more 
supranational way) (Pollack, 1998, p. 223).  
As noted above, although “political science critiques of Moravcsik’s LI focus on its 
assumption of non-changing state preferences and its inability to explain either the 
autonomy of the EU institutions or the de facto use of power in day-to-day EU politics” 
(Warleigh-Lack, 2009, p. 216), a set of historians are also sceptical about Moravcsik’s 
historical analyses from a political science perspective. For example, Kaiser (2010, pp. 55-
56) argued that although Moravscik’s emphasis on the economic dimensions of integration 
is useful up to a point, it ignores “the role of non-state political actors at supranational and 
transnational level within the Community”. Moreover, Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht 
and Morten Rasmussen (2009, p. 8) also argued that Moravcsik’s historical evidence 
selection is theory-biased and methodologically flawed due to having a weak EU 
historiography. In other words, according to this critique, Moravcsik collected only the 
historical data which was useful in proving his theory and ignored the rest of it; thus, his 
historical findings are methodologically not reliable (see also: Kaiser, 2007, 2009, 2010, 
Lieshout et al., 2004).   
There are also neo-realist critiques arguing that LI’s issue-specific pluralist analysis is not 
enough to explain national preference formation process because the nation-state is an 
actor in the anarchic international system with the comprehensive foreign policy concerns 
(e.g. the maximization of state autonomy, security and influence) that dominate specific 
domestic sectors’ economic interests (Schimmelfennig and Rittberger, 2005, p. 80). From 
this perspective, security concerns could limit a specific domestic sector’s pressure on a 
nation-state while determining national preferences (see also: Mearsheimer, 1994, 1995, 
Grieco, 1988, Feaver et al., 2000, Gilbert, 2004). In a similar vein, Helen Wallace also 
argued that there should be more attention on geopolitical considerations in LI’s analysis 
on member states’ national preference formation strategies (Wallace et al., 1999, p. 156).  
In conclusion, the critiques of LI constellate on the point that LI leaves little room for the 
importance of “structure” in its analysis on the relationship between the nation-state and 
the EU. At domestic level, it does not devote enough attention to the nation-state as a 
structure (state ideology, geopolitics, identity etc.), and at the EU-level, it ignores the 
influence of the EU structure on the European integration process. As a response to these 
critiques, Moravcsik accepted that structure might impose limits and possibilities for state 
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action but does not determine everything (Sánchez, 2009). For example, Moravcsik 
reiterated that “supranational influence is possible only where two conditions are met: 
national governments face high ex-ante transaction costs and significant informational (or 
ideational) asymmetries favour supranational entrepreneurs” (Wallace et al., 1999, p. 173). 
Moreover, Moravcsik accepted that “[g]eopolitical ideology is more important where 
issue-specific consequences are essentially incalculable … or where core national 
economic interests are already satisfied” (ibid., pp. 173-174). He also accepted that 
economic concerns might be less important in non-economic issues (e.g. foreign policy) 
and “economic interests do not tell the whole story” because geopolitics (security) and 
ideology might have an impact on the European integration process (Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 70). For example, in his magnum opus: “the Choice for Europe: 
Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht”, by analysing fifteen 
different cases in Germany, France and Britain, he argued that “geopolitical ideology” 
might have played a secondary or parallel role to economic concerns in eight of the fifteen 
cases (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 474). In one of his recent studies, Moravcsik (2013, p. 776) also 
argued that “geopolitical and related ideological factors” have an important impact on 
member states’ national preference formation processes.  
In terms of the constructivist critiques, Moravcsik partly accepted the influence of 
‘collective ideas’ on the national preference formation process; however, he defined them 
as “causally epiphenomenal” and “transmission belts for interests” (Moravcsik, 1999b, p. 
675). In concrete terms, LI accepts the essential role of collective ideas in social life. For 
example, Moravcsik argued that “we observe individuals and governments sincerely 
espousing ideas consistent with their rational interest and strategies” (Checkel and 
Moravcsik, 2001, p. 229). Therefore, according to him, “both rationalist (LI) and 
constructivist theories predict a correlation between ideas and policy outcomes” (ibid., p. 
230). However, he argued that collective ideas are endogenous to fundamental underlying 
factors shaping state behaviour, and they cannot be an exogenous variable directly 
affecting state behaviour (Checkel and Moravcsik, 2001, p. 229). As a result, “in the LI 
account of integration, ideas are present but not causally central” (ibid.). From this point of 
view, Moravcsik also claimed that collective ideas are ubiquitous and they cannot be tested 
through empirical scientific methods. Therefore, the constructivist studies putting 
collective ideas at the centre of their analyses are actually ‘meta-theoretical’ and their 
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capacity to empirically challenge LI’s findings is limited (Checkel and Moravcsik, 2001, 
Moravcsik, 2001).   
Additionally, LI’s rational understanding accepts a deliberative learning process. 
Particularly, as noted above, LI benefits from Rational Choice Theory to explain how 
cooperation is possible among rational actors in uncertainty. This approach mainly uses the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and argues that rational actors consciously learn from their 
previous iterated actions to decide how to behave in uncertainty (see also: Axelrod, 1984, 
1997, Axelrod and Keohane, 1985, Oye, 1986, Tsebelis, 1990). In other words, according 
to this understanding, rational actors might deliberately benefit from their previous 
experiences especially when there is uncertainty to make a cost-benefit calculation 
according to the logic of micro-economics (Farkas, 1998, p. 23).  
Last but not least, most of LI’s assumptions were formulated by Moravcsik in the 1990s; 
thus, they might be considered as outdated to explain the current developments within the 
EU. However, the developments in the 2000s (e.g., the crisis of the Constitutional Treaty, 
the Eurozone crisis, increasing Euroscepticism) has showed that LI’s main assumptions 
putting the nation-state at the centre are still valid in explaining the European integration 
process. For example, the number of studies focusing on Europeanization was in decline 
especially after the Eurozone crisis (Blavoukos and Oikonomou, 2012). Coman and Crespy 
(2014) also argued that the studies in the 2000s exaggerated the effect of Europeanization 
on the member states’ national structures11. In addition, Puetter (2012, pp. 58-59) argued 
that “[s]upranational institutions largely fail to benefit from the current expansion of joint 
EU decision making and activity”; thus, intergovernmental activity within the EU 
governance increased.    
2.2.3 Enlargement: LI’s Assumptions and Limitations 
As noted in chapter 1, LI emerged as a more appropriate theory than 
supranational/constructivist approaches for this research mainly for two reasons. Firstly, 
the literature review found that Britain was a Eurosceptic country refusing an upper 
European identity and any increase in the EU’s supranational competence. Therefore, any 
                                                 
11 Even in 2003 when supranational approach was relatively more popular in the EU studies, Featherstone 
(2003, p. 5) acknowledged that “[Europeanization’s] structural effects are not necessarily permanent or 
irreversible”.  
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theoretical approach, putting a common European identity at the centre of its analysis, 
cannot sufficiently explain Britain’s pro-enlargement policy. Moreover, it could be 
expected that Britain should have its own national reasons to support the EU’s enlargement 
waves as a leading Eurosceptic member. Thus, LI emerged as a more appropriate theory 
for this research as it puts member states’ national interests at the centre of its analysis 
while analysing the European integration process. In concrete terms, this research aimed to 
understand the behaviour/attitudes of policy makers and other societal groups’ in a 
particular member state (Britain) towards an issue of the EU (enlargement), and this aim is 
in compliance with the analytical focus adopted by LI.  
Secondly, this research aimed to separately and deeply analyse the reasons behind Britain’s 
pro-enlargement policy towards the EU’s enlargement waves (the Mediterranean 
enlargement, the EFTA enlargement, the Eastward enlargement, and the ongoing further 
enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey). In conjuncture with this, LI’s 
methodological individualist approach (Moravcsik, 2003, p. 162, Schieder, 2014, p. 109) 
provided an efficient theoretical framework to separately study Britain’s pro-enlargement 
position on every single enlargement wave. For example, Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 
(2009, p. 80) argued that “LI predicts that members will calculate the advantages of 
enlargement in terms of the costs and benefits of socioeconomic interdependence of 
various types”. Moravcsik (1998, p. 23) also argued that 
State preferences need not necessarily be uniform across issues, countries, or long periods of time. They vary 
in response to exogenous changes in the economic, ideological, and geopolitical environment within which 
European integration takes place… 
From this point of view, Britain’s pro-enlargement policy might have emerged as an 
output of a national decision making process (a specific cost-benefit calculation) for every 
enlargement wave, and it might have become the best choice for Britain (regarding her 
national interests) in accordance with the situational conditions of the enlargement waves 
(e.g. different economic, ideological, and geopolitical environments within which the 
enlargement waves took place). Therefore, the reasons for a pro-enlargement policy might 
have changed from one enlargement wave to another when their situational conditions 
changed. To illustrate, as noted above, at the beginning of the 1980s, a pro-enlargement 
policy towards the Mediterranean applicants might have become the best choice for Britain 
according to the early 1980s’ international conditions (e.g. the Cold War). A pro-
enlargement policy towards the EFTA countries and the CEECs might have been shaped 
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according to the post-Cold War conditions (e.g. the post-Cold War security problem in 
Europe, the rise of neoliberal ideas and globalization etc.). As another example, a pro-
enlargement policy towards Turkey might have become more important after the ‘9/11’ 
terrorist attacks.  
Moreover, from LI’s micro-economics oriented logic (see: section 2.2.1), it could be 
expected that the outputs of economic cost-benefit calculations might have become the 
main incentive for Britain to support the EU’s enlargement waves, and according to LI’s 
pluralistic decision making understanding, British interest groups might have also played 
an active role in the national preference formation process (for a pro-enlargement policy) 
in addition to the successive British governments.  
However, Moravcsik (together with Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 80) acknowledged that 
enlargement is a hard case for LI; thus its above-mentioned assumptions might fail to 
sufficiently explain Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the EU’s enlargement waves. 
Firstly, in the light of Moravcsik’s (1993, 1995, together with Schimmelfennig, 2009) 
arguments, the complexity of enlargement might have limited LI’s pluralistic decision 
making assumption because it would be harder for societal groups to make calculations on 
complex issues compared to governments, especially if those issues are not directly related 
to their issue specific interests; thus, the successive British governments might have 
become the dominant actor in the national decision making process. More interestingly, the 
complexity of enlargement (uncertain outcomes and externalities of it) might limit LI’s 
economic interest centred rational choice assumption. In other words, British actors might 
not have made precise cost-benefit calculations on EU enlargement due to its complex 
nature. In this regard, to compensate for this potential limitation, LI formulates a multi-
causal reasoning to explain how actors may behave in uncertainty12 (in a complex case like 
enlargement). More specifically, according to Moravscik (1995, p. 612, 1998, p. 7, 
together with Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 76), if economic interests are weak, diffused or 
indeterminate, geopolitical concerns and ideological motivations might become equally or 
more dominantly influential in member states’ national decision making mechanisms. 
Moreover, LI also accepts that economic concerns might be less important in non-
economic areas (e.g. foreign policy) (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 70). 
Despite this acknowledgment, LI strongly argues that governments cannot follow a 
                                                 
12 Uncertainty refers to any situation in which actors cannot make clear cost-benefit calculations. 
35 
 
geopolitical or/and ideological ambition at the expense of significant economic interests 
(Moravcsik, 1998, p. 317).  
According to LI, ideological motivations might also affect actors’ geopolitical and/or 
economic calculations in case of any uncertainty. In other words, as noted in the previous 
section, according to LI, ideological motivations might become “transmission belts for 
interests” (Moravcsik, 1999b, p. 675). For example, according to Moravcsik (1998, p. 27), 
“[e]conomic integration is not an end in itself but a means to manipulate ‘high politics’”; 
therefore, if nation-states share a common geopolitical ideology, they also have a tendency 
to develop economic cooperation with each other. From this point of view, the motivation 
to expand liberal ideals (e.g. market economy) might have also affected British actors’ 
economic and geopolitcal calculations about the EU’s enlargement waves. In other words, 
as noted in the literature review, the successive British governments might have aimed to 
expand liberal norms/ideals to new members; through which, they might have expected to 
have more allies regarding security and more economic partners. However, LI strongly 
argues that governments cannot follow an ideological ambition at the expense of economic 
interests (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 317). More specifically, Moravcsik and Vachudova (2005, 
p. 205) argued that ideological motivations (e.g. liberal ideals) can be influential in 
member states’ support for enlargement “when  measurable  economic  and  geopolitical  
benefits  push  policy  in  a  similar direction” and/or “when the economic costs are 
marginal, or have already been paid.” As a result, from LI’s perspective, it is highly 
possible that the successive British governments were not willing to sacrifice Britain’s 
major/significant economic interests even if the enlargement waves became geopolitically 
and/or ideologically desirable. 
At this point, LI’s rational perception of ideology/liberal ideals should not be confused 
with the constructivist understanding. As noted above, shared common liberal norms/ideals 
among member states are used by the constructivist arguments as a proof of a post-national 
European identity. However, as the literature review clearly showed, they were actually 
Euro-Atlantic ideals, significantly embedded by Britain as a part of British identity and 
foreign policy principle, and Britain’s ambition to extend liberal norms/ideals further via 
enlargement cannot be a proof showing that a common EU identity has an influence in 
Britain’s pro-enlargement policy.  
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The research also considered the potential limitations of LI in its theoretical 
assumptions/explanations on Britain’s support for the EU’s enlargement waves. 
Particularly, although LI acknowledges the limitation of its economic oriented 
explanations in the case of enlargement and gives more attention to geopolitics and 
ideology (a multi-causal reasoning), it still has a difficulty in explaining how geopolitics 
and ideology affects member states’ behaviour in uncertainty (e.g. the enlargement case). 
To deal with this limitation, the research considered both the findings of the literature 
review and the theoretical critiques of LI. As noted in the previous section, the main 
theoretical critiques of LI focus on the point that LI’s explanations ignore the influence of 
‘structure’ over actors’ behaviour; thus, the research benefited from this critique in order to 
overcome LI’s above-mentioned limitation. In addition to this, the literature review also 
suggested that Britain’s foreign policy principles (as a structure) might have constituted a 
rationale for the successive British governments to formulate a pro-enlargement policy. In 
other words, the British foreign policy principles, covering intertwined geopolitical, 
economic and ideological priorities/expectations, might encourage British actors to 
support the EU’s enlargement waves when they could not make precise cost-benefit 
calculations on the enlargement waves.  
To make this point clearer, by considering the theoretical discussions in the previous 
section, it could be argued that Paul Pierson’s historical institutionalist arguments might 
contribute a deeper explanation about how British foreign policy, as a structure, might 
have provided a rationale for Britain’s pro-enlargement policy (see: Pierson, 1998, 2000, 
2001, 2003, 2004). First of all, Paul Pierson’s arguments might complete the above-
mentioned limitation in a theoretical consistency with LI because Pierson’s HI 
understanding accepts the initial rational premises of LI. For example, Pierson (2004, p. 9) 
argued that rational choice theory should not be rejected, “but that its scope should be 
placed in proper perspective”. More specifically, according to Pierson, decisions are made 
by rational actors in a structure; thus, a potential effect of this structure on these rational 
actors could be expected. In other words, common norms/ideals/collective experiences 
might influence national actors’ choices. To put in another way, according to this 
assumption, actors learn from their historical experiences, and they benefit from these 
collective experiences while deciding on a complex issue, especially if they cannot make 
precise cost-benefit calculations on it (see: Pierson, 2004, p. 126). In this regard, as noted 
in the previous section, LI’s rational choice assumption also accepts that “rational actors 
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consciously learn from their previous iterated actions to decide how to behave in 
uncertainty” (see: section 2.2.2). Therefore, as a response to LI’s above-mentioned 
limitation, it could be argued that ideological motivations (e.g. liberal ideals) might 
penetrate in decision making process and affect economic and geopolitical concerns via a 
deliberative learning process. In a concrete manner, British actors might deliberately have 
learnt that the expansion of democracy and open market economy supported Britain’s 
geopolitical and economic interests. From this perspective, it could be expected that the 
historically institutionalized British foreign policy principles (liberal ideals) might have 
supported British actors’ economic and geopolitical benefit expectations about the EU’s 
enlargement waves as they could not make clear cost-benefit calculations on the 
enlargement waves, and in this way, a pro-enlargement policy might have emerged as an 
output of a multi-causal reasoning. In uncertainty, according to this approach, British 
actors’ experiences from a former enlargement wave (e.g. the Mediterranean enlargement) 
might have also affected their attitudes towards a later one (e.g. the Eastward enlargement).     
Despite Paul Pierson’s (potential) historical institutionalist contributions to deal with the 
LI’s above-mentioned limitation, this research will utilise the LI theoretical approach 
mainly for two reasons. Firstly, as noted in the previous section, HI gives more importance 
to the EU structure rather than member states while explaining the European integration 
process. But, this research dominantly aimed to understand Britain’s pro-enlargement 
policy on the EU’s enlargement waves. As a result, this case study needed a theoretical 
approach that downplays institutions and emphasises actors (member states). Secondly, by 
considering HI’s potential contributions, the researcher also tried to synthesize LI with HI 
to develop a theoretical framework at the initial stage of the PhD project. However, this 
attempt resulted in significant theoretical and methodological inconsistency, and if the PhD 
project had devoted to solving this inconsistency, there would not have been enough time 
and space to answer the research question. For example, the research would have needed to 
propose a good solution to agency-structure debate/problem; however, it would have been 
far beyond the scope of this problem-based PhD project because even there is not a single 
answer to this debate in the literature (e.g. rational choice institutionalism versus historical 
and sociological institutionalism) (see: Hall and Taylor, 1996, Pollack, 2009, Peters, 2011). 
As a result, the research mainly benefited from LI to develop a consistent theoretical 
framework to make the research case more knowable. However, in the light of the findings 
from the following case studies, the conclusion chapter also discusses again to what extent 
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Paul Pierson’s historical institutionalist arguments can be explanatory as a complementary 
approach, providing further explanations about the points where LI is limited.    
In conclusion, LI emerged as an appropriate theoretical approach to make Britain’s pro-
enlargement policy more knowable. In this sense, the research also acknowledged that LI 
has some potential limitations in explaining this case; however, it is clear that there is not 
any European integration theory as a panacea for a perfect theoretical explanation of the 
European integration process and member states’ behaviour in it. Moreover, as 
enlargement is a hard case for LI, it would be interesting to see to what extent LI’s 
theoretical assumptions are explanatory in a hard case. Additionally, the research also 
synthesised an original methodological strategy by benefiting from LI’s methodological 
strengths and by trying to strengthen LI’s methodological weaknesses and the next section 
focuses on this original methodological strategy.   
2.3 Methodology 
This research was designed as a qualitative case study. This means that it put words at the 
centre of its analysis rather than statistical numbers because the research case was 
intentionally chosen and it could not be sufficiently explained by using enumerated 
frequencies originating from surveys derived from random samples (Bryman, 2008). 
Furthermore, this method was an effective methodological strategy for this research for 
several reasons. Firstly, as Hancke (2009) and Stark and Torrance (2005) argued, the case 
study method selects an example of an action/issue/fact and collects extensive data from 
several sources in order to deeply explain it, thus putting it forward as a robust 
methodological approach. In a similar vein, Berg (2007, p. 283) argued that the qualitative 
case study method involves “[...] systematically gathering enough information about a 
particular person, social setting, event, or group to permit the researcher to effectively 
understand how the subject operates or functions”. In this regard, the research case 
(Britain’s pro-enlargement policy on the EU’s enlargement waves) was not randomly 
chosen, and the case study method provided a systematically gathered, extensive data 
about the research case, through which the effects of several independent variables (e.g. 
economic, geopolitical and ideological concerns, the position of domestic groups, the 
outputs of EU level negotiations, international developments) on the dependent 
variable/investigated phenomenon (Britain’s pro-enlargement policy) was deeply analysed.   
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Secondly, as Eckstein (2000) argued, the case study method can be effectively used in 
theory testing because it provides a framework through which in-depth data can be 
collected to test a theoretical assumption in a real-life context. Thanks to its capacity to 
collect in-depth empirical data form real-life, a case study might also compel 
political/social theoreticians to revise their theoretical hypotheses and help to falsify 
theoretical assumptions in social science (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 235). In this sense, 
Moravcsik (2013, p. 790), the main theoretician of LI, also accepted that “qualitative 
studies offer great potential to revise our conventional understandings of world politics”.  
Thirdly, the case study method was also in conformity with the theoretical framework of 
the research. Particularly, in his monumental research (The Choice for Europe), Moravcsik 
(1998) also used the case study method and analysed five historical cases (the negotiations 
on the Rome Treaty, the Common Market, the EMS, the SEA, and the Maastricht Treaty) 
which played a crucial role in his formulation of LI. In a similar way, this research focused 
on EU’s four enlargement waves/cases (the Mediterranean enlargement, the EFTA 
enlargement, the Eastward enlargement, and the ongoing further enlargement process 
towards the Western Balkans and Turkey) to deeply analyse/understand Britain’s pro-
enlargement policy. As a result, the case study method enabled this research to test the 
above-mentioned assumptions derived from LI and to contribute new empirical findings to 
the EU studies literature, which could be used for further theoretical discussions on the 
European integration process.  
However, the literature also carries a common critique of the case study method arguing 
that the findings of a case study cannot be generalized (lack of generalizability) (Herriott 
and Firestone, 1983, Stake, 2005, Flyvbjerg, 2006, Yin, 2003). In this regard, it could be 
argued that this limitation did not pose a significant challenge to this research. Firstly, the 
aim of the research is to understand/explain Britain’s pro-enlargement policy from 1975 to 
2014 but not to explain all member states’ positions towards the EU’s enlargement waves. 
Moreover, this research aims to test a set of theoretical assumptions derived from LI in 
order to answer the research question; thus, it is a question-based study rather than theory-
based. In line with this understanding, this research does not aim to generalize its findings 
and develop a new theory. Secondly, as Maxwell (2012, p. 137) argued, generalizability as 
a scientific criterion could be categorized as external and internal generalizability. 
Although external generalizability needs generalizability beyond a case study, “internal 
generalizability refers to the generalizability of a conclusion within the case”; thus, the 
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validity of a case study depends on its internal generalizability. Therein, the research tried 
to achieve the internal generalizability of the findings. Additionally, replication is a more 
important scientific criterion than generalizability for a case study (Dul and Hak, 2008, p. 
9); thus, this case study aims to achieve the replication of the findings to minimize the 
limitations in the external generalizability of them. In line with this methodological 
strategy, this research deliberately designed an empirical data collection method to 
strengthen the replication and internal generalizability of the findings as much as possible.     
2.3.1 Data Collection 
There is no doubt that data collection is one of the most important steps of a scientific 
research. If a research does not design its data collection method in an efficient way, 
although it may have a strong research question or theoretical framework, it cannot 
maintain validity, reliability and replication of its findings. Therefore, this research tried to 
collect various and in-depth data from multiple sources by using an effective data 
collection method to make the findings more compelling and accurate (see also: Yin, 
2003).  
To this end, the  theoretical  framework  of  the  research also  helped  to  determine  an  
effective data collection method. Firstly, as noted above, LI assumes that if member 
governments need to decide on a complex issue, they might become more dominant in 
their national preference formation processes at the expense of other domestic societal 
groups13 (see: Moravcsik, 1993, 1995, Moravcsik  and Schimmelfennig, 2009). Related to 
this assumption, as enlargement is a complex issue, the research focused on the successive 
British governments as the main actors shaping Britain’s pro-enlargement policy. The main 
political parties in opposition were also considered as other important political actors 
affecting Britain’s enlargement policy. In addition to them, in line with LI’s pluralistic 
decision making understanding, the research also considered British societal groups as 
other actors affecting Britain’s pro-enlargement policy. However, it was impossible to 
analyse all of the British societal groups’ attitudes towards the EU’s enlargement waves. In 
this regard, the research benefited from further assumptions of LI. In particular, as LI 
suggests (see: Moravcsik, 1993, 1997), the research assumed that if any British societal 
group was sensitive to any enlargement wave, it should try to access the national decision 
                                                 
13 As noted in section 2.2.1, it would be hard for societal groups to make calculations on complex issues, 
especially if those issues are not directly related to their issue specific interests.  
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making process via the House of Commons or other governmental bodies (or at least they 
should express their ideas when the House of Commons or other governmental bodies 
asked). Therefore, as noted below, the research mainly benefited from the official 
documents published by the House of Commons and other governmental bodies in order to 
detect which interest groups were sensitive to the EU’s enlargement waves. To 
demonstrate, thanks to one of the House of Commons’ Business and Enterprise 
Committee’s reports (HC 367-i, 2008), the researcher accessed the information that more 
than ten different interest groups submitted their evidence to the committee in 2008, 
explaining their position on Turkey’s EU membership. The research also accessed the 
official documents released by other governmental bodies (e.g. the FCO) to access more 
data on British societal/interest groups’ attitudes towards the EU’s enlargement waves. For 
example, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2013) asked more than sixty 
different interest groups about their position on the EU’s further enlargement (as a Call for 
Evidence question), and then, the concerned interest groups submitted their evidence on 
the issue. Therefore, this document became an important data source to access the sensitive 
British societal groups’ attitudes towards the EU’s further enlargement.  
In addition to this strategy to access the British societal groups, who were sensitive to the 
EU’s enlargement waves, the research also devoted special attention to the attitudes of the 
Confederation of British Industry (the CBI) and the Trades Union Congress (TUC) towards 
the EU’s enlargement waves as they are two peak/umbrella organizations representing 
numerous interest groups in Britain. Firstly, when the Mediterranean enlargement process 
started in the second half of the 1970s, they were particularly influential in the national 
decision making process (Cortell, 2006, p. 118, Grant, 2003, p. 365). Secondly, despite 
their declining influence over the national decision making process in time, the literature 
still recognizes them as two large influential interest groups, which are interested in all the 
policy areas affecting the British economy (including enlargement) (Williams, 1998, 
Garnett and Lynch, 2009, Watts, 2007, Baggott, 1995, Coxall, 2001, Grant, 2000). In 
addition to them, the research also took other influential interest groups into consideration 
like the National Farmers' Union (NFU), the Institute of Directors (IoD), and the British 
Chambers of Commerce (the BCC).  
After determining the main British actors shaping Britain’s pro-enlargement policy, LI was 
still helpful in determining variables affecting those actors’ attitudes towards the EU’s 
enlargement waves. In this sense, as LI proposes, economic, geopolitical, and ideological 
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concerns were considered as the main variables that might have affected the attitudes of the 
aforementioned British actors towards the EU’s enlargement waves (see: section 2.2.3). 
Additionally, while determining an effective data collection method, the research also 
considered the fact that the EU witnessed different enlargement waves in the period from 
1975 to 2014, namely, the Mediterranean enlargement, the EFTA enlargement, the 
Eastward enlargement14, and the ongoing further enlargement towards the Western 
Balkans and Turkey. Therefore, it was clear that the EU’s enlargement waves were not 
only social but also historical phenomena, and as LI accepts, every enlargement wave 
needs to be analysed in its own historical context. As a result, this research benefited from 
an archival research data collection method to collect empirical data to test the above-
mentioned theoretical assumptions derived from LI.   
2.3.1.1 The Archival Data Collection  
As noted above, LI also affected the research’s methodological strategy. Particularly, the 
archival research was chosen as the main data collection method for this research because, 
as Goodwin (2009, p. 388) argued, the archival data collection method provided sufficient 
empirical in-depth data to test the aforementioned theoretical assumptions derived from LI. 
As Moravcsik (1998) did, the research collected the archival data to empirically understand 
how a pro-enlargement policy emerged as an output of national preference formation 
process for every enlargement case and how the successive British governments defended 
Britain’s enlargement-related national preferences at EU level negotiations. To this end, 
the research mainly used six digitalised online archive datasets/resources: ProQuest’s 
House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (http://parlipapers.chadwyck.co.uk), LexisNexis 
(http://www.lexisnexis.com), Hansard (http://hansard.millbanksystems.com), the National 
Archives (www.nationalarchives.gov.uk), the House of Commons’ official webpage 
(www.parliament.uk), and the Archive of European Integration (http://aei.pitt.edu/)15, as 
well as two archive centres: The Modern Records Centre (The University of Warwick) and 
the Trades Union Congress Library Collections (London Metropolitan University). 
To analyse Britain’s national preference formation process for every enlargement case, the 
research mainly focused on the publications of the House of Commons as it is the hub of 
                                                 
14 This term has been used interchangeably with the big-bang enlargement in the following chapters.    
15 The European Council’s official webpage (http://www.consilium.europa.eu) was also used to access the 
presidency conclusions of the EU summits, published after 2006. 
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the British policy making system, in which societal groups (e.g. the CBI, the TUC and the 
NFU) also try to present their specific interests in addition to the British political parties. 
To this extent, ProQuest’s digital archive dataset: House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers was a great data source to access important official documents published by the 
House of Commons. Particularly, those documents included the House of Commons select 
committees’ reports, the successive British governments’ official position on the EU’s 
enlargement waves, and several memoranda and evidence given by British societal groups 
(e.g. the CBI, TUC and NFU) and professionals on the EU’s enlargement waves from 1975 
to 2014. Therefore, this dataset provided the main data through which Britain’s national 
preference formation for every enlargement case was analysed. Throughout the thesis, an 
extensive reference to those publications was given with the abbreviations: HC, CM, and 
Cmnd (as in-text citations). The documents starting with the abbreviation ‘HC’ presented 
the publications of the House of Commons’ select committees, and they were arguably the 
most reliable documents to access the successive British governments’ and other societal 
groups’ positions towards the EU’s enlargement waves in this research. In addition to 
them, the documents, starting with the abbreviation ‘CM’ (it was ‘Cmnd’ before 1986), 
represented the Command Papers16, which were produced outside the parliament (mostly 
by other governmental bodies) but were brought before it. In this thesis, most of the 
documents starting with the abbreviation ‘CM’ were produced by the Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs17, and they provided further data on the official 
positions/strategies of the successive British governments towards the EU’s enlargement 
waves.    
The House of Commons’ official website also provided similar data about current 
developments (mostly after 2008). Moreover, Hansard, the official transcripts of 
parliamentary debates, provided detailed parliamentary discussions about the EU’s 
enlargement waves from 1975 to 2014; thus, the research collected further data from 
Hansard about the British political parties’ attitudes towards the EU’s enlargement waves. 
The National Archives also provided governmental documents related to the 
Mediterranean enlargement (related to the late 1970s). In addition, LexisNexis is a great 
digital print media dataset covering many newspapers, journals and news agencies; 
                                                 
16 “Command Papers include major government reports, reports of Royal Commissions, statements of 
government policy ('White papers'), the U.K. Treaty Series and reports of tribunals of enquiry” 
(http://libwww.essex.ac.uk/Information_Skills/parlpapers.htm, accessed on 23.08.2015. 
17 In the reference list, the producers of these documents could easily be found. 
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therefore, it provided extensive day-to-day factual news reports on the national preference 
formation processes for the enlargement waves, domestic groups’ (e.g. the CBI, NFU) 
positions towards the enlargement waves in general and their reactions against the 
outcomes of the EU level negotiations in particular. In addition to the digital archives, the 
researcher also visited the Modern Records Centre (The University of Warwick) to access 
further data on the CBI’s and TUC’s positions towards the EU’s enlargement waves, and 
the Trades Union Congress Library Collections (London Metropolitan University) to 
access further data about TUC’s position on the EU’s enlargement waves18.  
In terms of the EU level intergovernmental bargains, as noted in the theory section, 
Moravcsik is mainly criticized for using theory biased historical data to prove his 
theoretical arguments (see: Kaiser, 2007, 2009, 2010, Lieshout et al., 2004, Kaiser et al., 
2009, Wincott, 1995). To deal with this criticism, the research aimed to screen all of the 
EU level negotiations related to the EU’s enlargement waves as much as possible. In this 
regard, the print media emerged as an important data source because it covers factual daily 
news reports, which was used to access detailed evidence regarding EU level negotiations. 
In particular, the research focused on the EU summits, where enlargement-related 
negotiations were carried out. However, many informal meetings were also organized at 
the EU level to achieve rapprochement between member states prior to the summits; thus, 
the research also tried to access data about those informal meetings. At this point, daily 
factual news reports provided data not only about the EU summits but also about those 
specific informal meetings, and helped the researcher to screen any enlargement-related 
EU level negotiation in its historical context.  
On the other hand, the research also considered the potential limitations of this data 
collection method. In this regard, the potential subjectivity of the print media emerged as 
the main bottleneck (Franzosi, 1987), and some measures were taken to strengthen the 
objectivity of the data extracted from news reports. Firstly, thanks to LexisNexis, the 
research had a chance to access almost all of the news (published in English) on 
enlargement published from 1970s to 2014. As a result of this rich data source, the 
research mainly used factual news reports but not columns. Secondly, the research only 
used the news reports confirmed by different sources; thus, if a news report was only 
                                                 
18 The research also benefited from their official websites to access further data on their positions towards the 
EU’s enlargement waves.  
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published by a single newspaper (e.g. the Daily Mail), the research did not use that news 
report as a data source. The research also tried to check the news reports released by the 
national newspapers (e.g. the Times, the Guardian, or the Independent) with foreign media 
sources (e.g. Agence France Presse, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, and Xinhua News Agency). 
By doing so, the research aimed to increase the internal consistency/reliability of the data 
extracted from news reports (Woolley, 2000). Thirdly, the research accessed almost all of 
the presidency conclusions of the relevant EU summits via the Archive of European 
Integration (http://aei.pitt.edu/) and via the European Council’s official webpage 
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu), which were the official documents used to check the 
validity of the data on the EU summits, collected from the print media19. The FCO’s 
special reports on the developments in the EU were also useful in screening the outcomes 
of the EU summits.  
In the literature on social/political science methodology, the print media/newspapers is also 
recognized as a data source (Monroe, 2000, Bucy and Holbert, 2011, Statham and Trenz, 
2013, Powner, 2014, Klotz and Prakash, 2008). Especially, newspapers might emerge as an 
alternative data collection method if researchers cannot access political elites, because 
newspapers have relatively more power than individual researchers to access elites (Gibson 
and Brown, 2009, p. 75). At this point, the target group of this research was the British 
elite (politicians, civil servants, businessmen, officials from different societal groups); thus, 
it was really hard to access them. For example, as noted below, the research tried to carry 
out interviews, but failed to access most of the potential interviewees. Therefore, the 
newspapers emerged as a tool to compensate for this limitation. For example, The Times 
published an article by Robin Cook, in which he as Shadow Foreign Secretary expressed 
his position on the Eastward enlargement in 1995 (Cook, 1995). In addition to this, as 
noted above, the research topic was a historical phenomenon (particularly the 
Mediterranean and EFTA enlargement cases) and several actors who played a role in the 
decision making process for a pro-enlargement policy were not alive; thus, newspapers 
provided archival data about those actors’ attitude towards the EU’s enlargement waves. 
To demonstrate, The Times published a letter by the Labour Prime Minister James 
Callaghan (1977), through which the research accessed his attitude towards the 
Mediterranean enlargement. Last but not least, LexisNexis is used as a dataset in political 
                                                 
19 The in-text citations starting with ‘The European Council’ cites these documents.  
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science in order to analyse political processes (see: Pennings et al., 2006, Green and 
Ernest, 2005), and this research also used it for a similar purpose (to analyse the 
enlargement-related EU level negotiation processes, containing several summits/meetings).  
As Moravcsik (1998) did, the research also tried to conduct interviews and access the main 
political actors’ bibliographies, autobiographies and memoirs; however, the data collected 
via those methods was limited and became supplementary to the data collected through the 
archival research. Firstly, the researcher tried to access around 35 potential interviewees 
from British politicians, civil servants, and officials from British societal groups (e.g. the 
CBI, the TUC and the NFU). However, they were inaccessible for the large part, and the 
researcher managed to conduct telephone interviews with just two of them, namely, with 
Malcolm Rifkind, who was the Minister of State for Europe from 1983 to 1986, and 
Charles Garret, who was the Head of EU Enlargement Team in the FCO from 2001 to 
2005. On the other hand, interviews as a data collection method were not an effective 
strategy to collect in-depth data. For example, one of the members of the Select Committee 
on European legislation in the 1990s acknowledged that he could not give detailed 
information about the discussions in the Committee about the EU’s enlargement towards 
the EFTA. As another example, a civil-servant from the FCO gave a very short written 
answer to the interview question: ‘what is the Coalition government’s position on Turkey’s 
bid for full EU membership’.  
Additionally, the research tried to benefit from the bibliographies, autobiographies and 
memoirs published by the British political actors; namely, James Callaghan (Callaghan, 
2006, Morgan, 1997), Anthony Crosland (Crosland, 1982), Geoffrey Howe (Howe, 1994), 
Francis Pym (Pym, 1984), Douglas Hurd (Hurd, 2003), John Major (Anderson, 1991, 
Seldon, 1997, Major, 1999), Margaret Thatcher (Young, 1989, Campbell, 2003, Thatcher, 
1995, Thatcher, 1993), Jack Straw (Straw, 2012), Gordon Brown (Seldon, 2011, Peston, 
2005, Lee, 2007), Robin Cook (Cook, 2004), Derek Scott (Scott, 2004), Tony Blair’s 
adviser, Tony Blair (Stephens, 2004, Seldon, 2004, Richards, 2004, Blair, 2011, Rentoul, 
2013, Seldon, 2007), Percy Cradock (Cradock, 1997), the Prime Minister’s foreign policy 
adviser from 1984 to 1992, and David Hannay (Hannay, 2013), the Ambassador to the 
European Communities from 1985 to 1990. However, the research found that those actors 
rarely mentioned the enlargement or enlargement-related developments; thus, the data 
derived from bibliographies, autobiographies and memoirs was also limited and 
supplementary.  
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2.3.1.2 The Data Analysis  
As most of the archives were online, the study accessed a considerable volume of 
documents from 1975 to 2014 through investigating online datasets by using the concepts 
related to the EU’s enlargement like “enlargement”, “accession”, “widen(ing)”, 
“applicant”, and “expansion” as keywords (see: Yakel, 2010). In this way, this archival 
research benefited from a thematic analysis strategy because the enlargement-related 
concepts (enlargement terminology) were used to extract relevant data from the above-
mentioned datasets. During the data analysis process, the available data extracted from the 
datasets were segmented, categorized, and finally different data from different datasets 
were linked to each other to synthesize original knowledge/evidence to test LI’s 
assumptions as potential theoretical answers to the research question (a conceptual link 
between the data derived from different documents) (see also: Ayres, 2008, Trochim and 
Donnelly, 2001, Brewerton and Millward, 2001, and Crano and Brewer, 2002).   
The initial aim of this comprehensive archival research was to capture all of the relevant 
data as much as possible. In this regard, when the keywords: “enlargement” and “Europe” 
were entered, ProQuest’s House of Commons Parliamentary Papers provided 4243 
official documents from 1975 to 2014, and when the keywords: “enlargement”+ 
“Europe”+ “Britain” were searched in LexisNexis, it provided more than 15.000 news 
related to the research topic for the same period. To make this extensive data more 
manageable, the research tried to use NVivo, which is a qualitative data analysis (QDA) 
computer software, but it failed for two reasons. Firstly, most of the documents accessed 
via ProQuest’s House of Commons Parliamentary Papers were recognized by NVivo as 
pictures; thus, it was impossible to do further analysis on them. Secondly, there were 
hundreds of documents and some of them were even more than 500 pages; therefore, this 
mass not only technically limited the ability of NVivo as a computer program but also 
blurred the historical/political context of those documents. As a result of this, the research 
needed to manually carry out the data collection and analysis process, and it took more 
than two years to complete this process.   
However, the above-mentioned datasets’ being online was highly helpful in making this 
manual data collection and analysis process less time consuming. In a concrete manner, the 
research mainly benefited from their online search functions. More specifically, by using 
the online archives’ search functions, the research firstly segmented the available data 
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according to the EU’s enlargement waves and then specifically categorized them according 
to the incumbent British governments. To illustrate, the study searched the archives to 
access data on the Mediterranean enlargement from 1975 to 1979 (the Labour government 
period) and from 1979 to 1985 (the Conservative government period); on the EFTA 
enlargement from 1989 to 1995 (the Conservative government); on the Eastward 
enlargement from 1989 to 1997 (the Conservative government) and from 1997 to 2007 (the 
Labour government); on the further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey 
from 2004 to 2010 (the Labour government) and from 2010 to 2014 (the Coalition 
government). Secondly, as noted above, by using enlargement-related concepts as 
keywords, the researcher directly accessed the online documents related to the EU’s 
enlargement waves. Thirdly, as the search functions of the online archives highlighted the 
searched keywords in the online documents, the researcher had a chance to easily access 
the relevant parts of the online documents. For example, by using the above-mentioned 
keywords, the research accessed the British Footwear Manufacturers’ position on the 
Mediterranean enlargement in one of the House of Commons Industry and Trade 
Committee’s documents (46 pages), which was mentioned in just one paragraph (HC 442-
xi, p. 326). In a similar vein, LexisNexis had also a search function and highlighted the 
searched keywords in texts, which helped the researcher to extract the relevant data from 
the news reports (mostly by using skimming reading technique). In addition to the online 
archives, the researcher also used online catalogues of the Modern Records Centre (the 
University of Warwick) and the Trades Union Congress Library Collections (London 
Metropolitan University) before visiting them; thus, the researcher easily accessed the data 
on the CBI’s and TUC’s positions towards the EU’s enlargement waves on arrival.  
Finally, all of the data, which was extracted from the datasets and then classified according 
to the Enlargement waves, was coded in a word document to see the whole picture. 
Subsequently, the possible intellectual linkages between the collected data were studied 
with the help of the theoretical framework of the research. While doing so, firstly, the 
collected data was analysed to understand the successive British governments’ positions 
towards the EU’s enlargement waves. In this sense, the research analysed the collected 
data to see how geopolitical, economic and ideological concerns affected the successive 
British governments’ positions towards the enlargement waves. In addition to this, the 
research also analysed the collected data to see the attitudes of other political parties and 
societal groups towards the enlargement waves. Secondly, the collected data was analysed 
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to see how the successive British governments defended Britain’s enlargement-related 
national preferences at the EU level negotiations.  
The research also considered scientific criteria during the data collection and analysis 
process. As Jackson (2012, p. 88) and Mcburney and White (2010, p. 228) argued, the 
archival research made the limited interaction between the researcher and the data 
collection process possible. Especially, as noted above, thanks to the online nature of the 
datasets, all the documents that contained the target keywords were studied, and this 
strategy remained the researcher’s bias towards the collected data limited. As a result, it is 
highly possible that by using the same data collection method from the same theoretical 
perspective, any researcher will collect similar documents and do similar analysis on them. 
Therefore, this data collection method strengthened the replication of the research’s 
findings; and in this way, supported the reliability and validity of the research.  
2.4 Conclusion  
The main aim of this chapter was to develop an effective theoretical framework, which 
would make the research case more knowable and an original methodological strategy, 
which would help to collect sufficient data and to systematically analyse this collected 
data. At this point, LI appeared as a more appropriate theory than the rest of the European 
integration theories because the literature review suggested that as a leading Eurosceptic 
member, Britain should have her own reasons for a pro-enlargement policy and LI, with its 
member state centred analysis, might provide an effective theoretical framework to 
understand/explain these reasons.  
More specifically, LI’s two-level game approach enabled the research to specifically 
analyse how Britain formed a pro-enlargement policy as a national preference for every 
enlargement wave, and how the successive British governments defended Britain’s 
enlargement-related national preferences at the EU level negotiations. At the domestic 
level, LI suggested that a pro-enlargement policy might have emerged as an output of a 
national preference formation process for every single enlargement wave under different 
domestic and international conditions (different situational conditions). In this process, 
according to LI’s economic interest oriented rational choice approach, economic interests 
might have become the main reason behind Britain’s pro-enlargement policy. In addition 
to this, according to its pluralistic decision making understanding, British societal groups 
50 
 
might also have become influential over Britain’s national preference formation process. 
LI also assumes that the successive British governments should defend Britain’s 
enlargement-related national preferences at the EU level negotiations.  
Moreover, as LI acknowledges, the issue of enlargement is a hard case for LI; thus, this 
research is also theoretically interesting to see the extent to which LI’s theoretical 
explanations are successfully explanatory in a hard case. In particular, LI acknowledges 
that its economic interest oriented rational choice assumption might be limited in 
explaining the issue of enlargement as it is a complex case for actors to make precise cost-
benefit calculations on. To compensate for this limitation, LI suggests that a multi-causal 
reasoning, covering economic, geopolitical and ideological concerns, might have affected 
Britain’s pro-enlargement policy. At this point, it is also interesting to study a topic on 
which LI needed to back down from its strong economic interest oriented rational choice 
position (the logic of micro-economics) and gave more reference to geopolitics and 
ideology. On the other hand, the research also considered that LI’s multi-causal reasoning 
explanation might be descriptive. Thus, to deepen its analytical capacity, the theoretical 
framework also benefited from Paul Pierson’s historical institutionalist assumptions to 
explain this multi-causal reasoning as a significant variable which might have affected 
British actors’ attitudes towards the EU’s enlargement waves.  
The research also synthesized an effective methodological strategy by considering LI’s 
methodological strengths and weaknesses. Firstly, as Moravcsik did, the research was 
designed as a qualitative case study, which enabled the research to deeply focus on each 
individual enlargement wave and to collect extensive data to test the theoretical 
assumptions derived from LI. Additionally, the EU’s enlargement waves are not only 
social but also historical phenomena; thus, the archival research was chosen as the main 
data collection method in order to collect empirical in-depth data directly from its 
historical context. While doing that, the research mainly benefited from the official 
documents (through online datasets), covering the successive British governments’, British 
political parties’, and other societal groups’ positions towards the EU’s enlargement 
waves. Moreover, the literature mainly criticizes Moravcsik for only selecting data from 
historical documents, supporting his own theory. To deal with this criticism, this research 
tried to screen all EU level negotiations related to enlargement with the help of the daily 
news reports extracted from LexisNexis (online dataset). In addition to this, as Moravcsik 
did, the research also tried to benefit from interviews and biographies; however, the 
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research could not access extensive data via those methods, and thus the obtained data 
became supplementary. As a result, the research also synthesized an original 
methodological strategy, trying to compensate for LI’s weaknesses and to enrich the 
methodological strategies used in the European integration studies.  
All in all, the research is original in that it was designed to contribute new knowledge and 
theoretical/methodological dimensions to the literature. Firstly, as noted above, the 
research question was not studied before; thus, the research filled a gap in the literature. 
Secondly, it was theoretically interesting to test LI’s assumptions on EU enlargement as it 
is a hard case for LI. Thirdly, the research synthesized an original methodological strategy, 
which helped to collect extensive empirical data and to compensate for LI’s 
methodological weaknesses.  
In line with this original theoretical framework and methodological strategy, the research 
collected empirical data and analysed it to test to what extent the theoretical assumptions 
derived from LI as a potential answer to the research question are correct, by sequentially 
focusing on the EU’s enlargement waves: the Mediterranean enlargement, the EFTA 
enlargement, the Eastward enlargement and the ongoing further enlargement process 
towards the Western Balkans and Turkey.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
3 The Mediterranean Enlargement 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses Britain’s policy towards the Mediterranean enlargement from an LI 
perspective. The Mediterranean enlargement process took 10 years from 1975 to 198520, 
and both the Labour Party (1975-1979) and the Conservative Party (1979-1985) governed 
the process during that time. However, this chapter analyses the Mediterranean 
enlargement process as a whole rather than separately examining the Labour and 
Conservative parties’ periods in government to prevent the repetition of 
findings/arguments.   
LI’s two level-game approach is practically useful in systematically analysing how a pro-
enlargement policy towards the Mediterranean countries emerged as an output of a national 
preference formation process at the domestic level and how the Conservative government 
defended Britain’s enlargement-related national preferences at the EEC level negotiations. 
In this regard, the findings support LI’s main intergovernmental assumption that Britain’s 
pro-enlargement policy towards the Mediterranean countries was shaped according to 
Britain’s national interests, and the Conservative government did not accept any significant 
cost (e.g. the budgetary cost) for the sake of the enlargement at the EEC level negotiations. 
However, the research has found that LI’s economic interest oriented rational choice 
explanation and pluralistic decision making assumption are limited in explaining the 
national preference formation process in this case.  
Firstly, the research has found that LI’s economic interest oriented rational choice 
explanation could not sufficiently explain this case because the Mediterranean enlargement 
was a complex issue for the successive British governments to make a precise cost-benefit 
calculation on, and geopolitical concerns were the main reason behind Britain’s pro-
enlargement policy towards the Mediterranean countries. On the other hand, the research 
has found that economic expectations and ideological motivations were also other 
                                                 
20 Greece made its application in 1975, the substantive accession negotiations started in February 1978 and 
concluded in April 1979, and finally the Treaty of Greek Accession was signed in Athens in May 1979. As a 
result of this agreement, Greece became a member of the EEC in 1981. On the other hand, Portugal and 
Spain made their formal applications in 1977, Portugal started the accession negotiations in October 1978 
and Spain started in February 1979. The negotiations took around 6 years and finally ended in 1985 (Cmnd 
7489, 1979, p. 3, Cmnd 7361, 1978, p. 3, Cmnd 8365, 1981, p. 7, Cmnd 9627, 1985, p. 8, Cmnd 7780, 1980, 
p. 4). 
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influential factors in the decision making process. Therefore, the latter finding supports 
LI’s multi-causal argument that geopolitical concerns and ideological motivations might be 
more or equally influential over actors’ decisions when they face complex issues to make 
precise economic cost-benefit calculations on. Despite this explanation, as noted in chapter 
2, LI does not provide further explanations about this multi-causal reasoning. In this sense, 
the findings have supported the literature review’s suggestion that the influence of 
geopolitical concerns, economic expectations and ideological motivations on the British 
actors might be understood better if the national preference formation process for the 
Mediterranean enlargement is analysed within the British foreign policy structure. More 
specifically, the research has found that the complexity of enlargement limited British 
actors’ rational choice, and that the pro-enlargement policy towards the Mediterranean 
countries depended on the British actors’ economic and geopolitical benefit expectations 
rather than a precise cost-benefit calculation. In this regard, the findings show that the 
British governments perceived the Mediterranean enlargement as a security measure to 
strengthen Britain’s collective security policy within the Cold War context and as a chance 
to expand market economy further, which would provide more economic benefits to 
Britain in the long-run. Thus, the British foreign policy structure (e.g. the aim to strengthen 
Britain’s collective security policy and to expand free market principles) affected the 
British actors’ attitudes towards the Mediterranean enlargement in the Cold War context.   
Secondly, unlike LI’s pluralistic assumption, the research has found that the successive 
British governments were the main actors in the decision making process. Despite this fact, 
there are also some findings supporting LI’s assumption that the domestic interest groups 
(e.g. steel, textile, agricultural, fishery sectors), which were sensitive to the Mediterranean 
enlargement, tried to lobby the British government to protect their interests against the 
negative externalities of the enlargement at the EU level negotiations. As a response to 
this, the Conservative government considered those domestic demands and negotiated at 
the EEC level to eliminate the negative externalities of the enlargement to Britain.  
To systematically present these findings in detail, this chapter firstly focuses on the 
national preference formation process. In this section, the research analyses the collected 
data to answer the questions: how the British executive and relevant societal groups 
formed Britain’s national preferences, and how economic, geopolitical and ideological 
concerns affected the national preference formation process. Thereafter, the chapter 
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focuses on the question: how the Conservative government defended the enlargement- 
related national preferences at the EEC level negotiations.   
3.2 National Preference Formation  
3.2.1 Political Concerns  
The research has found that the Mediterranean enlargement was a complex issue for the 
successive British governments to make clear cost-benefit calculations on (e.g. Hansard, 
1977d, Hansard, 1978d, Hansard, 1978h, Hansard, 1978b, Hansard, 1980, HC 15-i, 1985, 
p. 2). For example, John Tomlinson, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, argued that it was premature to try to put a precise figure on the 
costs of the Mediterranean enlargement to Britain in 1978 (Hansard, 1978d, p. 1821). 
Michael Meacher, the Under-Secretary of State for Trade (1976-1979) also accepted the 
difficulty in estimating the effects of the Mediterranean enlargement on the trade balance 
between Britain and the Mediterranean countries (Hansard, 1977f, p. 8). In the same vein, 
David Owen, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (1977-1979) 
highlighted the unpredictable nature of forthcoming developments in the European 
integration process and argued that the effect of the Mediterranean enlargement on the 
Community would be clearer in the upcoming detailed accession negotiations (Hansard, 
1978b, p. 1389). In addition to David Owen, the new Conservative Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher also accepted that it was not possible to make a precise cost-benefit 
calculation on the Mediterranean enlargement in 1980 (Hansard, 1980c, p. 713). 
Interestingly, even in 1985 just before the accession of the Iberian countries to the EEC, 
the Conservative government could still hardly make a calculation with any precision (HC 
15-i, 1985, p. 2).   
Despite this complexity, as LI argues, the successive British governments had a tendency to 
evaluate the Mediterranean enlargement issue according to Britain’s national interests. In 
this sense, the research has found that a multi-causal reasoning shaped British actors’ 
attitudes towards the Mediterranean enlargement. Firstly, the successive British governments 
perceived the Mediterranean enlargement as a security measure to strengthen Britain’s 
collective security policy in the Cold War context, and secondly as a long-run investment, 
which would provide economic gains for Britain in the long run.  
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The Labour government highly supported the democratization attempts in the Mediterranean 
countries in the 1970s in the Cold War context (especially it played an active role in the 
democratisation of Portugal) (Callaghan, 2006, pp. 360-362, Morgan, 1997, p. 434). 
Therefore, when the Mediterranean enlargement came to the EEC’s agenda in the second 
half of the 1970s, the Labour government (1975-1979) declared its strong support for the 
Mediterranean enlargement. For example, in 1977, the British Prime Minister Callaghan, 
argued that  
The Government and the Party have always supported the concept of enlargement. We have a strong political 
commitment to the support of democracy in Greece, Portugal and Spain, and the Community should use its 
democratic political strength to buttress these new democracies (Hansard, 1977a, p. 1309, The Times, 1977c).  
The main motivation behind the Labour government’s support for the Mediterranean 
enlargement was political. For example, Anthony Crosland, the Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, clearly argued that “enlargement [was] an investment 
in the democratic future of Europe; and in the long run the benefits [would] far outweigh the 
costs” (The Economist, 1977). In the same vein, David Owen, the successor to Crosland, 
argued that the Community had an economic institution but a political future; therefore, 
politics was “the decisive factor behind further enlargement” (Hansard, 1977c, p. 200). 
According to this political understanding, the further unification of Europe via enlargement 
was critically important in the Cold War context (see also:  Cp(74) 5, 1974). To illustrate, in 
the party conference in Scarborough in 1967, the Labour party declared that the party 
perceived “the enlargement of the EEC as a first step towards the creation of a wider and 
more unified continent” in a time when Europe was sharply divided as the West and East 
Europe (cited in: Hansard, 1975a, p. 1166). In this context, the Labour government also 
argued that an enlarged Community would be attractive to the Eastern European countries, 
who were seeking to free themselves from Soviet domination (C(76) 9, 1976, p. 4).  
In this political picture, the Labour government had also a tendency to tolerate the 
Mediterranean enlargement’s short-run costs. Frank Judd, the Minister of State, Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs (1977-1979), repeatedly argued that there were some economic costs 
of the Mediterranean enlargement but political gains would outweigh the costs of the 
enlargement (Hansard, 1978e, pp. 1734-1735, Hansard, 1978g). Regarding those short-run 
costs, according to him, the Mediterranean members would be net receivers from the EEC 
budget, which would pose an economic cost to Britain due to her being a net contributor to 
the EEC budget, and the Mediterranean enlargement would make the decision making 
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system within the EEC harder, which would pose a procedural cost to all the members 
(Hansard, 1978d, p. 1734). 
Moreover, the Labour Prime Minister Callaghan tried to pragmatically benefit from a pro-
enlargement policy towards the Mediterranean countries in domestic politics. In particular, 
an important number of leftist party members and the TUC were against Britain’s EEC 
membership in the second half of the 1970s, arguing that the EEC was a capitalist club 
which ignored the interests of the working class21 (e.g. the EEC was pushing up food 
prices) (The Economist, 1975b, Harper, 1975). When the leftist members within the 
Labour Party took control of the National Executive Committee (NEC), an alternative 
voice to the leader of the Labour Party (Kavanagh, 1998, Beer, 1982, p. 157), they 
increased their pressure on Callaghan against his pro-European policy in the second half of 
the 1970s. As a reaction to this pressure, as a talented pragmatist politician (Deveney, 
2010, p. 2, Bogdanor, 2004), Callaghan needed to form a new strategic position through 
which he could both continue his pro-European policy and appease the leftist members’ 
concerns about the EEC. In this regard, the chance of a second renegotiation with the EEC 
(on Britain’s terms of entry) was weak especially after the limited success of the first 
renegotiation prior to the 1975 referendum (Dinan, 1999). Therefore, a pro-enlargement 
policy emerged as the best option for Callaghan to appease the leftists within the Labour 
Party and the TUC, as the enlargement of the EEC had a potentiality to dilute supranational 
ambitions within the Community and to drive the European integration process forward in 
an intergovernmental way (Evans, 1977, Cornwell, 1977a, Raphael, 1977, The Times, 
1977b, Jenkins, 1976, The Economist, 1977a, Harper, 1977, Jenkins, 1977). For example, 
Callaghan (1977) wrote a letter to the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party, 
arguing that the enlargement would automatically dilute the federalist ambitions for the 
European integration22 (see also: Harper, 1977).   
On the other hand, Callaghan’s pro-enlargement policy was in conformity with the 
ideological background of the leftist Labour members and TUC. For example, the leftist 
                                                 
21 The TUC and the leftist members of the Labour Party also voted ‘no’ at the 1975 referendum, and the main 
reason behind that decision was to protect Britain’s sovereignty (The Guardian, 1975c, Aitken, 1975b, 
Hatfield, 1975). Furthermore, the TUC had much more power at the domestic level to affect the decision 
making system according to its interests; therefore, the British sovereign power should not be transferred to 
the EEC as a capitalist club.   
22 Although European leaders strongly criticized Callaghan’s enlargement description as a dilution tool 
(Hornsby, 1977, Palmer, 1977). 
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Labour Party members were supportive of the leftist Portuguese government’s bid for the 
EEC membership (Pridham, 2005), and the TUC had already declared its solidarity with 
the Spanish working class against the authoritarian Franco government (The Times, 1975). 
As a result, Callaghan pragmatically used the dilution rhetoric as a tool to get political 
leverage at the domestic level.   
The Conservative Party also supported the Mediterranean enlargement in the opposition 
(1975-1979). Therefore, there was a consensus between the British government and 
opposition on a pro-enlargement policy towards the Mediterranean countries. For example, 
Edward Heath in 1977 (Cornwell, 1977b, The Times, 1977), and Margaret Thatcher in 
1978 (Hornsby, 1978), declared their support for the Mediterranean enlargement by using 
the similar reasons with the government. In addition to them, Douglas Hurd repeatedly 
argued that Britain should support the applicants (Greece, Portugal and Spain) for the sake 
of the democratization of Europe, and that this political interest would outweigh the 
potential economic costs of the enlargement (Hansard, 1978g, Brown, 1978). Geoffrey 
Rippon also supported Anthony Crosland’s argument that the Mediterranean enlargement 
would be an investment in the democratic future of Europe and that the long-run benefits 
of it would far outweigh the short-term economic costs (Hansard, 1978g).  
When the Conservative Party came into government in 1979, their support for the 
Mediterranean enlargement continued (Tonge and Parkes, 1979, Hansard, 1980c, p. 713), 
and the political concerns were still increasingly the dominant factor behind this support. 
The Conservative government perceived the Mediterranean enlargement as an important 
collective security measure in the Cold War international system. To illustrate, in its 1979 
European election manifesto, the Conservative Party mainly used the Western European 
collective security as the main reason behind its support for the Mediterranean enlargement 
(The Guardian, 1979). Moreover, according to Margaret Thatcher, the European 
Community’s political mission was “to anchor new and vulnerable democracies more 
securely to freedom and to the West” (Thatcher, 1995, p. 476).  After analysing her several 
speeches on the Mediterranean enlargement, it has also been found that Thatcher 
repeatedly used the expansion of liberal democracy to the Mediterranean countries via 
enlargement as a collective security measure, which was highly important in the Cold War 
context (e.g. 27.11.1981: Press conference after London European Council, 07.06.1982: 
Radio Interview for BBC World Service, 25.02.1983: Joint Press Conference with Italian 
Prime Minister, 04.07.1983: Interview for Director Magazine, 06.12.1983: Press 
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Conference after Athens European Council, 04.12.1984: TV interview for BBC Dublin 
European Council, and 30.03.1985: Radio interview for BBC (Collins, 1999)).  Therefore, 
according to Thatcher, it was worth spending “a little bit money” to guarantee the 
Mediterranean countries’ place in the democratic Western system (Owen, 1984a). This 
argument was also reiterated several times by Malcolm Rifkind, the Minister of State for 
Europe from 1983 to 1986 (Clough, 1983) and Ian Gilmour, the Lord Privy Seal (Hansard, 
1980a, p. 571, Hansard, 1979a, p. 1042). Moreover, Lord Carrington, the Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, asserted that the Mediterranean enlargement was 
highly important for the collective security of the Western Europe (Brown and Langdon, 
1979); thus, according to him, “the question of enlargement must be seen on two levels, the 
political first and the economic second” (Spanier, 1980). There is also a government 
memorandum arguing that cooperation within the Western world was the best way to 
defend the collective interests (liberal democracy) of Western Europe in the Cold War, and 
the Mediterranean enlargement was particularly noteworthy in this context (HC 57-ii, 
1985, p. 14). In this regard, as Geoffrey Rippon argued, the enlargement of the EEC 
towards the Mediterranean countries would be a special “Marshal plan” to assist/accelerate 
the integration of the Mediterranean countries in the Western liberal democratic system in 
the Cold War (The CBI, 1978a). Malcolm Rifkind (01.12.2014, interview), the Minister of 
State for Europe from 1980 to 1983, also confirmed that the main  reason behind the 
Conservative government’s support for the Mediterranean enlargement was the expansion 
of liberal democracy to the Mediterranean countries as a security measure in the Cold War 
context.  
The Gibraltar case is also a good indicator to see how the successive British governments 
strongly associated Britain’s collective security understanding and the Mediterranean 
enlargement. More specifically, Spain blockaded the Gibraltar border in 1969 and 
challenged the British sovereignty over Gibraltar (Jordine, 2006). Therefore, this was an 
important national security problem for Britain. As a result, Britain could have demanded 
the settlement of the Gibraltar problem as a precondition for the Spanish membership; 
however, the successive British governments did not follow this opportunistic strategy. On 
the contrary, they believed that a permanent settlement on the dispute would be easier with 
the inclusion of a democratic Spain in the EEC. Consequently, the EEC would not only 
stabilize Spanish democracy but also automatically force Spain to end its blockade on the 
Gibraltar border (via the principle of free movement). Therefore, the Labour government 
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declared that the Gibraltar dispute was not a precondition for the Spanish accession to the 
EEC (Hansard, 1977, Hansard, 1978f, Hansard, 1978g, Hansard, 1978c, CM (78) 31, 
1978).  
The Conservative government also followed this policy (HC 166, 1981, p. 91). A case in 
point, a military intervention attempt in Spain in February 1981 proved the fragility and 
importance of the newly emerged Spanish democracy. On the other hand, military-run 
Argentina was a good example of how an authoritarian government might be a threat to 
British sovereignty over overseas territories (e.g. the Falklands islands) (The Economist, 
1982). As a result, the Conservative government preferred to solve the problem of Spain’s 
blockade on Gibraltar’s border within the EEC’s democratic mechanism. Particularly, the 
EEC’s free movement principle would make it compulsory for Spain to lift the border 
restrictions on Gibraltar in order to become a Community member, and the Conservative 
government repeatedly pointed out this principle to solve the dispute (Hansard, 1982a, 
Hansard, 1982c, Hansard, 1982b, Hansard, 1983, Hansard, 1984, Hannay, 2013). For 
example, Malcolm Rifkind argued that 
It is the British Government's desire that Spain should become a member of the Community. If it wishes to 
do so, it must recognise that Gibraltar is part of the Community and that it would be inconceivable if Spain, 
as a member of the Community, did not allow movement across its frontiers with Gibraltar similar to that 
which it would provide for other member countries (Hansard, 1983, p. 371).  
In addition to the main political parties, the attitudes of the CBI and the TUC towards the 
enlargement were also important, because they were an important part of the National 
Economic Development Council (NEDC), which was established in 1962 as an 
institutional framework in which the TUC and the CBI could discuss the macroeconomic 
policies of Britain with the government (Cortell, 2006, p. 118). Moreover, this council was 
increasingly influential over the British executive especially in the 1970s (Grant, 2003, p. 
365). In this regard, the CBI and the TUC also pointed out the expansion of liberal 
democracy to the Mediterranean countries as the main reason behind their support for the 
Mediterranean enlargement. The CBI issued its qualified support for the enlargement of 
the EEC in 1977 (Elliott, 1977) and accepted the priority of the political reason 
(democracy) to support those countries’ membership (The CBI, 1977a). Subsequently, the 
CBI also declared that “accession of Portugal and Spain to the EEC is welcomed as a 
means of strengthening their democratic institutions and contribution to the political 
stability of Western Europe” (The CBI, 1981a, p. 2). In the same vein, the TUC called the 
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British government to help the democratization of the Iberian Peninsula by supporting their 
accession to the EEC (The TUC, 1976).   
3.2.2 Economic Concerns 
As noted above, the Mediterranean enlargement was a complex issue, on which it was hard 
for the British actors to make a precise cost-benefit calculation. However, despite this 
limitation, the British actors had some long-run economic benefit expectations from the 
Mediterranean enlargement. According to the British actors, the main economic benefit of 
the Mediterranean enlargement would be that it would offer new market opportunities for 
British business. For example, according to the Department of Trade and Industry, the 
Iberian enlargement would increase the European market from 270 million to 320 million 
people, and thanks to the enlarging European market, the British manufacturing sector 
would export more to Europe, which would increase the profits of British companies and 
create more jobs in Britain (HC 329-i, 1984, p. 2). Moreover, according to the CBI, the 
enlargement would provide British business an opportunity to access the Mediterranean 
markets (The CBI, 1981a), and after the enlargement, the influence of the EEC would 
increase in the competitive world market (The CBI, 1978b), which was important in a time 
when Britain’s global competitiveness was in decline (Brown, 1975).  
In addition to those long-run economic benefit expectations, the British executive and 
British business also considered the potential economic costs of the Mediterranean 
enlargement in the national preference formation process. According to the Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Mediterranean enlargement would 
increase the EEC’s budgetary expenses (mostly due to substantial farming spending), and 
this would also increase Britain’s contribution to the EEC budget (C(76)37, 1976). HM 
Treasury also accepted that the Mediterranean enlargement would increase the burden on 
the EEC budget (and so on Britain) by increasing expenditure in the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) (HC 10-vii, 1978, p. 7). Moreover, relatively poor Mediterranean countries 
would also reduce the British share in the Regional Development Fund (RDF) (C(76)37, 
1976, p. 5). The RDF was established in 1975, and Britain was its main beneficiary (Helen 
Wallace in: HC41-xiii, 1977, pp. 82-83); thus, the Fund was arguably a substitution for the 
British contribution to the EEC budget/the CAP (Thody, 2002). However, the 
Mediterranean enlargement would dilute this substitution unless further reforms were 
adopted in the EEC’s financial system. For example, Britain’s share of the quota section of 
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the Fund for 1981 reduced from 27.03 per cent to 23.34 per cent (according to GPD per 
head of population) in 1981 due to the Greek accession (HC 159-xlvi, 1980, p. 5). As a 
result, the Mediterranean enlargement would worsen Britain’s existing unfair contribution 
to the EEC budget; thus, a correction mechanism covering the British rebate from the EEC 
budget and a limitation on the agricultural spending should be implemented before the 
enlargement.  
In terms of the necessary CAP reforms, Peter Walker, the Minister of State for Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food, proposed a gradual reform of the CAP over five years in which the 
“absurd cost of financing surpluses” would be reduced; and that otherwise, the existing 
CAP system would not endure a dramatic cost increase after the Mediterranean 
enlargement (Walker, 1980). For example, as David Curry (1980), MEP for Essex NE, 
argued, the Mediterranean enlargement might pose new surplus threats (e.g. olive oil) due 
to the applicants’ mass agricultural productions. To prevent further burdens of the CAP on 
the EEC’s budget after the Mediterranean enlargement, Geoffrey Howe, the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer (1979-1983), argued that the CAP should be reformed according to three 
principles: the reduction of European subsidies for farm products in surplus, the 
domination of open-market forces in the EEC’s farming sectors, and strict controls on the 
EEC’s spending on farm support (Blake, 1981). 
On the other hand, there were also potential economic costs of the Mediterranean 
enlargement to Britain but they were tolerable and not a precondition for the Iberian 
enlargement. Therefore, Britain highlighted the point that a transition period and special 
arrangements between the EEC and the Iberian countries were necessary to minimize the 
costs of the enlargement to British business in the horticultural, textile, steel related, and 
fishery sectors.  
As John Silkin, the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, pointed out, the 
Mediterranean enlargement would not result in any significant competition against the 
British agricultural industry except for horticulture (Hansard, 1977b). The Conservative 
government also accepted that although the Iberian enlargement would provide potential 
markets for the British producers (e.g. cereals) and cheap foods for British consumers, the 
large and competitive Spanish horticultural sector might damage the British horticultural 
sector at the domestic market after the Iberian enlargement (Hc 15-I, 1985). The Central 
Horticultural Committee (British) was also quite sensitive to this issue, and Peter Pearson, 
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the chairman of the Central Horticultural Committee, warned the Conservative government 
that Spain might over-supply the British domestic market with its horticultural products 
after the enlargement; thus, that some EEC level measures ought to be taken to prevent 
potential bankruptcies in the British horticultural sector (HC 41, 1982, p. 292). In addition 
to horticulture, wine production was perceived as another British farming sector that the 
Iberian enlargement could negatively affect. Particularly, Spain wanted to reserve the 
label: “sherry” for a particular Spanish wine but this condition would negatively affect the 
demand for British products using the name: “British Sherry”. Therefore, the Conservative 
government would also insist on a satisfactory solution to this problem at the upcoming 
EEC level negotiations (HC 15-i, 1985, p. 9). Therefore, these cases are good examples 
confirming LI’s theoretical assumption that if a societal group’s interests are in danger, 
they have a strong tendency to affect the executive power to defend their interests at the 
EEC/EU level negotiations.  
The enlargement also had a potentiality to negatively affect Britain’s older industries: 
textile and steel (C(76)37, 1976, p. 5). In this period, the textile and steel sectors (and 
related minor sectors such as footwear23 and shipbuilding) emerged as the most vulnerable 
ones that the British government needed to consider particularly during Portugal’s and 
Spain’s accession negotiations (Hansard, 1977f, Hansard, 1978a, Hansard, 1978i, Hansard, 
1978g, Hansard, 1978c, Hansard, 1979). In fact, by the middle of the 1970s, Britain had 
lost her competitiveness (mostly in the textile and steel related sectors); therefore, the CBI 
and TUC issued a joint memorandum calling the government to take adequate measures to 
protect British industry (Carvel, 1976). The TUC also demanded that the government take 
necessary measures to protect the sensitive manufacturing sectors: textile-clothing-
footwear, iron-steel products, and motorcars (The TUC, 1978). In addition to the TUC, the 
CBI also pointed out that the interests of the mentioned sectors (textile, steel, and motor 
industry) should be considered by the British government during the Iberian enlargement 
negotiations (The CBI, 1981b). Moreover, according to the CBI, Spain and Portugal were 
required to modify their import restrictions and textile export policies according to the 
EEC standards as soon as possible to smoothly integrate into the EEC system. Moreover, 
the CBI called Spain to lower tariffs, to repeal the Buy Spanish act, to introduce VAT, to 
                                                 
23 For example, Anthony Clothier (Clarks shoe firm) perceived Portugal as a serious problem against the 
British shoe industry; thus, according to him, the British government should consider this fact during the EU 
level negotiations (HC 442-xi, 1980, p. 337).  
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end its import licensing system (adopt the EEC customs methods), to adopt the 
Community’s steel policy, to accept a transition period for Britain’s textile industry, and to 
end limits to EEC investment in Spain (Andrews, 1981, Townsend, 1981). There were also 
specific British sectors (e.g. the British Footwear Manufacturers Federation (HC 442-xi, 
1980, p. 326) and British Leyland Limited (HC 109, 1981, p. 534)) arguing that the 
Mediterranean countries’ protectionism made the British firms’ accession to those 
countries significantly harder; thus, they urged the British government to eliminate those 
trade barriers at the accession negotiations. The director of British Independent Steel 
Producers' Association also asked the British government “to watch the Spanish steel 
industry like hawks” in order to take the necessary measures at the accession negotiations 
to protect the British steel industry against the subsidised Spanish steel24 (HC 478-iii, 
1984, p. 87). As LI assumes, these examples also show that the interests groups, which 
were sensitive to the Mediterranean enlargement, tried to affect the British government to 
defend their interests at the EEC level negotiations. 
However, the successive British governments did not consider protectionism as a measure 
against the Iberian competitiveness in textile and steel. In this regard, according to them, a 
reasonable transitional period for the fragile British sectors would give enough time to take 
the necessary measures. For example, Frank Judd, the Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs from the Labour Party, argued that a transition period regarding 
the Mediterranean enlargement would be necessary (Hansard, 1978i, p. 1377), and that the 
transition issue should be higher on the accession negotiation agenda (Hansard, 1979, p. 
1131). The Conservative Nicholas Winterton also argued that British textile industry, 
which employed 6000 people, faced a severe competition from Greece, Portugal and 
Spain; however, the rejection of their membership or any protectionist policy was not a 
solution. The solution was to have a transition period in which the weak British sectors 
could take adequate measures to protect themselves against the enlargement (HC 647-iii, 
1978, p. 916). Additionally, the CBI also argued that a reasonable transition period for the 
Iberian accession would be a good solution (Elliott, 1977). 
                                                 
24 Related to this request, the Department of Trade and Industry also accepted that unauthorised state 
aids/subsidies were a more serious problem than non-tariff barriers against Britain’s trade balance in 
manufacturing goods with other member states (HC 329-i, 1984, p. 19).  As a result, this case also confirms 
that LI’s theoretical assumption that if a societal group’s interests are in danger, they have a strong tendency 
to affect the executive power to defend their interests at the EU/EC level. 
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Moreover, the British actors also considered Spain’s large fishing sector as a challenge to 
the British fishery sector. For example, the Expenditure Committee warned that the EEC 
member states take the necessary measures against Spain’s large fishing fleet and that the 
Iberian enlargement should not decrease the fishing opportunities available to existing 
members (HC 356, 1978, p. 67). Winifred Ewing, one of the leading members of the 
Scottish National Party, also warned the British government about the potential threat of 
the Spanish fishery sector against the British fishery sector after the enlargement and 
argued that in case of any bankruptcy in the sector, there was not any alternative to the 
employment held in the fishing sector; therefore, that necessary measures ought to be taken 
to protect fish stocks and therefore jobs in Britain before the Iberian enlargement (Hansard, 
1978g, p. 143). The Sea Fish Industry Authority also warned that a special measure25 
should be arranged in the accession negotiations to protect the British fishery sector against 
Spain’s large fishing fleet (HC 15-viii, 1985, p. 180).  
In terms of the potential effects of the enlargement on the British labour market, according 
to the Home Office, it was difficult to estimate any potential immigration flow to Britain 
from Greece, Portugal and Spain during the initial stages of their accession process. 
However, according to the available data, the immigrants from the applicant countries 
substantially preferred to emigrate to the continental European countries (mostly to France 
and West Germany) rather than Britain (HC 410-i, 1978, p. 5). Therefore, the Home Office 
did not forecast any serious immigration flow that could be a big burden on the British 
labour market (ibid.). In addition to this, according to the Department of Health and Social 
Security (DHSS), the social security cost of the Mediterranean enlargement to Britain 
would be modest (DHSS, 1977).   
As LI assumes, the research also found that specific societal groups who were affected by 
the Mediterranean enlargement tried to lobby the British executive to protect their interests 
at the EEC level negotiations. For example, according to the UK food industry, the EEC 
regime for tomato concentrate needed to be changed; as otherwise, the existing regime 
would not be sufficiently flexible for further enlargement (HC 29-xiii, 1978, p. 27). The 
Merchant Navy and Airline Officers’ Association also warned the British government that 
the cheaper labour force of Greece, Portugal and Spain might put the labours from the 
developed members in a disadvantaged position regarding the “manning of EEC ships”; 
                                                 
25 For example, a long transition period for Spain to access the Community’s Pond.  
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thus, that some measures needed to be taken before the accession of those countries to the 
Community (HC 29-xxi, 1978, p. 44).  
All in all, as LI assumes, Britain shaped a pro-enlargement policy towards the 
Mediterranean countries according to her national interests. The successive British 
governments benefited from a multi-causal reasoning while evaluating the issue, and 
economic expectations and ideological motivations also affected the national preference 
formation process in addition to the dominant geopolitical concerns. In this process, in 
addition to the geopolitical and economic benefits of the enlargement, the potential costs 
were also considered by the British governments. Moreover, the interests groups, which 
were sensitive to the enlargement also tried to affect the decision making process and the 
Conservative government also considered their specific economic interests in the national 
preference formation process. In other words, as LI assumes, the Conservative government 
was not willing to sacrifice Britain’s significant economic interests for the sake of the 
geopolitical benefits of the Mediterranean enlargement. As a result, Britain’s rebate from 
the EEC budget and the interests of Britain’s old industries (steel and textile), horticultural 
sector and fishery sector emerged as the main issues which the British government tried to 
defend at the EEC level negotiations.  
3.3 Intergovernmental Bargains 
The initial finding of the research at this level has been that the old members carried out 
tough negotiations at the EEC level to maintain their national interests despite their 
political commitment to the Mediterranean enlargement. Thus, this finding confirms LI’s 
basic intergovernmental assumption that member states are the main actors within the 
EC/EU system, and their national interests are the main factor affecting their behaviour 
within it. 
The Greek accession did not significantly challenge the old members’ interests; thus, it 
happened in a fast and smooth way in 198226 (Tsoukalis, 1981, see also: The CBI, 1977b). 
However, the Iberian enlargement (particularly Spain) posed some significant challenges 
to the old members’ national interests; thus, the Iberian accession negotiations took six 
years as a result of the tough intergovernmental negotiations. In this regard, the main 
                                                 
26 The EC signed the accession agreement with Greece on 28th May 1979, and Greece was allowed a five-
year transition period to align itself with most EEC rules (Jonquieres, 1979).  
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problem was that the Iberian enlargement forced the existing EEC system to change, 
wherein the old members tried to sustain their national interests within the new EEC 
system that would be created after the Iberian enlargement. As a result, the Iberian 
accession and the structural reform negotiations went hand in hand in the early 1980s (The 
Times, 1980b).  
In this long negotiation process, as LI assumes, the British executive determined a national 
position by considering the significant national interests and the relevant domestic groups’ 
interests related to the Mediterranean enlargement. At this point, Britain’s contribution to 
the EEC budget was already a big problem and the Mediterranean enlargement would 
worsen it (Davidson, 1979, Smith, 1981). Thus, according to the British government, this 
problem needed to be solved prior to the enlargement. In addition to this, the 
Mediterranean enlargement might have posed a significant threat to Britain’s old industries 
(steel and textile), horticultural sector, and fishery sector. Therefore, according to the 
British government, a satisfactory transition period in which Britain would take the 
necessary measures to protect the above-mentioned sectors should be arranged before the 
integration of the Iberian countries into the EEC’s free market mechanism. In addition to 
this, as the British manufacturers demanded, the Conservative government needed to 
negotiate in order to accelerate the liberalization of the Iberian markets in the accession 
process.  
As noted above, from Britain’s point of view, the Iberian countries had large agricultural 
sectors which would increase the EEC’s spending on agriculture (the CAP) from which the 
benefit to Britain was negligible. To compensate for this cost, Regional Development Fund 
(RDF) had been designed but the poorer Iberian countries would also shift the flow of the 
Fund from north to south. As a result, a direct rebate mechanism (from the EEC to Britain) 
was the only solution to compensate for Britain’s overspending on the EEC budget before 
the Iberian enlargement. On the other hand, France and Italy (and later Greece) demanded 
an increase in agricultural spending because their share in the EEC’s agricultural spending 
would decrease after the Iberian enlargement (as Spain and Portugal had large agricultural 
sectors). Like Britain, Germany was against the growth of the agricultural spending but 
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less willing to accept Britain’s claim for a rebate from the EEC budget27 (HC 480, 1984, 
pp. xxi-xxiv). For example, Helmut Schmidt, the Chancellor of West Germany, argued that 
the EEC could not finance the Mediterranean enlargement “without the indispensable 
adjustments to its agriculture policy and without a more balanced distribution of burdens” 
(Clough, 1980). Subsequently, Greece also made its support to the Iberian enlargement 
conditional on the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs), which would 
compensate for the decreased EEC aids to Greece as a result of the Iberian enlargement 
(Cmnd 9485, 1985, p. 4).  
When the accession negotiations started in 1979, Geoffrey Howe declared that Britain’s 
overspending on the EEC budget problem needed to be solved before the Mediterranean 
enlargement (Palmer, 1979a), after which, the British rebate issue became one of the main 
negotiation topics in addition to the EEC’s agricultural spending and the potential 
institutional reforms (Palmer, 1979b).  
On the other hand, as a reaction to the increased demand to reform the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), the French President Giscard d’Estaing suggested slowing 
down the enlargement process (Ellman, 1980, Hargrove, 1980) just after the 
commencement of the accession negotiations. Raymond Barre, the French Prime Minister, 
even hinted that the Iberian countries might have a different status in the EEC system other 
than full membership (The Times, 1980a). Particularly, the French government was not 
willing to start the tough negotiations including farming before its national elections 
(1981), due to the anxiety of French farmers about the potential competitiveness of the 
Spanish farming sector (Palmer, 1981b). As a result, France insisted, at the foreign 
ministers’ meeting in Brussels on 21 July 1980, that the Iberian enlargement not take place 
before reaching an agreement between the old members to reform the EEC budget and the 
CAP, although January 1983 had been decided as the date for the Iberian accession to the 
EC (ibid.). In reaction to France’s unenthusiastic position, Peter Walker, the Minister of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food reiterated the British governments’ support for the Iberian 
accession to the EEC and that the negotiations should be finished as soon as possible as the 
Iberian enlargement would economically, militarily and politically strengthen the EEC’s 
global leadership capacity, which member states greatly needed in the 1980s (Debelius, 
                                                 
27 From an LI perspective, the southern French farmers did not want to lose this privilege in the CAP as a 
result of the Mediterranean enlargement. On the other hand, the West German taxpayers were not willing to 
pay increasing burden on the EEC budget due to the Mediterranean enlargement or the CAP (Palmer, 1980).  
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1980). Furthermore, he criticized France by arguing that Britain’s contribution to the EEC 
budget as a result of the Iberian enlargement would be much more than France’s but that 
Britain never hesitated to support a “greater Europe” (Burns, 1980).  
When the Conservative government assumed the EEC Presidency in July 1981, the 
Mediterranean enlargement was one of the main objectives of the British Presidency in 
addition to the structural reforms of the EEC (e.g. the EEC budget and the CAP) (Lewis, 
1981, Spanier, 1981). Despite this priority, the enthusiasm for the enlargement started to 
wane among the member states because of the difficulties in the negotiations over the EEC 
budget and the CAP (Palmer, 1981a). As a result, the leaders failed to agree on a final 
reform of the CAP and budget at the London Summit (26–27th November 1981) under the 
British Presidency (Palmer, 1981c, Spanier and Murray, 1981).  
The EEC level negotiations started to get tougher in 1982. The discussions mainly focused 
on the question: how to finance the Iberian enlargement. In particular, France demanded an 
increase in the EEC’s budget (the EEC’s own resources); however, Britain insisted that the 
Iberian enlargement could be financed by using the existing EEC budget if the agricultural 
expenses were cut/controlled (Wyles, 1982a, Palmer, 1982). For instance, in November 
1982, the British government blocked the revenue increase in the EEC budget as a 
response to the deadlock in Britain’s rebate demand, and the Foreign Secretary Francis 
Pym also argued that if the EEC’s farm spending was reduced, the EEC’s existing own 
resources would be sufficient for the EEC’s expenses (and even after the Iberian 
enlargement) (Palmer, 1982). As a reaction to this, France clarified that it would block 
Portugal’s application until the budget and CAP problems were resolved (ibid.). As a result 
of this deep division between the member states, the EEC could not give a target date for 
the Iberian accession to the EEC in 1982 (Wyles, 1982b).  
At the same time, at the domestic level, pressure on the Thatcher government was 
increasing prior to the 1983 national elections. As a result of this, the British rebate issue 
started to emerge as a condition on the Iberian enlargement. Particularly, the Labour Party 
and the TUC started to demand Britain’s withdrawal from the EEC. For instance, the TUC 
launched a campaign in 1981 for the British withdrawal by arguing that the renegotiation 
policy failed to solve the problems between Britain and the EEC (e.g. the EEC budget 
burden on Britain, the CAP system resulting in inefficiency and higher food prices, the 
trade deficit in the manufacturing sector, restrictions on state aid to industry etc.) (The 
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TUC, 1981). The TUC’s withdrawal campaign also increased the domestic pressure on the 
Conservative government to renegotiate the CAP and Britain’s unfair contribution to the 
EEC budget (see: The TUC, 1982). At the NEDC meeting in 1981, in addition to the TUC, 
the CBI also accepted that the EEC budget was one of the major difficulties for Britain 
within the EEC system (Smith, 1981). Additionally, the NFU (1981) also underlined the 
point that a substantial resource transfer would take place towards the Iberian countries; 
thus, the existing budget problem needed to be solved before the Iberian enlargement.  
As a result, the Conservative government strongly reiterated that it was against any 
increase in member states’ contribution to the EEC budget and that if agricultural expenses 
were controlled, the saved money would be sufficient to finance the Iberian enlargement 
(Owen, 1983). Furthermore, Thatcher hinted that Britain might unilaterally withhold her 
budgetary contribution if a long-term settlement for the British rebate was not reached 
(Palmer, 1983). At this point, the Conservative government hoped that the Iberian 
enlargement would force the EEC members to accept a longer-term deal for the British 
rebate (Brown and Tonge, 1982). For example, Howe openly argued that the expected 
enlargement needed a durable budgetary arrangement for the British rebate to prevent 
budgetary discussions recurring every year or two (Bevins, 1983).  
In 1983, the German Presidency tried to initiate a rapprochement between the member 
states to reach an agreement on the EEC budget, the CAP and the Iberian enlargement. For 
example, in June 1983, the EEC commission released a proposal suggesting a 12-year 
transition period for some Iberian farm products to ease the pressure of the Iberian 
enlargement on the CAP (The Guardian, 1983). Despite this attempt, the division 
continued between the Mediterranean members (France, Italy and Greece) and Germany 
and Britain. The Mediterranean members were demanding a special “Mediterranean” 
measure to protect their farming sector before the Iberian enlargement. For example, Pierre 
Mauroy, the French Prime Minister, made it clear that the Iberian enlargement was not 
possible without additional funds for Mediterranean fruit and vegetable producers 
(Housego, 1983). On the other hand, Britain and Germany argued that if a special measure 
was taken to protect the Mediterranean agriculture sectors without considering the cost of 
the Iberian enlargement, the new Mediterranean members (Spain and Portugal) would put 
significant burden on the EEC budget (via increasing surpluses in the agricultural products) 
(Doyle, 1983, The Times, 1983b).  
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After long negotiations, finally, the member states broke a two-year deadlock on 18 
October 1983 under the Greek Presidency and reached an agreement on this dispute. In 
particular, the agreement met most of France’s demands: a new price support system was 
designed to protect EEC farmers from low cost competition (the French farmers from the 
cheaper Spanish products) and a transitional period for Spanish olive oil was accepted 
(Brown, 1983b). However, Britain, Germany and the Netherlands were still uneasy about 
the potential costs of the new agricultural agreement (ibid.). 
As a reaction to this, Britain tried to prioritize the EEC’s budget problem (and thus 
Britain’s unfair contribution to it) before the Athens Summit (4–6th December 1983) 
(Bevins, 1983). In this regard, Geoffrey Howe accepted that the Iberian enlargement was 
an urgent priority; thus, that it might be necessary for member states to increase the EEC’s 
resources. On the other hand, the European Commission proposed that the VAT ceiling be 
raised from 1 per cent to 1.4 percent to finance the Iberian enlargement; however, West 
Germany and Britain set the reforms in agriculture and the calculation method of national 
contribution to the EEC budget (related to the British rebate problem) as two preconditions 
for the Commission’s proposal (Boland, 1984d). Particularly, according to the 
Conservative government, an effective control on the EEC’s expenditures (e.g. agricultural 
expenditures) needed to be designed and the unfair burden of the EEC budget on Britain be 
removed, to increase the EEC’s resources (The Times, 1983a). However, the member 
states failed again to agree on the EEC budget at the Athens Summit (4–6 December 
1983). Particularly, the Thatcher government demanded a truly long-term EEC budget 
mechanism to act as a “safety net” linking member states’ contributions to their relative 
prosperities; however, France opposed this proposal (Brown, 1983a).  
In 1984, the Iberian enlargement process and the British budgetary problem were closely 
linked to one another during the negotiations, as obtaining the extra funds required to 
finance the Iberian countries’ entry without solving the British rebate problem was 
implausible (The Economist, 1984, Dinan, 1999). However, when the British rebate 
problem was solved at the Fontainebleau Summit28  (25–26th June 1984), the British 
government conceded to the Commission’s proposal to increase the VAT ceiling from 1 
                                                 
28 According to Geoffrey Howe (1994, p. 398), before the Fontainebleau Summit, the French President 
Mitterrand also recognized the significant relationship between the need to increase the Community sources 
prior to the Iberian enlargement and the settlement of the British rebate problem. 
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per cent to 1.4 per cent29 (Kennedy and Boland, 1984, The European Council, 1984b). 
Therefore, as LI assumes, the British government strongly negotiated at the EEC level to 
diminish the negative externalities of the Mediterranean enlargement to Britain, and the 
British rebate from the EEC budget was achieved. 
After solving this financial obstacle in the Iberian enlargement process at the 
Fontainebleau Summit, 30th September 1984 was determined as the date for the accession 
agreement with Spain and Portugal, however, the member states failed to find a common 
position on the issues: the Mediterranean wine and oil production and the adaptation of the 
large Spanish fishery and steel sectors into the EEC system (The Financial Times, 1984a). 
For example, according to the British government, the high Spanish tariffs on British 
goods (e.g. cars) needed to be decreased (Murray, 1984b), the Iberian countries needed to 
accept the EEC’s fishery regime (together with Ireland) (Pyle, 1984), and a quota system 
needed to be implemented to prevent olive oil surplus30 (together with West Germany and 
The Netherlands) (Boland, 1984c). Additionally, the British government made it clear that 
Spain needed to open the Gibraltar border as soon as possible upon accession to the 
Community (Murray, 1984a). On the other hand, France insisted on a quota system in the 
wine sector to protect its own wine sector against other cheaper Mediterranean wines 
(Boland, 1984c); however, Italy opposed this proposal (Boland, 1984a).  
In the autumn of 1984, the accession negotiations gained momentum31. Firstly, the member 
states agreed that the Community’s “blocking minority” decision system would require 23 
out of 76 total votes (previously 15 out of 63 total votes) (Peel, 1984a). Subsequently, on 
1st October 1984, the member states agreed on a new system of budgetary control placing 
particular limits on agricultural expenditures (Boland, 1984a). The deal was a triumph for 
Britain, according to Lawson, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as the British government 
had been trying to achieve it for years (Boland, 1984a). On 19th December 1984, the EEC 
                                                 
29 But Thatcher declared that the decision on increasing the EC’s own resources (increase in the VAT ceiling) 
would not be ratified until the Finance Ministers took appropriate measures on agricultural expenditure.  
30 The main position of the British government during the negotiations was that the rise in agricultural 
spending should be less than the Community’s revenue (Boland, 1984a).  
31 The West Germany and the Netherlands insisted that the EC’s own resources should be increased after the 
enlargement. Thus, without the completion of the Iberian enlargement, the EC would face a budget crisis in 
1985, and this was a strong incentive forcing the member states to accelerate the enlargement negotiations 
(Peel, 1984).  For example, in September 1984, the finance, foreign and agriculture ministers held meetings 
side-by-side to break the deadlock in the enlargement negotiations (The Financial Times, 1984). In terms of 
Britain, the British rebate from the EC in 1985 depended on the confirmation of the EC budget for 1985; 
thus, the completion of the enlargement was also important for the British government to get the rebate (Ecu 
1 billion) in 1985 (Peel, 1985).  
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and Spain also agreed on the steel industry and the Spanish import tariffs on industrial 
goods. According to the deal, Spain would gradually decrease the tariffs on industrial 
goods in the first seven years after it gained EEC membership. According to Paul 
Channon, the Minister for Trade, the new deal would annually increase the British car 
exports to Spain from 2,250 to 5,000 (Peel and Dawnay, 1984); therefore, the British 
government managed to protect the British’s car industry’s interests. In addition to this, a 
transitional period limiting the Spanish steel industry’s exports to the EEC countries were 
guaranteed as the British steel industry demanded (Peel and Dawnay, 1984).  
On the other hand, at the Dublin Summit (3–4th December 1984) Greece declared that it 
would veto the Iberian accession unless it got more financial aid from the EEC32 (Brown, 
1984, The European Council, 1984a). As a result, the negotiations were extended to 1985, 
and the Greek aid issue also became another problem in the negotiations in addition to the 
fishery issue. However, the Brussels Summit (29–30th March 1985) managed to settle 
those problems (The Irish Times, 1985, Hawkes, 1985, The European Council, 1985), and 
the accession agreement was signed with Spain and Portugal on 12th June 1985 (Conney, 
1985).  
Margaret Thatcher described the agreement on the Iberian enlargement as “good for 
Britain and good for democracy to have a greater area of stability in Europe, in a very 
troubled world” (Hawkes, 1985). Furthermore, the British government was satisfied with 
the outcomes of the accession negotiations of the Mediterranean enlargement as it had 
managed to decrease the cost of the Iberian enlargement to Britain through the EEC level 
negotiations. In particular, the Conservative government achieved its two main aims, 
which would decrease the cost of the enlargement: the British rebate from the EEC budget 
and the necessary restrictions in the EEC’s agricultural expenses. Moreover, the British 
government guaranteed a transition period to protect its horticultural sector, as “85 per cent 
of Portuguese agriculture and the Spanish fruit and vegetable sector” were to be 
incorporated into the relevant CAP regimes over the following 10 years. The negotiations 
also reached an agreement to use the name “British Sherry” for a period of 10 years, and 
later the parties would review the agreement according to their interests (Cmnd 9627, 
                                                 
32 Greece was demanding an Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs), an ECU 7.331 billion special 
funding programme for the Mediterranean regions of the EEC, which would compensate for Greece’s lost 
due to the Iberian enlargement in terms of the EEC’s aids (Boland, 1984b, Ierodiaconou, 1984). On the other 
hand, Margaret Thatcher openly criticized Greece’s veto threat against the Iberian enlargement (Owen, 
1984).  
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1985, p. 19). Moreover, Spain would be a full member of the Common Fishery Policy 
(Dawnay, 1985) and “the number of Spanish and Portuguese vessels fishing in United 
Kingdom waters would continue to be strictly controlled”, and “there would be no 
Spanish and Portuguese access to the North Sea” (Cmnd 9627, 1985).  Additionally, as 
British business demanded, Spain would decrease its tariffs and quotas on industrial goods 
(Dawnay, 1985), and Spain’s steel exports to the EEC countries would also be limited. 
Last but not least, the settlement of the Gibraltar dispute occurred in parallel with the 
Spanish accession negotiations. On 10th April 1980, Britain and Spain agreed on the 
Lisbon Statement “desiring to strengthen their bilateral relations and thus to contribute to 
European and Western solidarity” (HC 166, 1981, p. xvi). The bilateral negotiations on the 
Gibraltar problem that followed were tough; however, according to Malcolm Rifkind 
(01.12.2014, interview), the Conservative government, owing to its collective security 
understanding, never considered using its veto power against the Spanish accession to the 
EEC in an opportunistic manner. Finally, the Brussels Agreement was signed by Britain 
and Spain in 1984, an agreement that lifted the Spanish blockade on the Gibraltar border 
(Jordine, 2006). Consequently, the Conservative government had successfully managed to 
solve the Spain-Gibraltar border problem within the EEC’s democratic mechanisms prior 
to the Spanish accession to the EEC, in conformity with its collective security 
understanding. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the Mediterranean 
enlargement from an LI perspective. The chapter has showed that LI’s two-level game 
approach has been an efficient method in analysing/understanding how Britain developed 
her pro-enlargement policy towards the Mediterranean countries under the situational 
condition of the enlargement (the domestic and international realities belonging to the late 
1970s and early 1980s), and how the Conservative government defended Britain’s national 
preferences at the EEC level negotiations. In particular, the findings support LI’s basic 
intergovernmentalist assumption that Britain’s pro-enlargement policy was shaped 
according to Britain’s national interests at the domestic level, and the British government 
did not accept any significant negative externalities of the enlargement to Britain at the 
EEC level negotiations. For example, the Conservative government did not accept the 
Commission’s proposal to increase the VAT ceiling from 1 per cent to 1.4 per cent, which 
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was a necessary measure to achieve the Iberian enlargement, before solving the British 
rebate problem. 
On the other hand, the research has found that LI’s two main assumptions on national 
preference formation process are limited in explaining this case. Firstly, as noted in chapter 
2, LI assumes that a pro-enlargement policy should emerge as an output of a rational 
decision making process, in which economic concerns should be dominant. However, the 
research has found that the complexity of the Mediterranean enlargement limited the 
British actors’ rational choice capability. For example, the Labour government and then the 
Conservative government repeatedly argued that it was hard for them to make a precise 
cost-benefit calculation on the Mediterranean enlargement. In addition to this, unlike LI’s 
strong emphasis on economic interests, the research has found that geopolitical concerns 
were the dominant factor behind Britain’s support for the Mediterranean enlargement. For 
example, in addition to the successive British governments, even the CBI and TUC, which 
were interest groups looking for their specific interests, gave priority to the political 
importance of the Mediterranean enlargement.  
Moreover, the research has found that economic expectations and ideological motivations 
also affected the decision making process in addition to the dominant geopolitical 
concerns. Therefore, this finding supports LI’s assumption that a multi-causal reasoning, 
containing economic interests, geopolitical concerns and ideological motivations, might 
affect actors’ decisions if they face a complex issue, such as EU enlargement, on which 
they cannot make precise cost benefit calculations. Furthermore, according to the findings, 
those factors were intertwined with each other. For example, the expansion of democracy 
(liberal ideals) towards the Mediterranean countries via enlargement was perceived by the 
British governments both as a security measure in the Cold War context and as an 
economic investment, which would provide economic benefits to Britain in the long-run.   
However, although LI points out that a multi-causal reasoning is a tool that actors use to 
make decisions on complex issues, LI does not provide further explanation for it. At this 
point, as the literature review suggested, the findings support the argument that Britain’s 
foreign policy priorities might have constituted a rationale for the successive British 
governments to formulate Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the Mediterranean 
countries in the Cold War context. More specifically, according to the findings, Britain’s 
pro-enlargement policy towards the Mediterranean countries depended on the geopolitical 
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and economic benefit expectations of the successive British governments but not on 
precise calculations. Thus, the above-mentioned expectations as an output of a multi-causal 
reasoning were rational within Britain’s foreign policy structure according to the 
enlargement’s situational conditions (e.g. the Cold War). To put in another way, in parallel 
with Britain’s collective security understanding, the EEC’s enlargement towards the 
Mediterranean countries would provide more security for Britain in the Cold War context. 
Moreover, from this point of view, it was also not rational for the successive British 
governments to issue a veto threat against Spain in order to solve the Gibraltar dispute in 
the Cold War context. Particularly, there was a consensus among the Conservative and 
Labour Parties on the assertion that issuing a veto against Spain’s EEC membership would 
not be a solution to the Gibraltar problem, but that it would be easier to solve this problem 
with a democratic Spain within the EEC system. Secondly, the British actors expected that 
the enlargement would expand the European market, which would provide more economic 
wealth for Britain, and this expectation was in compliance with the liberal principles, 
which were historically embedded in British foreign policy structure. With regard to this 
point, as discussed in the literature review, the empirical findings of the chapter have also 
supported the argument that Britain’s pro-enlargement policy was not just a dilution tool 
against the deepening attempts in the European integration process, but was shaped in a 
broader foreign policy context to provide more security and economic wealth for Britain. 
Interestingly, the ‘dilution’ rhetoric was mainly used by the Prime Minister Callaghan as 
an opportunistic domestic policy tool to lessen the anti-Marketeers’ pressure on him in the 
late 1970s.    
Secondly, unlike LI’s reference to a pluralistic decision making assumption about national 
preference formation process, the research has found that the successive British 
governments were at the centre of the national decision making process. More specifically, 
as Moravcsik (1995, together with Schimmelfennig, 2009) also accepted, the findings 
support the argument that if the expected costs of any policy to interest groups are 
inconsiderable or unclear, governments have more autonomy both in the national 
preference formation process and at EEC/EU level negotiations. On the other hand, as LI 
assumes, the Conservative government was responsive to British actors’ sensitivity/issue-
specific interests. Particularly, the Conservative government tried to protect the interests of 
the old British industries (textile and steel), agriculture sector (horticulture), and the fishery 
sector at the EEC level negotiations. In parallel with the CBI’s demands, it also negotiated 
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at the EEC level to accelerate the liberalization of the Iberian countries’ markets as early as 
possible in the accession process. As a more specific example, the Conservative 
government even considered protecting British products using the name: “British Sherry” 
at the EEC level negotiations as Spain wanted to use the label “sherry” exclusively for a 
particular Spanish wine.  
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4 The EFTA Enlargement 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses Britain’s policy towards the EFTA enlargement from an LI 
perspective. The EFTA enlargement was put on the EU’s agenda in the late 1980s and was 
achieved in 1995. In this period, the Conservative Party was in power; thus, the research 
mainly focused on the Conservative governments (the Thatcher and Major governments).  
The main findings of this chapter are similar to the findings of the Mediterranean 
enlargement case. As found in the Mediterranean enlargement case, this case has also 
confirmed LI’s intergovernmentalist assumption that Britain’s pro-enlargement policy 
towards the EFTA countries was shaped according to her national interests. Moreover, the 
chapter has also showed that LI’s pluralist decision making  and economic interest oriented 
rational choice assumption are limited in explaining Britain’s national preference 
formation process for the EFTA enlargement. Firstly, unlike LI’s pluralistic decision 
making assumption, the Conservative government played an entrepreneurial role in 
encouraging British business to exploit potential opportunities in the EFTA markets. 
Secondly, according to the findings, unlike LI’s economic interest oriented rational choice 
explanation, ideological concerns were the dominant factor behind the Conservative 
party’s support for the EFTA enlargement, in a time when the history-making negotiations 
started to shape the future of the European integration in the post-Cold War era. However, 
economic expectations and geopolitical concerns, which were actually intertwined with 
those ideological concerns, also affected the national preference formation process. 
Therefore, this finding supports LI’s assumption that actors might benefit from a multi-
causal reasoning when they face complex issues such as enlargement, on which they 
cannot make precise cost benefit calculations. As another interesting finding, in line with 
LI’s logic of micro-economics, the research has found that the British government 
continued to support the EFTA enlargement by considering her comparative advantage in 
the finance sector although it was aware that Germany would make bigger gains than 
Britain regarding the manufacturing sector.   
As LI assumes, the chapter has also found that the Conservative government tried to 
defend Britain’s national preferences at the EU level negotiations. In this sense, the main 
motivation of the British government was to complete the EFTA enlargement prior to the 
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1996 intergovernmental conference. Thus, the government focused on this goal at the EU 
level negotiations, and the EFTA enlargement was achieved in 1995. However, the 
extension of the QMV emerged as an unanticipated outcome of the EU level negotiations, 
which would result in a political cost to the Major government at the domestic level.   
To systematically present these findings in detail, the chapter firstly focuses on the national 
preference formation process. In this section, from an LI perspective, the research analyses 
the collected data to answer the questions: how the British executive and relevant societal 
groups formed Britain’s national preferences towards the EFTA enlargement, and how 
economic, geopolitical and ideological concerns affected the national preference formation 
process. Subsequently, the chapter focuses on the question: how the British government 
defended Britain’s national preferences at the EU level negotiations.   
4.2 National Preference Formation 
4.2.1 Political Concerns  
As LI assumes, the research has found that Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the 
EFTA countries was shaped according to her national interests. In the national preference 
formation process, ideological concerns were the dominant factor behind the Conservative 
government’s support for the EFTA enlargement; however, this ideological motivation was 
also supported by the economic benefit expectations and geopolitical concerns.  
Particularly, the discussions on the future of the European integration process were 
stimulated in the second half of the 1980s. The discussions generally focused on two main 
projects to shape the integration: the European integration would evolve into a 
supranational structure or it would continue as a more intergovernmental polity by 
covering other European countries as much as possible (deepening versus widening) 
(Usborne, 1990, Pinder, 1992). Within this debate, France was the leading country who 
wanted to create a more supranational European integration by developing deeper 
economic, monetary and security policies (Palmer, 1989, Hoagland, 1989, Jaconson, 
1989). There were also other countries in sympathy with the French project (e.g. Italy, 
Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and eventually the West Germany) (Riding, 1990).  
On the other hand, the Conservative government supported an intergovernmental and 
wider European integration project (as a wider free-trade association of sovereign states) 
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(Riding, 1990, Hilton, 1990, Jenkins, 1991b, Watts, 2008, p. 39, Gowland et al., 2006, p. 
304). According to Thatcher (1988), the European Community needed to have an outward 
looking free market (rather than a deeper and inward-looking protectionist market), play a 
full role in the wider world (but a deeper EC/EU would become more regional and thus 
more isolated), and not have any security measures (like the Western European Union -
WEU-) as an alternative to NATO.  At this point, it is clear that the Conservative Party’s 
ideological background played an important role in this position. More specifically, Adam 
Smith’s laissez-faire economic model constituted the essence of Thatcherite Conservative 
governments’ economic understanding33 (Soffer, 2009, Blundell, 2008, Thatcher, 1990b, 
Evans, 1997, Leach, 1983, Leach, 2002, Gillingham, 2003, p. 151), and according to the 
Conservative Party, this economic model also needed to be extended to Europe (Schmidt, 
2001, p. 256).  
To this end, “the Single European Act appeared to ﬁt neatly into the Thatcherite free 
market ideology and its programme of ﬂexible economic modernisation” (Gifford, 2008, p. 
94). Therefore, the Thatcher government perceived the Single European Act (SEA) as a 
chance to evolve the European integration process towards greater market liberalism in 
Europe (Schmidt, 2001, Bradbury, 1996). Thus, Thatcher became one of the main initiators 
who made the SEA the Community’s priority34 (Wall, 2008, Gillingham, 2003), and “she 
found little difficulty in signing the Single European Act” (Leach, 1995, p. 25). Moreover, 
the SEA would help to redefine the Europe 1992 Project in a neoliberal way unlike the EC 
President Jacques Delors’ corporatist and protectionist aim (Overbeek, 1993). For 
example, Thatcher argued that the SEA would “get the Community back on course, 
concentrating on its role as a huge market” (in: Turner, 2000, p. 99). For the sake of the 
expansion of free market, Thatcher (1988) even had a tendency to tolerate increasing 
qualified majority voting (QMV) and boost the legislative powers of the European 
Parliament with the SEA.  
Interestingly, the SEA project also forced the EFTA countries to form closer relationships 
with the EEC. The EFTA economies mostly depended on trade with the EEC (HC 347, 
                                                 
33 Although Thatcher resigned in November 1990, the Major government continued to follow the neoliberal 
economic principles designed by her (Thatcherism) (Black et al., 1999, p. 404, Bradbury, 1996, p. 79). In the 
same vein, both leaders were also among the most enthusiastic supporters of the EFTA enlargement within 
the Community (Van Oudenaren, 1992, p. 124).  
34 According to Jenkins (2007), Thatcher assumed that the SEA would be an important step in forming 
“Euro-Thatcherism”. 
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1990, p. viii); thus, their exclusion from the EEC’s internal market would result in 
significant costs to them. For example, the SEA would reduce the costs of trade between 
the EEC members by removing trade barriers, harmonizing trade regulations, and 
establishing common standards for trade (ibid., p. 9); but, the EFTA countries could not 
benefit from them. At this point, the European Economic Area (the EEA) emerged as a 
solution for the EFTA countries because it would provide them with an opportunity to 
participate in most of the benefits of the Single Market (HC 347, 1990, p.10, Watts, 2008, 
p. 39)35.  In particular, according to the EEA:  
The Community’s Single Market would be extended to the seven EFTA states (Austria, Finland, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) from 1 January 1993. The EFTA states would take on most 
of the economic rights and obligations of Community membership created by the relevant Community 
legislations (the “acquis”) without being full members with votes in the Council of Ministers (HC 24-vii, 
1992, p. vii).  
The Conservative government strongly supported the formation of the EEA between the 
EEC and the EFTA; however, the Conservative government had a tendency to perceive the 
EEA as a step that would drive the EFTA countries to full membership. For example, when 
the negotiations for the EEA started in 1989, Douglas Hurd, the Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, highlighted the point that the EEA might be “a 
staging post” for further integration of the EFTA countries into the EEC (HC 82, 1990, p. 
95). In 1992, the Conservative government also argued that the EFTA countries would 
adopt a substantial body of the Community legislation thanks to the EEA agreement and 
this legislative adaptation would “facilitate the accession of those EFTA states who wish to 
join the Community” (HC 24-vii, 1992, p. x).  
In this regard, the expectation of the Conservative government was that the expansion of 
the Single Market towards the EFTA countries would also expand free-market forces 
towards the EFTA countries, which had strong social democratic systems (as an alternative 
to free-market model). For example, Douglas Hurd argued that creating a liberal Europe 
and “bringing down barriers to trade wherever they exist” were Britain’s two longstanding 
objectives and the enlargement of the EU towards the new European countries would 
“cement democracy and free-market” in  the continent (Cm 2798, 1995, p. iii). In parallel 
with this purpose, it was good news for the British government when Swedish business put 
pressure on the Swedish government to apply for the EU membership at the beginning of 
                                                 
35 Thus, as LI argues, this case also shows how interdependence between nation-states affects their rational 
behaviour.  
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the 1990s (Agius, 2006, p. 136) although “Sweden’s social-democratic governments had 
previously rejected membership of the EC on the grounds that the free-market orientation 
of the organization would jeopardize the Swedish model of capitalism” (Bache et al., 2011, 
p. 538).  
Furthermore, the Conservative government was facing difficulty in finding allies within the 
EC/EU to drive the integration process towards an outward-looking intergovernmental 
way. For example, at the Hanover EEC summit (27–28 June 1988), Thatcher was the only 
leader supporting a European integration (the 1992 vision) as a free market system 
(abolition of barriers and creating new trade opportunities) (Owen, 1988). At this point, the 
Conservative Party also perceived the EFTA countries as natural allies in the EC/EU to 
establish a more intergovernmental European Union (Jenkins, 1992). For example, the 
Conservative MP Kenneth Warren argued that the EFTA enlargement would shift the 
centre of gravity within the EC/EU towards the Northern tier countries with which Britain 
had more common values, and that in this way, Britain would no longer be on the 
perimeter of the European integration process (Hansard, 1992, p. 56). 
The security concerns also affected the ruling Conservative Party’s attitude towards the 
EFTA enlargement. In the Cold War context, the neutrality of the EFTA countries was a 
problem for Britain. For example, when Austria applied for the EC membership in July 
1989, the Conservative government was sceptical about the Austrian application due to its 
neutrality in the Cold War context (Mcewen, 1990, Hoagland, 1989). In other words, 
Austria was a neutral country, and “it was therefore regarded as a potential brake on the 
creeping process of military and political integration” (Binyon, 1989). In July 1989, 
Edward Heath even argued that Austria should give up its neutrality as a condition in order 
to enter the Community (Hansard, 1989). However, the end of the Cold War relaxed this 
concern (Mcewen, 1990). To illustrate, in 1990, Margaret Thatcher argued that the issue of 
neutrality was no longer a relevant conditionality on the EEC membership (Mcewen, 
1990).  
Despite this fact, the Conservative government continued to perceive the European 
integration as a part of its collective security understanding, taking NATO at the centre. At 
this point, the Conservative government strongly supported the idea that any security 
measure taken by the European Union should be complementary to NATO (not an 
alternative to it) (Hansard, 1991, p. 1011). In this regard, Douglas Hurd argued that both 
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NATO and the EU were needed in order to maintain stability and prosperity in Europe 
(Cm 2798, 1995, p. iii). As a result, according to the British government, the EU should 
not get any supranational authority in terms of security as France demanded; however, it 
needed an intergovernmental security body complementary to NATO that would also make 
the integration of the neutral EFTA countries into the Western security system possible. 
That’s why, Garel-Jones, the Minister for Europe (Hansard, 1993, p. 527) argued that “no 
one has been stauncher than Britain in advocating the admission of those EFTA countries 
that wish to join the Union or in defending their right as neutrals to join”.36 
4.2.2 Economic Concerns 
The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) removed all tariffs on industrial goods in 
trade between its members in the mid of the 1960s when Britain was still one of its 
members. In addition to this, a free trade agreement between the EEC and EFTA came into 
force after 1973, when Britain became a member of the EEC. As a result of those 
agreements, there was a well-developed trade relationship between Britain and the EFTA 
countries in industrial goods (HC 666, 1990, p. v), and the British government expected 
that the EFTA enlargement would not result in any significant cost to Britain (HC 347, 
1990, HC 24-vii, 1992, p. x). On the other hand, according to the British government, the 
EFTA enlargement would be economically beneficial for Britain in several ways.  
Firstly, a European Union with the EFTA countries would become the world’s largest 
single market with a GDP of nearly $ 7,000 billion; thus a wider Single Market via the 
EFTA enlargement would provide increased opportunities for British business and benefits 
for British consumers, and would promote growth in Britain (HC 262, 1992, p. xxxiv, Cm 
2525, 1994, p. 5). A stronger EU with the EFTA enlargement would also provide benefits 
to Britain in the globalizing world market. For example, after the EFTA enlargement, 40 
per cent of the world trade would be controlled by the EC/EU (HC 216, 1993, p. 14); thus, 
an enlarged EU would be more attractive to foreign investors (Aristotelous and Fountas, 
1996). At this point, Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004) estimated that the EFTA enlargement 
would make the FDI flows to the EU 26 per cent faster, and Britain was the main 
                                                 
36 In a supranational EU security system as France demanded, the EFTA countries’ neutrality would not be 
possible.  
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beneficiary of the FDI flows to the EU37. Furthermore, the EC/EU as the largest Single 
Market after the EFTA enlargement would give the member states more power to govern 
the globalising world market. In this sense, the British government hoped that an enlarged 
EU would help Britain to expand free-market principles further. For example, the EFTA 
countries supported the British government’s position on further liberalization of public 
procurement at the multilateral GATT negotiations (HC 666, 1990, p. v). In the same vein, 
the CBI also shared this expectation with the British government because the GATT 
negotiations were the top priority for the British industry lobby (The Times, 1991a).  
Secondly, although the above-mentioned agreements between the EEC and EFTA 
eliminated tariff barriers to trade, non-tariff barriers remained in a number of sectors, 
which were frustrating the free flow of goods, services, capital and labour. For example, 
there were still restrictions on foreign ownership of companies (including banks) and civil 
aviation sectors in the EFTA countries (HC 666, 1990, p. v). In this regard, the integration 
of the EFTA countries into the Single Market would mean the extension of the four 
freedoms (goods, services, capital, people) to the EFTA countries and the adaptation of the 
acquis communautaire by them (HC 347, 1990). Therefore, the EFTA countries would 
make the necessary harmonization and liberalization in their domestic markets according 
to the EEC’s trade regulations. At this point, the British government expected that the 
liberalization of the EFTA markets (mostly in the public procurement and service sectors) 
and the harmonization of trade regulations between the EFTA and the EC/EU would 
provide new opportunities for British business (HC 347, 1990, HC 24-vii, 1992, HC 262, 
1992, p. xxxiv, HC 666, 1990, p. iv).  
Regarding this expectation, there was a strong consensus among the relevant British actors. 
For example, the Department of Trade and Industry, the Committee of Trade and Industry 
(the House of Commons), and the CBI agreed on the expectation that further liberalization 
of the EFTA markets would provide better opportunities for British business (HC 347, 
1990). Moreover, specific British firms/companies had a similar benefit expectation from 
the EFTA enlargement. For example, Lucas Automotive Ltd, Imperial Chemical Industries 
PLC, the Wellcome Foundation, Crosfield Electronics Limited, Chemical Industries 
Association, the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry, BEAMA Federation 
                                                 
37 As of 1993, “Japan has almost twice as much investment in Britain as in other EC countries while the UK's 
share of US investment within the community amounts to more than the combined totals recorded by 
Germany, the Netherlands and France” (Cassell, 1993). 
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(the British electro-technical manufacturing sector), the British Insurance and Investment 
Brokers’ Association, British Aerospace plc, the Food and Drink Federation, Barclays 
Bank Plc, and National Westminster Bank Plc also expected that further harmonization of 
the trade regulations between the EEC and the EFTA and the liberalization of the EFTA 
markets would provide new opportunities for British business (HC 347, 1990).  
As LI assumes, there were also some British societal groups, which evaluated the 
enlargement according to their issue-specific interests. To illustrate, according to the Food 
and Drink Federation, further liberalization of trade in food and drink industry in the EFTA 
countries would create significant trading and investment opportunities for the British food 
and drink industry. Moreover, according to the Association of British Insurers, the 
insurance markets in the EFTA countries were dominated by domestic companies; 
therefore, further liberalization of the sector in the EFTA markets would open up 
opportunities for the British insurance industry. Additionally, the Department of Trade and 
Industry hoped that the integration of the EFTA countries into the Single Market would 
eliminate the remaining discrimination against the export of British alcoholic beverages to 
the EFTA countries (HC 666, 1990, p. iv). The Department of Transport also expected that 
the liberalisation of the EFTA markets would create significant opportunities for British 
aircraft carriers (HC 11-Xvi, 1990, p. xxiii).  
On the other hand, as the Department of Trade and Industry (HC 347, 1990, p. 83) argued, 
Germany was Britain’s major competitor in the EFTA markets and it had greater 
advantage over Britain regarding the manufacturing sector due to Germany’s geographical 
proximity to the EFTA countries. However, as LI’s absolute-gain oriented micro-
economics logic assumes, British actors mostly focused on Britain’s absolute gains from 
the EFTA enlargement. For example, the principal beneficiary of the extension of the 
Single Market to the EFTA countries would be the finance sector in Britain thanks to its 
higher competitive power (Whitebloom, 1991). Margaret Thatcher started to transform the 
British economy according to the emerging post-industrial global economy in the 1980s 
(Leach, 2002, p. 191). In this era, “a profound shift from a state-dominated to a market-
dominated world” took place (Gilpin, 2000, p. 18), and increasing global integration 
offered a new strategic role for major cities (including London). In the new era, the major 
cities could become the governance centres of the globalized world economy by 
specializing in finance and service sectors instead of manufacturing (Sassen, 1991). Thus, 
Thatcher considerably deregulated and liberalized the British financial market in order to 
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strengthen the position of the City of London as a global financial centre (e.g. the Big Bang 
in 1986) (Hay and Farrall, 2011, Green, 2004, Jeremy, 1998), and those measures 
increased “the pace of the globalization of the London capital markets” (Green, 2004, p. 
173). As a result, “although Britain has lost ground in the export race, primarily to the 
Germans, across the EFTA zone, the EFTA enlargement could give the City of London a 
useful fillip, as financial services should be the main growth area” (The Times, 1991a). In 
this regard, Alison Wright, the Director General of British Invisibles38 also argued that 
doing business in a wider Europe should not be “a zero-sum game”, and that the 
integration of the EFTA countries into the Single Market was a real opportunity for the 
City despite the German dominance in visible trade (e.g. manufacturing) (Narbrough, 
1991).  
Interestingly, unlike LI’s pluralistic understanding, the Conservative government was the 
main actor in the decision making process, and even played a more dominant role by 
increasing British companies’ awareness of the economic opportunities in the EFTA 
markets. In this regard, a report by the Trade and Industry Committee indicated that the 
apathetic attitudes within the British companies towards the EFTA markets was an 
important reason behind Britain’s loss of her potential market share to other Western 
competitors (HC 347, 1990, p. xxv). According to the report, for instance, just few British 
companies visited the Austrian Trade Fairs in 1990, and they also regarded Finland “as a 
relatively unimportant country with a difficult language”. As a reaction to the apathetic 
attitude of British business towards the EFTA markets, the DTI launched British Overseas 
Trade Board Forward Plan (BOTB), which determined the Western Europe as the number 
one priority market. Specifically, the European Trade Committee (the ETC) was formed 
within this structure (BOTB) as an Area Advisory Group, and the ETC launched several 
initiatives in order to increase British companies’ awareness of the EFTA markets. For 
instance, a “Look Nordic” campaign was conducted between 1986 and 1988. In addition to 
this, the ETC organized several seminars in different parts of Britain in order to encourage 
British companies to become more active in the EFTA countries (HC 347, 1990, p. 4).  
Last but not least, according the Conservative government, the enlargement would also 
decrease the EC budget burden on Britain because the EFTA countries would be net 
contributors to the Community budget (HC 48-xiv, 1994, p. xv). For example, the 
                                                 
38 A lobby group for the service sectors in Britain 
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European Commission estimated that “Sweden’s total contribution would account for 
approximately 3.2 per cent of Community expenditure” (HC 79-vi, 1992, p. xliv). 
Additionally, the EFTA countries would be net contributors to the Community cooperation 
programmes, and in this way, Britain (e.g. Northern Ireland) would get more from the 
EC/EU’s cohesion funds after the EFTA enlargement (HC 24-vii, 1992, p. x).  
4.2.3 The Position of Other Domestic Actors 
There was a political consensus on a pro-enlargement towards the EFTA countries at the 
domestic level; therefore, as LI argues, this domestic consensus strengthened the 
Conservative government’s pro-enlargement position at the EC/EU level negotiations and 
played an important role in Britain’s becoming one of the main initiators who launched and 
governed the EFTA enlargement process at the EC/EU level.   
Firstly, the Labour Party, as the main opposition party, supported the EFTA enlargement 
(Wintour, 1990, Oakley, 1990, Jonea and Grice, 1991). For example, in its 1992 election 
manifesto, the party declared that “the Labour Party shall make the widening of the 
Community a priority, and shall advocate speedy admission for Austria, Sweden, Finland 
and Cyprus, whose membership applications have been or are about to be lodged”39. 
However, unlike the Conservative government, there was not a direct/strong relationship 
between the Labour Party’s support for the EFTA enlargement and the wider Europe thesis 
as an alternative to the deepening thesis. For example, George Robertson, who would 
become the Secretary of State for Defence from 1997 to 1999, declared that “the Labour 
Party has set out its agenda for a deeper, wider, more accountable and more relevant 
Community” (Hansard, 1990a, p. 99). In this context, in addition to its strong support for 
the EFTA enlargement, the Labour Party also backed further extension of the QMV 
mechanism (e.g. towards environmental and social issues), but this did not mean that the 
Labour Party supported a federal Europe (Jonea and Grice, 1991). Moreover, like the 
Conservative government, the Labour Party supported the idea that enlargement should 
have a priority over full monetary integration; otherwise, the entry conditions would be 
harder for the applicants (not only for the EFTA countries but particularly for the Eastern 
European countries) (Timmins, 1992). To illustrate, Austin Mitchell, a Labour Party 
politician, argued that a deeper European integration would erect a bigger barrier against 
                                                 
39 http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/lab92.htm, accessed on 29.04.2014.  
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the applicant states but that the main aim of the European integration should be “to bring 
Europe together” (Hansard, 1991, p. 1077). The Labour Party also argued that a military 
role for the EC would make the membership of the neutral EFTA countries (Austria, 
Switzerland and Sweden) impossible; and that therefore, Britain should rule out any 
possibility of the European Community taking on a defence or military role (Hansard, 
1990, p. 509, Hansard, 1990c, p. 38)40.  
In terms of the CBI and the TUC, there was a dramatic change in their capacity to 
influence the national decision making mechanism under the Conservative Party rule in the 
1980s and early1990s. Thatcher tried to institutionalize a strong state authority instead of 
the previous corporatist system (Watts, 2006). “The  National Economic Development 
Council was marginalised, its monthly meetings being reduced to quarterly ones in 1984, 
and it was axed with effect from 1 January 1993” (Wrigley, 2002, p. 74). At this point, 
Thatcherism perceived trade unions as a reason behind the British uncompetitiveness (they 
resulted in increasing cost of goods and services), a catalyst deteriorating the 
unemployment problem, and a serious impediment to a free market economy (ibid.). As a 
result, the TUC’s accession to the government was decreased (Mcilroy, 2009), “the law 
being tilted strongly against trade unions e.g.  outlawing  the  closed  shop,  curtailing  the 
ability of unions to strike and removing the support for collective bargaining (Gospel and 
Wood, 2003) and, in the private sector, many trade union activists being made redundant 
in the early 1980s” (Wrigley, 2002, p. 28). In 1984, Thatcher identified the trade unions 
even as “the enemy within” the country (Undy, 2008). In addition to the TUC, the 
influence of the CBI on the Conservative government also relatively decreased in the 
second half of the 1980s because the CBI was also seen as a part of the corporatist system 
(NEDC) (Burgess, 1998, Grant, 2001), and “particularly under Thatcher, preference was 
given to more ideologically congenial organisations such as the Institute of Directors” 
(Grant, 2001, p. 339).  
As a reaction to the Conservative government’s pressure on it, there happened a dramatic 
change in the TUC’s attitude towards the European Community. Especially, Delaros’ 
(1988) speech to the TUC at Bournemouth played an important role in this shift. Delors 
pointed out that the 1992 programme for completing the Community’s internal market 
                                                 
40 In addition to the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats as another opposition party in the House of 
Commons also backed the EFTA enlargement (The Times, 1992, Travis, 1991, Mason, 1991).  
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would have a social dimension through which “the TUC's voice would carry weight in 
Brussels, even if it was effectively ignored by Mrs Thatcher's government”41.  In parallel 
with the sympathy of Delors towards trade unions, as Denis MacShane (1992) pointed out, 
the unification among the European trade unions after the Maastricht Treaty would become 
more important in the globalizing world. As a result, a deeper cooperation with the 
European Trade Unions Confederation (ETUC) was a rational option for the TUC in order 
to counterweight neoliberal attacks against trade unionism at the domestic level (Rigby, 
1999, p. 29, Van Der Maas, 2006, p. 167, Mitchell, 2012, Rosamond, 1998, p. 139). In 
addition to this, as Ken Jackson (the Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union) 
argued,  the TUC supported the idea that  trade unions should act together in order to have 
a real influence in globalization, and thus, the European Union/ETUC was very important 
for the TUC (The TUC, 1996). In this context, the ETUC (and so the TUC) supported the 
EFTA enlargement (European Social Policy, 1992) because the Scandinavian countries 
had strong trade unions  and those countries’ integration into the EU would also strengthen 
trade unionism within the EU system (HC 676-i, 1994, p. 583).  
In addition to the British government, the CBI was one of the fervent supporters of the 
European Single Market. For example, it launched the Initiative 1992 at the end of the 
1980s with the aim of helping the completion of the European Single Market by 1992 (The 
CBI, 1990). In this context, the CBI favoured a larger Single Market including the EFTA 
countries (Harris, 1991). However, the CBI favoured their full membership to the 
Community rather than maintaining the EEA as a final institution (The Times, 1991). The 
main reason behind this position was that the EFTA countries would be outside the 
responsibility of the common policies and not be subject to the rules of the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) unless they became full members of the Community. Particularly, they 
would not be subject to the common rules on subsidies and competition, which would 
decrease British companies’ chance to be in fair competition with the domestic companies 
in the domestic markets of the EFTA countries. Moreover, those countries would also not 
be a part of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP); thus, border controls on agricultural 
products between the EEC and the EFTA countries would not totally be abolished. 
Additionally, the CBI was worried that the EFTA countries might continue to hold 
reservations about free capital movement and free movement of people. As a result, the 
                                                 
41 http://pro-europa.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=281:delors-necessary-to-work-
together&catid=11:the-struggle-for-the-union-of-europe&Itemid=17, accessed on 24.02.2014.  
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EEA might not provide free movement of goods, services, capital and people as perfectly 
as what full membership provided. On the other hand, according to the CBI, if the EEA 
would be maintained, the benefits enjoyed by the members of the EEC should not totally 
be offered to the EFTA countries, and they should also not be allowed to get involved in 
any decision making procedure, which could lead to delays in the Community’s legislative 
system (HC 347, 1990, p. 120). In other words, according to the CBI, an economic 
integration under the EC system via full membership would be less problematic and more 
profitable compared to the EEA. Therefore, Brain Corby (1992, p. 5), the President of the 
CBI argued that the European Community must become wider and that British business 
should support the early accession of the EFTA countries to the Community. In addition to 
those economic concerns, the CBI also had some political concerns behind its support for 
the EFTA enlargement. In line with the Conservative government’s expectation, Dick 
Eberlie (1992, p. 23), the Director of the CBI’s Brussels Office, argued that the EFTA 
enlargement might form a better balance between the North and South (the rich and poor 
members) within the EU. He also argued that the CBI’s support for the enlargement 
depended on the conditionality that “the negotiations neither impede nor delay … 
progress towards economic and monetary union” (ibid.). As a result, in terms of the EMU, 
the CBI positioned itself in a different place than the Conservative government despite its 
support for the government’s pro-enlargement policy.  
All in all, as LI argues, this section has showed that Britain’s pro-enlargement policy 
towards the EFTA countries was shaped by her national interests. When the discussions on 
the future of the European integration were stimulated after the mid-1980s, the 
Conservative government aimed to create an outward-looking intergovernmental European 
Union in line with its ideological background. Within this context, the Conservative 
governments’ ideological motivations emerged as the main reason behind Britain’s 
ambition to swiftly achieve the EFTA enlargement in addition to the economic and 
geopolitical benefit expectations. Moreover, there was a common consensus among the 
main British actors on a pro-enlargement policy towards the EFTA countries, which 
enabled the British government to become more active within the EC/EU in order to 
accelerate the EFTA enlargement process. In this regard, at the EC/EU level negotiations, 
the main concern of the British government was to achieve the EFTA enlargement prior to 
the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), which would result in important structural 
changes in the EU.  
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4.3 Intergovernmental Bargains 
As noted in the previous section, the Conservative government aimed to create a Single 
Market in accordance with liberal market principles, and widen it further. In this regard, in 
the 1990s, the main motivation of the Conservative government was to institutionalize 
neoliberal principles via the Maastricht Treaty within the EU system, and expand them 
further via enlargement. In this context, the British government targeted to achieve the 
EFTA enlargement prior to the 1996 IGC (through which member states would make 
structural changes to the EU system), and thus increase heterogeneity among member 
states within the EU (via the EFTA countries) in order to prevent potential supranational 
outcomes of the 1996 IGC.  
In particular, the Conservative government put liberalization of trade at the top of its 
presidential agenda when it assumed the Presidency of the EEC Council of Ministers in 
1986 (Owen, 1986). Therefore, the British Presidency re-affirmed the importance of the 
Joint Luxembourg Declaration, which was signed by the EEC and the EFTA to promote 
trade between the two parties in 1984, and this declaration gave political impetus to further 
cooperation between the EEC and the EFTA (Cm 122, 1987, p. 32). In the wake of this 
initiative, the European Commission and the EFTA countries met in Interlaken on 20th 
May 1987 to work on further harmonization of trade regulations between the EC and the 
EFTA countries (Cm 205, 1987, pp. 26-27). In December 1989, the EC and EFTA officials 
agreed to extend the Single Market to the EFTA countries by creating a European 
Economic Area (EEA) (Cm 1023, 1990, p. 39), and in June 1990, the Community began 
the negotiations with the EFTA countries on the establishment of the EEA. As a result, an 
agreement on the EEA was signed on 2nd May 1992, and the EEA entered into force on 1st 
January 1993 (Cm 2065, 1992, p. 30). 
When the EEA negotiations started in 1990, Austria was the only country that had applied 
for full membership (in 1989). The other EFTA countries intended to enjoy the benefits of 
the Single Market via the EEA without full membership, which would impose extra burden 
on them (Tatham, 2009, p. 59). Therefore, during the negotiations on the EEA, they tried 
to get derogations from the acquis communautaire to guarantee special institutional 
arrangements for the EEA, through which they could maintain their national interests, and 
to form special legal frameworks, through which they could get involved in the decision 
making procedure within the EC/EU. However, the EC/EU members opposed the EFTA 
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countries’ demand for permanent derogations from the acquis (e.g. the free movement of 
capital and foreign ownership of shares) (Preston, 1997, pp. 94-95). In this regard, the 
Conservative government also opposed this demand, arguing that the negotiated 
derogations needed to be restricted to short-term transitional arrangements, in a small 
number of specific sectors overall (HC 262, 1992, p. xxxiv).  
Moreover, the old members offered the EFTA countries a limited voice in the EC/EU’s 
decision making procedure (a weak influence over the policy making process in the 
EC/EU); thus, full membership emerged for the EFTA countries as the only option through 
which they would have an equal voice in the EU’s decision making mechanism (Tatham, 
2009, p. 59). As a result, the EFTA countries needed to apply for full membership: Sweden 
made its application in July 1991, Finland in January 1992, Switzerland in May 1992, and 
Norway in November 1992 (later Switzerland and Norway withdrew their applications) 
(Preston, 1997).  
The applications of the EFTA countries for full membership fulfilled a long-term policy 
objective of the British government (Cm 2369, 1993, p. 2). However, as LI assumes, the 
accession negotiations were difficult due to the difference in national interests. More 
specifically, in addition to Britain, Denmark and Germany also welcomed the applications 
of the EFTA countries; however, there was less enthusiasm for the EFTA enlargement 
among the rest of the members since they wanted to give priority to the deepening of the 
EU (Preston, 1997, p. 90). In this regard, France was the least enthusiastic leading member 
within the EC/EU for several reasons. Firstly, from a geopolitical perspective, the EFTA 
enlargement would strengthen Germany’s position within the EU. Secondly, the neutral 
EFTA countries would dilute an independent European defence policy that was strongly 
supported by France. Last but not least, the EFTA countries with their  export-oriented 
economies might transform the EU into a free trade zone in line with the British 
preference, which France did not want  (Krotz and Schild, 2013, p. 145). In addition to 
France, the poorer members of the EC/EU also considered that the EFTA enlargement 
might result in a power shift from poor south to rich north within the EC/EU, and that as a 
result of this power shift, they might benefit less from the EC/EU. Particularly, they were 
worried that “enlargement might weaken the EC's commitment to ‘social and economic 
cohesion’, from which they are substantial beneficiaries” (Hutton, 1992). As a result, at the 
Brussels Summit (11 May 1992), Spain, Portugal and Ireland even expressed their 
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intentions “to veto any decision on the inclusion of the four EFTA countries until a 
satisfactory agreement on the cohesion funds had been achieved” (Piedrafita, 2006, p. 54).  
When the discussions on the future of the Community (the Maastricht Treaty) were heated 
at the beginning of the 1990s, John Major argued that Britain would be “at the centre of 
that debate as an enthusiastic participant” to lead the Community to an outward looking 
future (Cm 1457, 1991, p. vi). According to him, the main challenge was not the 
Community’s internal developments but the dramatic events (e.g. the collapse of the 
Eastern Bloc) taking place around the Community; thus, it needed to focus on those events 
(Moncrieff and Meade, 1991). In this context, when the European Council reached an 
agreement on the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991, the British government declared 
that it was a success for Britain because firstly that it limited the supranational power of the 
EU institutions, secondly that it created a Common Foreign and Security Policy that would 
not become an alternative to NATO, and lastly, that Britain did not make any commitment 
to a single European currency and obtained an opt-out from the Social Charter (Cm 1857, 
1992, HC 223, 1992, p. 15, Gifford, 2008). At this point, as LI assumes, the exclusion of 
the QMV mechanism from the social issues (e.g. minimum wages, working time) was one 
of the main concerns of the CBI about the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, and the British 
government met the CBI’s demand at the EU level negotiations (Harris, 1991).  
At the Maastricht Summit, member states also agreed on the enlargement of the 
Community towards the EFTA countries and Eastern Europe in principle (Jenkins, 1991a, 
The European Council, 1991)42. After this decision, in the following era, the British 
government tried to expedite the pace of the EFTA enlargement and achieve the 
membership of the EFTA countries prior to the 1996 IGC, which would re-arrange the 
institutional structure of the EU. In doing so, Britain hoped that the EFTA enlargement 
would make the federalist/centralist projects for the future of the EU unworkable (Riddell, 
1992). To illustrate, Douglas Hurd, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs, emphasized his belief that the enlargement would make federalist trend inevitable 
within the EU on the eve of the discussions on the 1996 IGC (HC 28-ii, 1994, p. 34).  
                                                 
42 Regarding the outcomes of the Maastricht Summit, the most consensual point was the recognition of the 
enlargement in principle at the domestic level (Riddell, 1992). For example, according to John Major, an 
outward looking Community would need the further enlargement towards the EFTA and Eastern European 
countries (Moncrieff and Meade, 1991), and in the same vein, the Labour Party’s leftist Tribune group also 
argued that “the issue of enlargement should be raised quite genuinely as a question of priority over full 
monetary integration” (Timmins, 1992).  
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However, as the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty was an important conditionality to the 
EFTA enlargement, the Danish veto on the Maastricht Treaty in June 1992 stalled the 
process and put the completion of the EFTA enlargement prior to the 1996 IGC in danger 
(Walker, 1992). In this political atmosphere, when the British government assumed the 
Presidency of the Community in July 1992, it mainly focused on completing the Single 
Market and preparing the Community for the EFTA enlargement (Cm 1857, 1992, p. v). 
Additionally, the British government also aimed to use the EU Presidency as a strategic 
tool to promote “an outward looking Community based on free enterprise” (The 
Conservative Party, 1992).    
In parallel with this purpose, just before Britain’s Presidency, the Prime Minister John 
Major put early start of the accession negotiations with the EFTA applicants on the agenda 
of the Lisbon European Council (26-27th June 1992) in the hope that an early enlargement 
of the EFTA countries would appease the Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty 
(Xinhua General News Service, 1992). At the summit, Germany supported Major’s 
proposal to start the accession negotiations with the EFTA applicants without the need for 
the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by all the member states (Murray, 1992, European 
Report, 1992). However, the other actors did not support this proposal. For example, the 
Commission President Delors argued that “the EC should not consider allowing in new 
members until the Maastricht mess is cleared up and the treaty ratified” (Davis and Greig, 
1992). France and the poorer members (Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland) also 
demanded a new budget deal (extra money) as a condition to cooperate on the EFTA 
enlargement43 (Parkhouse, 1992, Palmer, 1992, Lambert, 1992, Hutton, 1992). As a result, 
John Major could not get full support from other members to start an early accession 
negotiation with the EFTA countries (Moncrieff and Meade, 1992, Palmer, 1992a, 
Gillespie, 1992), and the Council just agreed that “official negotiations with the EFTA 
countries which had applied for membership could begin as soon as the Treaty on 
European Union the Maastricht Treaty] had been ratified and an agreement had been 
                                                 
43 The Commission President Jacques Delors arranged a budget package proposing to increase the 
Community’s spending ceiling to 87.5 billion European currency units ($ 116.5 million) from 66.6 billion 
ECUs (US$ 88.5 billion), a large portion of which would go to cohesion and structural funds in which the 
main beneficiaries were poor members (Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Ireland). However, Britain and 
Germany were against this proposal, which would increase their contribution to the EC budget. As a 
response, the poorer members tried to use the increase in the EC budget as a condition for the EFTA 
enlargement. For example, “Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales has threatened to veto any enlargement 
unless the package is approved” (Rockwell, 1992a). 
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concluded on the second package of structural and financial measures an increase in the 
EC budget” (The European Council, 1992).  
At the Birmingham Summit (16th October 1992), the main concern of Major was to 
decrease the differences between member states in order to increase the chance of the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by all the members especially after a narrow ‘yes’ in 
France (Millar et al., 1992). Therefore, the issue of the EFTA enlargement was not 
prominently discussed at the summit (Millar, 1992). However, at the Edinburgh European 
Council (11-12 December 1992), after giving some concessions in order to increase the EC 
budget, as the poorer members demanded to allow the EFTA enlargement, Major managed 
to convince the other members to start the accession negotiations with Austria, Finland, 
and Sweden at the beginning of 1993 (Lambert and Goodwin, 1992, Macintyre and 
Marshall, 1992, see also: The European Council, 1992a). In addition to this, it was agreed 
that Norway would start accession negotiations as soon as the European Commission 
released its opinion on the Norwegian application (Cm 2168, 1993). However, Switzerland 
was out of the accession negotiations process since the Swiss rejected the EU membership 
in December 1992 (Bache et al., 2011).  
The accession negotiations started with Austria, Finland and Sweden in February 1993 and 
with Norway in April 1993 (Cm 2502, 1994, p. 13). Compared to the Mediterranean 
enlargement, the accession negotiations with the EFTA countries were more systematic. 
Partularly, the Copenhagen European Council (21-22nd June 1993) systematized the 
accession conditionality, which must be met by any applicant country to become an EU 
member44. At this point, the Copenhagen criteria were in conformity with the British 
ambition to create a liberal Europe. Moreover, those criteria would force the EFTA 
countries to open their domestic markets to the other members, and this would 
automatically meet Britain’s expectation to access the EFTA markets. Therefore, the 
Conservative government declared that Britain would support any candidate who met all 
                                                 
44 According to the Copenhagen Criteria, a candidate country should have stable democratic institutions and a 
working market economy, and it should commit itself to totally adopting the acquis communautaire 
(Yesilada, 2012). In addition to this, the acquis was divided into different chapters (29 chapters), and the 
Commission would carry out the accession negotiations by following those chapters to have applicants adopt 
the acquis (Hillion, 2004). In this process, a candidate did not have any negotiation alternative except for 
adopting the acquis, and the Commission had a duty to monitor its adaptation process. In other words, an 
accession negotiations process became a more bureaucratic and fixed process in which the member states 
were less active compared to the Commission although they were still the main actors who decided to start 
and approve accession negotiations. 
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the conditions of membership (the Copenhagen criteria) (HC 79-xx, 1992/93, p. xix). 
Tristan Garel-Jones, the Minister of State for Europe, also described the accession 
negotiations with the EFTA countries as a technical and bureaucratic process, and 
according to him, Britain’s main priority was their accession to the EU by 1st February 
1995 prior to the 1996 IGC (HC 79-xv, 1993).  
As given in the previous section, one of the main political concerns of Britain on the EFTA 
enlargement was the neutrality of the EFTA applicants (except Norway). In general, 
Britain had a tendency to see the European integration as part of the Western security 
system; therefore, the integration of the neutral EFTA countries (Sweden, Austria, and 
Finland) to the Western security system was important for Britain. At this point, the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (the CFSP) was designed in an intergovernmental 
way at the Maastricht Treaty as a complementary structure to NATO (mostly because of 
Britain’s strong Atlanticist position) (Smith, 1999, p. 53). Moreover, the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy was a part of the acquis, with which the EFTA countries would comply 
(HC 48-xiv, 1994, p. xii). As a result, the neutral EFTA countries would be integrated to 
the Western security system via the CFSP, and Britain was satisfied with this security 
arrangement.   
At the same time, the Copenhagen Summit (21-22nd June 1993) gave impetus to the 
accession negotiations with the EFTA countries and re-affirmed 1st January 1995 as a 
target date for the enlargement (The European Council, 1993). Subsequently, a special 
European Council (29th October 1993) set 1st March 1994 as a target date to complete the 
accession negotiations with Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Norway (Cm 2525, 1994, p. 4). 
The accession negotiations between the EU and the EFTA were in general smooth, and 
“the most difficult negotiating chapters were agriculture, fisheries, regional policy, the 
budget and institutions” (Cm 2675, 1994, p. 22).  
However, the need to reform the EU’s qualified majority voting (QMV) mechanism was a 
paradoxical issue for the British government at the EU level negotiations because it did not 
want to increase the power of the QMV mechanism in the EU decision making system 
despite its ambition for the EFTA enlargement. According to the existing QMV 
mechanism, there were 76 votes in total in the Council of Ministers and 23 votes out of 76 
(the threshold of blocking minority) were sufficient to block any decision. However, 
according to a reform proposal arranged by the European Commission, the total vote 
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number would increase to 90 and the threshold of blocking minority would increase to 27 
votes from 23 votes after the EFTA enlargement (Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway).  
Douglas Hurd refused this proposal at a foreign ministers meeting in Brussels on 23rd 
March 1994. Britain was against this proposal because it would strengthen the central 
power of the EU at the expense of Britain’s sovereignty (Brown, 1994, Major, 1999, p. 
588). In other words, this proposal would limit Britain’s ability to block any EU decision 
that was against Britain’s interests (Ellingsen, 1994). Another reason behind Britain’s 
refusal of the new proposal for the blocking minority (27 votes out of 90) was that if the 
arithmetic used in this proposal was implemented to future enlargements (e.g. Poland, 
Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic), the large members (including Britain) would lose 
their power in the EU decision making system despite their overwhelming resource 
contribution to the EU (Young, 1994).  
In the wake of the Commission’s proposal, the Eurosceptics in the Conservative Party also 
forced Major and Hurd to refuse it (Ames, 1994, Major, 1999, pp. 588-589). In this regard, 
according to Preston (1997, p. 106), the Eurosceptic Conservative members were 
influential because a further intensified Eurosceptic backlash might overturn the 
Conservative government’s small majority in the Parliament. As a result, Major tried to 
block this proposal at the EU level negotiations and even declared that “he was willing to 
think about delaying EU enlargement if the proposed voting system weakened Britain's say 
in decision-making” (Duncan, 1994, see also: Young, 1998, p. 454 and Lippert, 2006, p. 
114) although the EFTA enlargement was a priority for the British foreign policy. 
Therefore, from an LI perspective, when the negative externalities of the EFTA to Britain 
became significant, her support for the EFTA enlargement correspondingly diminished.  
To resolve the deadlock, an informal foreign ministers meeting was arranged in Ioannina 
(Greece) on 26-27th March 1994. At the meeting, Britain and Spain insisted that the 
minority blocking continue with 23 votes after the EFTA enlargement until the 1996 IGC, 
where there would be a final negotiation to determine the EU’s decision making 
mechanism. In other words, according to them, one small and two large EU members 
should continue to have a veto power even in a 16-nation EU 45(Wielaard, 1994).  
                                                 
45 According to the existing system, there were 76 votes (Britain, France, Germany and Italy got 10 votes; 
Spain, 8; Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal, 5; Denmark and Ireland, 3 each, and Luxembourg, 
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However, Britain’s position was weak at the Ioannina meeting (Major, 1999, p. 589). 
Firstly, there was just Spain as an ally supporting Britain’s position (23 votes as the 
threshold of blocking minority); however, its support waned in time (Macintyre and 
Marshall, 1994a). Secondly, the other 10 members strictly supported that the necessary 
vote number should be 27 out of 90 in order to block any decision in the Council of 
Ministers after the EFTA enlargement (Barnard, 1994a). Thirdly, the European officials 
also supported the proposal and refused any concession in a way that Britain wanted. For 
example, Jacques Delors refused to accommodate the proposal in parallel with the British 
demand and argued that a crisis would be better than a poor compromise (Wise, 1994). 
Fourthly, some of the members of the European Parliament (MEPs) argued that “they 
[would] vote enlargement down if Britain and Spain [were] allowed to weaken EU 
authority” (Brown, 1994). In addition to this, a group of the MEPs from the Conservative 
Party sent John Major a message urging him to find a solution to the crisis (Macintyre and 
Marshall, 1994b). Last but not least, March 1994 was a vital deadline to finalise the 
accession negotiations with the EFTA countries, as the enlargement treaty needed the 
approval of the European Parliament; however, the Parliament would be dissolved for the 
elections in June 1994, and if the member states missed this deadline, it would be hardly 
possible to achieve the accession of the EFTA countries to the EU on 1st January 1995 
(Mclaughlin, 1994).  
As a result, Britain had to accept an increase from 23 to 27 votes in order to block any 
decision at the Council of Ministers after obtaining some concessions. According to the 
compromise, “the blocking minority would be set at 27 votes, but countries that muster 
23 to 26 votes can delay decisions for a ‘reasonable’ period of time” (Barnard, 1994b). 
Moreover, the new rule would not be implemented in the issue of labour legislation in 
order to guarantee Britain’s opt-out from the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty 
(ibid.). Additionally, John Major highlighted the point that the agreement on the QMV was 
only acceptable until the 1996 IGC, which would re-organize the EU’s governance (HC 
48-xiv, 1994, p. xix). 
After solving the QMV crisis, the Accession Treaty with the EFTA countries was signed at 
the Corfu European Council (24-25th June 1994) (The European Council, 1994). 
                                                                                                                                                    
2). The vote to achieve the blocking minority was 23 out of 76; therefore, one small and two large members 
could reach 23 votes and veto any decision.  
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Subsequently, Finland, Sweden and Norway held referenda on EU membership in the fall 
of 1994. Although the Finnish and Swedish people voted in favour of membership, the 
Norwegian people voted against it (Cm 2798, 1995). Additionally, Austria had already 
held a referendum in favour of membership on 26-27th March 1994 (Cm 2675, 1994, p. 
22). As a result of those referenda, Austria, Finland, and Sweden became full members of 
the EU on 1st January 1995 prior to the 1996 IGC; therefore, the British government 
achieved to fulfil one of its long-term policy objectives on the European integration (Cm 
2369, 1993, p. 2).  For instance, John Major argued that  
Enlargement would bring into the Union countries which share Britain’s open trading instincts, and which 
will be net contributors to the budget. It will be another step towards the wider, less centralised, open trading 
Europe for which the members of the Conservative government have been working” (HC 48-xiv, 1994, p. 
xix).  
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the EFTA countries from 
an LI perspective. As found in the Mediterranean enlargement case, this chapter has also 
found that LI’s two-level game approach was an efficient method in analysing how Britain 
developed her national preferences over the EFTA enlargement and how the Conservative 
government defended them at the EU level negotiations. Particularly, there was a strong 
consensus among the main domestic actors on a pro-enlargement policy towards the EFTA 
enlargement, which made the British government one of the main initiators of the EFTA 
enlargement at the EU level. Related to this, the findings have also supported LI’s 
intergovernmentalist assumptions. In concrete terms, a pro-enlargement policy towards the 
EFTA countries was shaped according to Britain’s national interests and the Conservative 
government tried to defend those interests at the EU level negotiations. For example, the 
accession of the EFTA countries to the EU before the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference 
(IGC) was very important for the British government to drive the European integration 
process towards an outward-looking intergovernmental system. Therefore, the 
Conservative government tried to accelerate the EFTA enlargement process in the early 
1990s, and firmly rejected the EFTA countries’ demand for some permanent derogation 
from the acquis at the negotiations on the EEA (otherwise, it would be an alternative to full 
membership).  
However, the findings showed that LI’s economic interest oriented rational choice 
assumption is limited in explaining this case because, firstly, the ideological concerns were 
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the main driving force behind the Conservative government’s pro-enlargement policy 
towards the EFTA countries, and secondly the economic motivation of British actors for a 
pro-enlargement policy mostly depended on expectations rather than clear-cut cost-benefit 
calculations due to the complexity of the issue. As noted above, the EFTA enlargement 
coincided with the EU level history-making negotiations, and the Conservative 
government with its neoliberal motivations perceived the EFTA enlargement as a chance to 
drive the European integration towards a more outward-looking intergovernmental way 
and also as a chance to export liberal market economy principles to the EFTA countries. 
However, despite this limitation, LI’s logic of micro-economics (rational choice 
assumption) convincingly explains an interesting behaviour/attitude of the British 
government in this case. More specifically, the Conservative government was aware that 
Germany would gain more than Britain from the EFTA enlargement in terms of the 
manufacturing sector; however, British government did not perceive this as a threat and 
focused on the finance sector in which Britain had a comparative advantage over other 
members including Germany. Therefore, as LI’s logic of micro-economics assumes, the 
British government mostly focused on the absolute gains of the EFTA enlargement to 
Britain rather than other members’ relative gains from it.   
In addition to this finding, the chapter has also found that economic expectations and 
geopolitical concerns, which were actually intertwined with the above-mentioned 
ideological concerns, were also other variables which affected Britain’s pro-enlargement 
policy towards the EFTA countries. As noted above, the Conservative government aimed 
to liberalize the EFTA markets via enlargement according to its neoliberal ideology. 
However, this ideological ambition was also in conformity with the economic expectation 
that the liberalization of the EFTA markets would offer new economic opportunities to 
British business. In this sense, there was a common consensus between the Conservative 
government and numerous British companies on this benefit expectation. For example, the 
Department of Trade and Industry, the Committee of Trade and Industry, and the CBI 
agreed on this expectation in addition to several other interest groups/companies such as 
Chemical Industries Association, the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry, 
BEAMA Federation, the British Insurance and Investment Brokers’ Association, the Food 
and Drink Federation, and Barclays Bank Plc.  
In addition to economic expectations, geopolitical concerns also affected the British 
government’s attitude towards the EFTA enlargement. For example, when Austria applied 
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for full membership in 1989, the Conservative government perceived its neutrality as a 
problem in the Cold War context. However, in the post-Cold War context, the neutrality of 
the EFTA countries was not a problem but a chance for the Conservative government to 
thwart France’s ambition to create an independent European security system (as an 
alternative to NATO).   
Therefore, as LI assumes, it could be argued that the British government benefited from a 
multi-causal reasoning, containing ideological motivations, economic expectations and 
geopolitical concerns, while formulating its pro-enlargement policy towards the EFTA 
countries as it was hard to make precise cost-benefit calculations on the EFTA 
enlargement. However, as noted in the theory chapter, LI does not have further explanation 
about this multi-causal reasoning. At this point, if the findings from the literature review 
are considered, the Conservative government’s ideological ambitions, economic 
expectations, and geopolitical concerns about the EFTA enlargement appeared more 
consistent and rational within the general British foreign policy framework. In other words, 
the Conservative government’s ambition to liberalize the EFTA markets via enlargement 
(and economic benefit expectation from it) was in conformity with the British foreign 
policy priorities. Thus, the British foreign policy priorities as a structure might have 
constituted a rationale for Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the EFTA countries. 
The findings from the chapter have also showed that, unlike LI’s pluralistic decision 
making assumption, the British government was not only a dominant actor in the national 
preference formation process but also an entrepreneur trying to increase British business’ 
awareness of the economic opportunities in the EFTA markets. For example, the 
Conservative government established the  European  Trade  Committee  (the  ETC) to  
raise  British  companies’  awareness  of  the  EFTA  markets and to help them to access 
those markets. However, as LI argues, the Conservative government was still responsive to 
the demands of British societal groups despite its domination in the national preference 
formation process. For example, as noted above, by refusing the EFTA countries’ any 
permanent derogation from the acquis at the negotiations on the EEA, the British 
government also met the CBI’s demand, which was against any EU level agreement 
diluting liberal trade principles (see: HC 347, 1990, p. 120).  
In this regard, when the issue of the extension of the QMV was raised at the EU level 
negotiations, the influence of the domestic dynamics on the Conservative government 
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became more apparent. More specifically, although the British government strictly 
negotiated to prevent any further extension of the QMV within the EU decision making 
system, it failed to achieve this despite getting some concessions. As a result, the outcome 
of the negotiations was a lukewarm result for the Conservative government and would 
result in further clash in the Conservative Party between the pro-Europeans and the 
Eurosceptics. In this regard, in his memoirs, Douglas Hurd (2003, pp. 438-440) argued that 
he accepted this deal because of Britain’s broader interests in the EU but he also admitted 
that the main fault of the Foreign Office was to leave the negotiations on the QMV late in 
the tight timetable of the EFTA enlargement (1st January 1995) (Theakston, 2004, p. 220).  
In his autobiography, John Major also defined the outcome as a mistake, which could have 
been avoided (Major, 1999, pp. 589-590). Therefore, the extension of the QMV was an 
unanticipated consequence of the EFTA enlargement for the Conservative government and 
resulted in further domestic criticism against the government in the following era.   
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5 The Eastward Enlargement 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses Britain’s policy towards the Eastward enlargement from an LI 
perspective. The Eastward enlargement was a highly complex and detailed process, which 
took place over a long period from the early 1990s to the mid-2000s, during which both the 
Conservative and Labour governments held power. Moreover, the Eastward enlargement 
went hand in hand with two history-making intergovernmental conferences (the 1996 IGC 
and 2000 IGC). Therefore, to deeply analyse this complex process, the chapter separately 
focuses on the Conservative government (1989-1997) and the Labour government (1997-
2007) periods.   
LI’s two level-game approach is a useful method in analysing how Britain developed her 
national preferences over the Eastward enlargement at the domestic level and how the 
successive governments (the Conservative and Labour governments) defended them at the 
EU level negotiations. As found in the previous cases (the Mediterranean and EFTA 
enlargements), the findings of this chapter also support LI’s intergovernmental assumption 
that a pro-enlargement policy towards the CEECs46 was shaped according to Britain’s 
national interests. In this regard, there was a strong consensus on a pro-enlargement policy 
among the main domestic actors, which made the successive British governments the 
influential initiators of the Eastward enlargement at the EU level. However, despite their 
strong pro-enlargement position, the successive British governments were not willing to 
sacrifice Britain’s crucial interests (e.g. the British rebate) for the sake of the Eastward 
enlargement during the enlargement-related reform negotiations. 
Moreover, as found in the previous cases, this case has also showed that LI’s pluralistic 
decision making and economic interest oriented rational choice assumption are limited in 
explaining Britain’s national preference formation process for a pro-enlargement policy. 
Firstly, unlike LI’s pluralistic decision making assumption, the findings have showed that 
the British governments were the dominant actor in the national preference formation 
process. Secondly, unlike LI’s economic interest oriented rational choice assumption, 
                                                 
46 The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and 
later, Romania and Bulgaria. 
103 
 
geopolitical concerns were the dominant reason behind the British governments’ support 
for the Eastward enlargement. Yet, the research has also found that those geopolitical 
concerns were interconnected with the economic expectations and ideological motivations 
of the British governments. Therefore, this finding supports LI’s multi-causal reasoning 
that geopolitical concerns and ideological motivations might be more or equally influential 
over actors’ decisions when they face complex issues to make precise cost-benefit 
calculations on. But, as noted in the theory chapter, LI’s actor oriented logic does not 
provide further explanation about this multi-causal reasoning. In this regard, as the 
literature review suggested, the British foreign policy structure might have constituted a 
rationale for the British governments because their expectation that the expansion of 
democracy and liberal market principles to the CEECs via enlargement would bring more 
security and prosperity to Europe and to Britain was in conformity with the main British 
foreign policy objectives.  
To systematically present the analyses/findings in detail, this chapter firstly focuses on the 
Conservative government era, and then on the Labour government era. In both cases, from 
an LI perspective, the chapter analyses the collected data to answer two questions: firstly, 
how the British executive and the relevant societal groups determined the national 
preferences with regard to the Eastward enlargement, and secondly, how political and 
economic concerns affected the national preference formation process. Subsequently, the 
research focuses on the question: how the British executive (the Conservative and Labour 
governments) defended Britain’s national preferences at the EU level negotiations. These 
negotiations consisted of successive sessions. Therefore, the domestic reactions to these 
successive sessions were also taken into consideration, as it is true that domestic reactions 
to the outcomes of former sessions might have affected Britain’s national preferences at 
subsequent sessions during the long negotiation process.  
5.2 The Conservative Party Period (1989-1997) 
5.2.1 National Preference Formation  
5.2.1.1 Political Concerns 
As found in the previous cases, this case has also confirmed LI’s intergovernmental 
assumption that the Conservative government’s pro-enlargement policy towards the 
CEECs was shaped according to Britain’s national interests. Firstly, the research has found 
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that geopolitical concerns were the dominant reason behind the Conservative government’s 
pro-enlargement policy (see also: Lippert et al., 2001). However, according to findings, 
ideological motivations and economic expectations were also the other factors affecting 
British actors’ position on the Eastward enlargement. Therefore, Britain’s pro-enlargement 
policy towards the Eastward enlargement was an output of a multi-causal reasoning.  
On the eve of the collapse of the Soviet hegemony over Central and Eastern Europe, 
Britain’s main concern was that the emerging power vacuum in the region might result in 
new security risks in Europe. According to the Conservative government, this was a 
security problem that could not be solved by bilateral measures. For example, any bilateral 
involvement in the region might unfavourably provoke the Soviet Union or the authorities 
of the Eastern European Countries, which would weaken the reform attempts in the region 
(HC 16, 1989, p. xxx). Moreover, bilateral arrangements to fill the mentioned security 
vacuum might also pave the way for new unexpected and dangerous security problems on 
the continent (HC 82, 1990, p. 34). Therefore, according to the British government, a 
collective policy was needed to guarantee the democratisation of the CEECs (Cm 708, 
1989, p. 10). At this point, the EU would be the best multilateral framework to form a 
collective policy towards the region47. Particularly, the Community’s enlargement policy 
could be effectively used to achieve the transition of the CEECs from authoritarianism to 
democracy (Bevins and Bulloch, 1989). The Conservative government’s experience from 
the Mediterranean enlargement also encouraged it to give the EC/EU’s enlargement policy 
a central role to manage the democratization of the CEECs. For example, both Margaret 
Thatcher (1993) and John Major (1993a) argued that the enlargement policy could be used 
as an effective tool to create a democratic and free market oriented Central and Eastern 
Europe, as the Mediterranean enlargement achieved in Greece, Portugal and Spain in the 
1980s.  
                                                 
47 The Conservative government also believed that the extension of NATO towards the CEECs should be a 
complementary security measure in addition to the EU’s enlargement towards the region because the EU’s 
enlargement might not be a panacea for every security problem that Europe faced (Cm 2800, 1995, p. 22). In 
parallel with this, when the 1994 Brussels Summit welcomed the enlargement of NATO towards the 
democratic countries from the Central and Eastern Europe,  the Conservative government was “one of the 
foremost proponents of enlargement, and played a full part in the preparation of the NATO Enlargement 
Study” (Cm 3781, 1997, p. 4). Moreover, Britain strongly supported NATO’s Partnership for Peace and the 
WEU’s Associate Partnership programme and also launched the Outreach programme as a bilateral co-
operation with Central and Eastern Europe in order to integrate CEECs into the Western security system (HC 
215, 1996, p. vi, Cm 2800, 1995, p. 22).  
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In parallel with this motivation, the Conservative government played an active role within 
the Community to promote relationship between the EC/EU and the CEECs (Cm 2369, 
1993, p. 19). For example, when the Soviet bloc started to crack, Thatcher (Moncrieff, 
1990) and Hurd (Cm 1023, 1990, p. 7) proposed that the EC/EU needed to develop its 
relationship with the CEECs to govern the rapid and dramatic change in the region. 
Especially, the political stability and economic development of the CEECs should be 
achieved to maintain “the long-term peace and prosperity of the continent” (Cm 2369, 
1993, p. 19). To achieve this, according to the British government, the enlargement policy 
needed to be used as a “carrot and stick” policy. Thus, at the first level, the Central and 
Eastern European countries would be separately considered according to their unique 
conditions (Cm 708, 1989, p. 7). Secondly, the integration of the CEECs into the EC/EU 
would gradually happen in a period, in which important but painful reforms would be 
achieved step-by-step according to the conditionality of enlargement. As a result, 
according to the Conservative government, firstly trade and cooperation agreements, 
secondly association agreements, and finally full membership of the CEECs into the 
EC/EU would be achieved (HC 35-i, 1991, p. 7, Major, 1992).   
According to Douglas Hurd, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs, the association agreements with the CEECs would be the most effective interim 
arrangements (HC 335, 1990, p. 12). By using this arrangement, the Community would be 
able to fully get involved in the transition process in those countries and would be able to 
screen the reform processes country by country. In this way, the Community would also be 
able to accelerate the transition process and to keep the economic and political reforms in 
the CEECs in the way the Community wanted. In other words, the Conservative 
government assumed that those agreements would tremendously increase the asymmetric 
economic tie between the EC/EU and the CEECs in favour of the Community (Cm 641, 
1989, p. 6), and the EC could use this asymmetric economic interdependence to promote 
the democratization process in the region. For example, the Community used this power by 
suspending the negotiations of a trade and cooperation agreement with Romania as a 
reaction to Romania’s poor human rights policy in 1989 (Cm 801, 1989, p. 6). As a result, 
as Hurd argued, the association agreements would be a bridge to eventual full membership 
but not a guarantee since full membership would depend on the condition that the CEECs 
have a democratic political system and a working market economy (HC 77-i, 1990).   
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The ideological motivation of the Conservative Party was also influential in the 
Conservative government’s adopting this position. In particular, the Conservative 
government’s ideological motivation and security concerns were spirally intertwined and 
they co-existed. The party believed that the expansion of liberal democracy would not only 
bring prosperity but also perpetual peace on the continent. For example, John Major 
(1993b) argued that the association agreements would substantially liberalise trade in 
Central and Eastern Europe, and trade liberalization was the most effective and permanent 
means to consolidate political stability, economic growth, and peace in the region. In 
addition to Major, Francis Maude, the Minister of State for Europe, also argued that “a 
market economy goes hand in hand with genuine democracy”; therefore, the political 
reforms in the Central and Eastern European countries needed to be sustained by liberal 
economic change (Hansard, 1990b, p. 334). In parallel with this expectation, the 
Conservative government even had a tendency to tolerate the short-run costs of the 
Eastward enlargement48. Both Margaret Thatcher (1993) and John Major (1993a) 
continued their support for the Eastward enlargement even though both accepted that the 
Eastward enlargement might result in some short-run costs to Britain. However, the British 
government also rationally considered that if Britain did not tolerate the short-run costs and 
did not help the CEECs, the alternative cost (e.g. high security risk with the unstable 
CEECs) would be much higher (see: Thatcher, 1993).  
On the other hand, Thatcherism as an economic model was highly popular in the Central 
European countries (Castle, 1990). For example, Vaclav Klaus, the leader of the Civic 
Democratic Party in the Czech Republic, was highly inspired by the Thatcherite ideas 
(Hanley, 1999, Williams, 2003, Rutland, 1992). According to Morawski (1997, p. 298), the 
Polish reform policy was also mostly shaped in a neoliberal paradigm (particularly in the 
period between 1989 and 1993); thus, it was “an attempt to implement the prescriptions of 
Thatcherism […]”. Additionally, Poland also followed the Thatcherite privatization model 
after the collapse of the communist regime in the country (Jasinski, 1997). As a result, the 
Eastward enlargement would give the Conservative government a chance to increase its 
ideological influence over the region.  
                                                 
48 The Eastward enlargement would put extra burden on the EU budget, as the CEECs would become net 
receivers from the EU budget, and would result in procedural costs regarding the governance of the EU. In 
addition to this, the CEECs needed to achieve an economic transition from socialist economy to liberal 
market economy prior to their full membership, which needed economic help and trade/export privileges 
provided by the EU’s rich members.    
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Moreover, as Tristan Garel-Jones (Hansard, 1993a, p. 928) and Douglas Hurd (HC 77-i, 
1990, p. 13) pointed out, the Conservative government expected that the Eastward 
enlargement would become a catalyser to form an outward-looking intergovernmental 
Community because the Eastward enlargement would make the EU more heterogeneous 
(HC 51-xxviii, 1996, p. 9). Thus, as John Major argued, the Conservative government 
favoured an early Eastward enlargement as soon as possible (Hansard, 1992a). On the 
other hand, the ruling Conservative Party was against the thesis that the EC needed a 
massive institutional change (in a supranational way) in order to increase the EC’s 
magnetism/attractiveness to the Central and Eastern European countries. For example, 
Douglas Hurd (HC 82, 1990, p. 80) argued that changing the balance of power within the 
institutions of the Community would not help to increase the magnetism of the EC. 
According to him, “the EC's attractiveness to East Europe was because of progress it had 
made towards the single market”; thus, “he scorned attempts to move further to a single 
bank and common currency” (Usborne, 1989). Thatcher also argued that power transfer 
from member states to the (bureaucratic) EC institutions (e.g. a European Central Bank) 
would make the EC democratically less accountable, and this would be ironic while the EC 
was “encouraging the countries of East Europe to move to full democracy and human 
rights” (Usborne and Bevins, 1989). In the same vein, Micheal Howard, the Secretary of 
State for Employment, argued that “it would be ironic if at a time when the workers of 
Eastern Europe are being freed from bureaucracy and collectivism, the European 
Community began to impose on its own employers and employees new obstacles to 
freedom of choice at work the Social Charter” (Cm 1810, 1992, p. 6). Moreover, 
according to Thatcher (1990), the Central and Eastern European countries had a very 
strong feeling of the national identity and “they would want to preserve that while also 
cooperating with the Community”. Therefore, a more intergovernmental EC/EU with a less 
centralised and looser structure imposing fewer obligations on its members would be more 
useful/effective in integrating the CEECs into the EC/EU. Otherwise, a supranational 
integration in Western Europe would be worthless if some of the CEECs would slip back 
into authoritarianism due to their inability to meet the higher expectation of a potential 
supranational Union (Thatcher, 1993). At this point, according to Francis Maude, the 
Minister of State for Europe, the rules of the Community should not be changed in a way 
(more bureaucratic/supranational) that might prevent any applicant from being able to join 
(HC 188-iii, 1990).   
108 
 
A pro-enlargement policy would also become a strategic position regarding the 
Conservative Party’s inner party politics. As noted in the previous chapter, the issue of the 
European integration resulted in a division within the Conservative Party (e.g. Eurosceptic 
Thatcher versus pro-European Nigel Lawson, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and 
Geoffrey Howe, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs) (Heppell, 
2007, p. 77). This division even became one of the main reasons behind Thatcher’s 
resignation. Subsequently, when John Major came to power, the issue of European 
integration was still a division reason within the Conservative Party. Particularly, Major 
was mostly supported by the Conservative/Thatcherite Eurosceptics against Heseltine and 
Hurd for the party leadership; thus, the Eurosceptic Conservative Party members would 
have a power to destabilise Major’s party leadership in the 1990s (Heppell, 2007, pp. 92-
93, Crowson, 2007, p. 55). Moreover, after the Maastricht Treaty, the division within the 
party on the issue of European integration became more apparent between the Europhiles 
(e.g. Michael Heseltine) and the Eurosceptics (e.g. Michael Portillo, Peter Lilley and John 
Redwood). At this point, John Major tried to use a consensual and pragmatic leadership to 
prevent a further split in the party (Heppell, 2007, p. 96). In this regard, the aim to create 
an outward-looking and intergovernmental Europe would be acceptable for both groups, 
and the EU’s further enlargement would help to achieve this aim. For example, according 
to a survey carried out in 1994, the majority of the backbench Conservatives perceived the 
enlargement of the EU as the best defence against deepening/supranational attempts within 
the EU (Baker et al., 1995, p. 222). Thus, a pro-enlargement policy would also help John 
Major to prevent any further division in the Conservative Party49.  
5.2.1.2 Economic Concerns 
As LI assumes, the chapter has found that the British actors also tried to consider the 
potential economic outcomes (benefits and costs) of the Eastward enlargement in addition 
                                                 
49 Despite Major’s consensual and pragmatic leadership attempts, when the Major government accepted the 
Ioanninan compromise (1994) on the new QMV system at the Council of Ministers (the increase in the 
blocking minority vote from 23 to 27), which was necessary for the EFTA enlargement, the Eurosceptic 
Conservatives strongly criticized John Major and they demanded that the QMV blocking minority should be 
restored to 23 at the 1996 IGC (Baker et al., 1995, p. 229). Even a Conservative backbencher (Tony Marlow) 
called Major’s resignation as a response to the increasing power of the QMV system (Crowson, 2007, p. 60). 
In the same year (October 1994), Norman Lamont, the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, also argued that 
the possibility of withdrawal from the EU should be openly discussed (Forster, 2002, p. 110). As a response 
to the increasing power of the Eurosceptics within the party, Major tactically resigned and then maintained 
his leadership until 1997. However, from an LI perspective, increasing Euroscepticism within the party 
limited the Major’s government flexibility at the EU level negotiations on the EU reforms that were 
necessary for the Eastward enlargement. 
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to the political outcomes. In particular, the Conservative Party’s security/ideology 
dominated pro-enlargement policy had also an economic dimension. In general, the 
Conservative government expected that the expansion of the Single Market towards the 
CEECs would create more prosperity for all the members. In particular, the Eastward 
enlargement would provide new markets for British goods and new investment 
opportunities for British firms (Cm 1969, 1992, p. 3, HC 21, 1992, p. xvi). For example, 
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) defined the extension of Single Market laws 
to the CEECs as a significant beneficial development for the British traders, investors and 
consumers simply because the enlarging Single Market would provide new markets for the 
EU exporters, improve access of CEE-produced goods to the Community markets, attract 
inward investment, and contribute to the competitiveness of the EU in the global market 
(HC 378, 1995, p. 6). Additionally, the Conservative government also wanted to benefit 
from the Eastward enlargement as a tool to consolidate London as a financial centre in 
Europe and in the world. For example, the British government managed to make London 
EBRD’s (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development50) headquarter in 1991(Cm 
1234, 1990, p. 36). 
Moreover, the economic expectations of British business mainly focused on the potential 
benefits from the liberalisation/modernization of the markets of the CEECs. For example, 
the DTI advised that the British companies’ emphasis should be on “modernisation and 
refurbishment at enterprise level, particularly through co-operation, joint ventures etc.” 
instead of capital intensive projects (HC 51, 1988, p. 5). Some specific British companies 
also perceived the liberalization of the CEECs’ markets as an economic opportunity. For 
example, one of the DTI’s interviews carried out with 17 British firms in the computer and 
telecommunication sector showed that most of the firms perceived the reforms in the 
CEECs as an opportunity that would stimulate their exports (HC 231, 1992, p. 61). 
Communication and Control Engineering Co. Ltd. also expected that the CEECs would 
modernise and improve safety standards in their mining industries, and this would create “a 
considerable market for mining equipment” (HC 216, 1993, p. 118). In a similar way, 
Ravenscraig expected that the liberalization would develop the economies of the CEECs; 
therefore, the demand for higher quality strip steel products that were not locally available 
would increase in the region (HC 63, 1991, p. 13). The British Insurance and Investment 
                                                 
50 It was initially designed to build market economies in the CEECs.  
110 
 
Broker’s Association also expected that the liberalization of the CEECs’ markets would 
develop their economies; thus, the brokers’ role would increase in those developing and 
liberalizing markets (HC 216, 1993, p. 63). As a result of this expectation, according to the 
Association, the major British brokers already opened offices in many of those countries at 
the beginning of the 1990s (ibid.). In the same vein, British Airways Plc argued that the 
liberalization of the CEECs would offer new market opportunities. In addition to this, 
according to the company, the reduction in military forces and unification of European 
airspace would provide extra opportunities for civil air transport in general (HC 147, 1992, 
p. 71).  
However, the extension of the Single Market towards Central and Eastern Europe was not 
seen as an opportunity for all the British sectors. The integration of those countries into the 
Single Market was particularly seen as a potential threat to the British agriculture and food 
sectors mostly because of their low-cost products. Thus, according to the Conservative 
government, the reform of the CAP and the Structural Funds would be necessary to make 
enlargement a success (Cm 3441, 1996, p. 8). Particularly, the MAFF argued that the 
reforms in the CAP were needed not only for the potential Eastward enlargement but also 
for the next round of international trade negotiations (the WTO round negotiations on 
agriculture in 1999) because “EU agricultural policies must operate within the framework 
of the Union’s international trade commitments” (Cm 3604, 1996, p. 5). Other relevant 
domestic actors also shared the idea that the CAP should be reformed for a successful 
Eastward enlargement. For example, the NFU declared its support for the Eastward 
enlargement, but according to it, the enlargement should not undermine the long-term 
viability of the EU horticulture industry (HC 61-ii, 1995). According to the British Poultry 
Meat Federation (BPMF), the EC should not open its market to imports from the CEECs 
without necessary internal reforms to reduce the cost of agricultural inputs; otherwise, it 
would penalise the EC poultry and meat industry (HC 112, 1992, p. 217). MD Foods Plc 
also argued that further enlargement towards the CEECs required a change in the existing 
CAP regime because the average price of dairy products in the Czech Republic, the Slovak 
Republic, Hungary and Poland was half of the EU members according to the 1993 
statistics (HC 40, 1996 p. 177). According to Milk Marque, the Central and Eastern 
European countries also needed a long transition period before full integration into the 
CAP mostly because of their low cost and hygiene standards (ibid, p. 115).  
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As found in the EFTA enlargement case, the findings in this case also shows that the 
Conservative government had more enthusiasm than British business to invest in Central 
and Eastern Europe in the second half of the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s. To 
illustrate, in 1988, a report of the DTI (HC 51, 1988, p. 4) argued that  
Many UK companies were put off the markets of Eastern Europe simply by their instinctive dislike of the 
Communist system, not without some reason. Too few even of our largest exporters had however made a 
serious study of the opportunities for their products though fortunately some have found that they can be very 
worthwhile.  
In 1989, according to the DTI, the process of British companies’ involvement in the 
Central and Eastern European markets was still slow. For example, there were only “some 
half dozen British joint ventures in Poland, and slightly more in Hungary” (Cm 708, 1989, 
p. 5). In another report, Alan Smith, a Specialist Adviser, argued that the insufficient 
performance of British companies in the Central and Eastern European countries became a 
greater urgent problem in 1991. For example, Britain’s share in the OECD exports to the 
Central and Eastern European countries gradually decreased from 6 per cent in 1987 to 4.9 
per cent in 1990 (HC 262, 1992, p. liv).  
As a result, unlike LI’s pluralistic assumption, the Conservative government became the 
main initiator and tried to encourage British business to increase their trade relations with 
the CEECs due to the British societal groups’ apathetic position towards them (Cm 708, 
1989, p. 5). In particular, the British government used the relevant governmental 
institutions to create an attractive atmosphere in which British business would increase 
their investments in Central and Eastern Europe. In this sense, the main responsibility was 
given to the DTI with a major help of the FCO and other institutions, including the Export 
Credit Guarantees Department (ECGD), and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food (MAFF) (HC 16, 1989, p. 186). In 1989, the DTI argued that trade with the CEECs 
needed “a high level of participation by governments” because of the tradition of state 
control in trade in the region. Thus, the DTI devoted more financial resources and staffs to 
assist the British companies which were to do/doing business in those countries (HC 16, 
1989, p. 186). Moreover, John Vereker, the Permanent Secretary for the Overseas 
Development Administration, also argued that the government arranged a number of pre-
investment schemes that were designed to create an environment where British investors 
would want to go in the Central and Eastern European countries (Hc 370, 1996, p. 102). In 
1990/1, in parallel with this purpose, the CBI also launched the Eastern European 
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Initiative with a budget of £ 2 million in order to develop British companies’ trade 
relations with the CEECs (Jones, 1991, Preston, 1990).  
In addition to those institutions, the Government also supported the activities of the BBC 
and the British Council in the region in order to create an efficient cultural framework in 
which it would be easier for the British companies to do business. For example, the main 
mission of the British Council was determined as “to maximise the visibility, impact and 
availability of British creativity and expertise” in Central and Eastern Europe (HC 516-i, 
1991, p. 21). In parallel with this mission, the British Council arranged English language 
programmes in the Central and Eastern European countries to spread the usage of English 
in the region; and according to the Council, the increasing usage of English would help 
British companies in the region (Cm 3573, 1997, p. 8).  
On the other hand, it was hard for the British government to calculate the potential costs of 
the Eastward enlargement to Britain especially in the first half of the 1990s. To illustrate, 
Douglas Hurd accepted that it was impossible to predict the consequences of the 
enlargement although the Conservative government expected that the liberalization of the 
CEECs would provide opportunities for British business (HC 223, 1992, p. 15). However, 
the Conservative government had a tendency to tolerate the potential short-run economic 
burdens originating from the process of the Eastward enlargement. For example, regarding 
the British farming sector’s pressure on the British government to limit the accession of the 
agricultural products of the CEECs to the Common market, Douglas Hurd declared that 
“we must open up our markets more to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as they 
make the difficult transition to full market economies” (Cm 2525, 1994, p. III). As a more 
specific example, in 1995, the NFU lobbied the MAFF to renegotiate the minimum import 
prices system, which had been negotiated between the EC and the CEECs as a part of the 
Europe Agreements, since the NFU was not happy with the cheap Polish blackcurrants in 
the EC market as a result of the Europe Agreement with Poland. However, despite  the 
NFU’s pressure, the MAFF reiterated  that the Europe Agreements were valuable in 
liberalising trade in the CEECs; thus, NFU should also see the Europe Agreements from 
this perspective (HC 61-ii, 1995, p. 32).  
In addition to its tendency to tolerate the short-run costs, the Conservative government had 
also a tendency to spend money in order to guarantee the transition of Central and Eastern 
Europe towards a full market economy. Particularly, the Conservative government 
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launched ‘Know How Fund’ for Poland in 1989 and subsequently extended the Fund to the 
rest of the region (23 countries of the former Soviet bloc) (HC 262, 1992, p. xx). “Priority 
sectors for the Fund included energy, financial services, management training, food 
distribution, small business and public sector reform” (Cm 2202, 1993, p. 51). In 1991, the 
Fund was also extended to the environmental issues (Cm 2068, 1992, p. 23). The purposes 
of the Fund were to transfer British skills and expertise, to promote the CEECs’ transition 
to a free market economy and the development of democratic institutions in the region, and 
to encourage the British companies’ investment in the region (Cm 2502, 1994, p. 54). To 
achieve those ends, for example, the British government spent £15 million in 1990/91 (Cm 
1902, 1992, p. 42) and £ 54 million in 1993/94 (Cm 2502, 1994, p. 54). 
5.2.1.3 The Position of Other Domestic Actors 
Like the Mediterranean and EFTA enlargement cases, there was also a clear consensus 
among the main British actors regarding the government’s pro-enlargement policy towards 
the CEECs. As a result, from an LI perspective, the consensus among the main British 
actors on a pro-enlargement policy made the British government one of the main initiators 
of the Eastward enlargement at the EU level. 
The Labour Party, as the main opposition party, strongly supported the Community’s 
enlargement towards the CEECs. The economic, political and security concerns, similar to 
what the Conservative government had, also made the Eastward enlargement a high 
priority for the Labour Party (Hansard, 1992, p. 49). Like the Conservative government, 
the Labour Party also believed that the East European problem needed to be solved in a 
multilateral framework (HC 446-iii, 1989, p. 52). For example, when the authoritarian 
regimes in Central and Eastern Europe started to dissolve in the late 1980s, Neil Kinnock, 
the leader of the Labour Party, supported the Community’s aids to stimulate the emergence 
of democracy in the Central and Eastern European countries (Oakley and Webster, 1989). 
In 1990, the Labour Party agenda also promised to “welcome eventual membership from 
new democracies in central and Eastern Europe [...] to provide the best framework for 
building new relations across continent” (Wintour, 1990a). Robin Cook (1995), the 
Shadow Foreign Secretary, also pointed out that “peace for our country depends on 
stability on the continent, for which the best guarantee is enlargement of a healthy EU to 
support the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe”. As a result, the enlargement 
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towards Central and Eastern Europe was a priority not only for the Conservative 
government but also for the Labour Party (Riddell, 1992a).  
Moreover, like the Conservative Party, the Labour Party supported the idea that the 
Eastward enlargement needed to be achieved as soon as possible. For example, Peter Shore 
argued that the Eastward enlargement needed to be fast like the German unification (The 
Times, 1990). In this context, the Labour Party supported the Conservative government’s 
position that the vertical integration attempts (e.g. monetary integration) might become an 
obstacle for the Eastward enlargement (Timmins, 1992). For instance, Robin Cook, the 
Shadow Foreign Secretary, maintained that “[w]e should take no steps to deepen the bonds 
of the European Union which [would] make it more difficult to widen access” 
(Cheeseright, 1994). In the same vein, Joyce Quin pointed out that the European Economic 
Agreement with the EFTA countries should not delay the Association Agreements with the 
CEECs (Hansard, 1992, pp. 49-50). However, like the ruling Conservative Party, the 
Labour Party also accepted that the CEECs needed to meet the accession conditionality 
(e.g. having a democratic political system and a working market economy) to become full 
members of the EU (Rockwell, 1992).  
The Liberal Democrat Party also supported the enlargement of the EC/EU towards the 
Central and Eastern European countries. The party highly welcomed liberalization attempts 
in the CEECs and backed assistance used in reforming those countries (Gow and White, 
1989). However, contrary to the ruling Conservative Party, the Liberal Democrats 
perceived deepening and widening of the EU as complementary to each other (Hansard, 
1990e, p. 330, Hansard, 1992b, the Liberal Democrat Party, 1992).  
As the biggest British business interest group, the CBI supported the enlargement of the 
EU towards the CEECs because of both political and economic reasons. In terms of the 
political reasons, the CBI argued that the Eastward enlargement would bring greater 
security and stability on the continent and strengthen the EU’s competitiveness in the 
world (The CBI, 1996, The CBI, 1996b). Moreover, regarding the discussion on a deeper 
versus wider Europe, Brain Corby (1992, pp. 4-5), the president of the CBI, argued that the 
EC might become deeper but “it must become wider”.  
In terms of the economic concerns, as noted in the previous chapter, the CBI favoured a 
wider European Single Market covering not only the EFTA countries but also the CEECs 
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(Harris, 1991, The CBI, 1996b). For example, a CBI survey in 1991 showed that the most 
of big British companies thought that the CEECs should be able to join the EC/EU within 
10 years (Bowen and Fagan, 1991). In addition to this, the CBI also perceived the 
liberalization of the CEECs’ domestic markets as a great opportunity and that the 
enlargement process would guarantee continuation of this liberalization (in addition to 
stabilization of their newly democratic political systems) and make accession of the British 
business to those markets easier. To illustrate, the CBI launched its Eastern Europe 
Initiative in 1990 in order to encourage the British firms to invest in the Central and 
Eastern European countries (Preston, 1990). According to Alan Lewis, the chairman of the 
CBI's Eastern Europe Initiative, the CEECs were offering many opportunities for British 
firms in the sectors like “the refurbishment of factories, food processing, agricultural 
equipment and for the communications and energy industries as well as for health care and 
financial services and tourism” (Jones, 1991). Additionally, Adair Turner, the Director-
General of the CBI, argued that the CEECs were a dynamic market for British business 
because the labour costs were four times lower than the Western European countries and 
the Central and Eastern European markets were within only three hours’ drive of each 
other (Flanagan, 1996).  
 However, the CBI underlined three conditions for a successful integration: the applicant 
countries need to meet the Copenhagen criteria, the relevant Community policies like the 
CAP and the Structural Funds needed to be reformed, and the EU’s structure and 
institutions needed to be rearranged (ibid.). In particular, the first condition would 
guarantee that the CEECs would become democratic countries with functioning market 
economies. Secondly, the CAP and the Structural Funds were absorbing 80 per cent of the 
Community budget and the newcomers would be the main recipients without any reform in 
those programmes. Thus, this condition was not acceptable. Thirdly, the CBI supported a 
European Union with efficient, transparent and effective institutions; however, a Union 
with around 20 members would not be able to have efficient, transparent and effective 
institutions under its existing structure; therefore, they should be reformed (The CBI, 1995, 
1996, 1996a, and 1996b).  
The TUC also supported the enlargement of the EC/EU towards the CEECs. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, it could be argued that ideological motivation of the TUC highly 
affected this position. Particularly, “the solidarity among workers” was used by the TUC as 
the main rhetoric to support the Eastward enlargement. When the authoritarian regimes 
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collapsed in Central and Eastern Europe, the TUC accepted it as a principle to promote 
independent and effective trade union organizations in the CEECs through educational and 
organisational help (The TUC, 1991, p. 119). Moreover, the TUC called on the British 
government and the European Commission to effectively support the democratization of 
those countries. In the same vein, the TUC criticized the PHARE programme51 for 
concentrating too much on the economic and commercial liberalisation in the following 
sectors: agriculture, training, environment, energy, and industrial and economic 
structuring, but less on the need for strong and effective trade union organizations in those 
countries (The TUC, 1991, p. 512).  
In addition to its ideological concerns, materialistic concerns also affected the TUC’s 
position on the Eastward enlargement. Firstly, as noted in the previous chapter, as a part of 
the ETUC, the TUC aimed to strengthen the position of the trade unions at the EC/EU 
level as an alternative to its decreasing power in Britain under the Conservative 
government. For example, at the annual meeting of the TUC in Brighton (11-15th 
September 1995), one of the TUC officials argued that the TUC looked to the EU to get 
protection and support for 15 years as “an antidote to counter the effects of a poisonous 
national  government the Conservative government” (The TUC, 1995). In this regard, the 
Eastward enlargement would help to establish a larger and stronger unification among 
trade unions in Europe. Secondly, the TUC had also some economic concerns over a 
potential Eastward enlargement. On the one hand, the TUC pointed out that the CEECs 
would not cause any immediate competitive threat against Britain because of “the collapse 
of industrial production in many of these countries, and the moves to abolish state pricing 
of exports which previously made them artificially competitive” (Hc 216, 1993, p. 82). On 
the other hand, the TUC highlighted the point that Britain might pay more for the 
Structural Funds but receive less when the poor CEECs joined the EC/EU unless the Funds 
were fairly reformed (Dorman, 1996, p. 5).  
5.2.2 Intergovernmental Bargains 
As LI assumes, the Conservative government firstly determined its national position 
towards the Eastward enlargement at the domestic level. In this sense, a pro-enlargement 
policy was not only a priority for the Conservative government but also for other main 
                                                 
51 The EU’s (financial) pre-accession instruments to assist the CEECs. 
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British interests groups. As a result of this strong consensus among the British actors on a 
pro-enlargement policy towards the CEECs, the Conservative government became one of 
the main initiators of the Eastward enlargement. On the other hand, the Conservative Party 
was also quite sensitive to Britain’s national interests during the negotiations and tried to 
defend them especially when the enlargement-related EU reform negotiations started (e.g. 
the reforms in the CAP, the Structural Funds and EU decision making system). 
As noted above, the transition of Central and Eastern Europe from authoritarianism to 
liberal democracy was crucial for the Conservative government. Thus, to guarantee this 
transition, it tried to use the EC/EU as an effective tool as much as possible in the first half 
of the 1990s. For example, when the Soviet bloc began to dissolve, the Conservative 
government started to play “an active role within the Community to promote the 
negotiation of trade, commercial and economic co-operation agreements with the Soviet 
Union and most Eastern European countries” (Cm 708, 1989, p. 7). The Conservative 
government was also one of the main initiators of the Associate Agreements with the 
CEECs (Cm 1857, 1992, p. 34) because those agreements, as the first step of enlargement, 
would link the CEECs to the Western system and would impose liberal norms (e.g. 
establishing multiparty systems, free and fair elections, respect for human rights, economic 
liberalisation, rule of law and freedom of the press) on them52 (HC 431, 1990, p. 4).  
The British government achieved this goal in 1991 when the Association Agreements with 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czechoslovakia were signed on 16th December 1991 (Cm 1857, 
1992, p. v) despite the extension of the negotiation process. In this sense, the French 
reluctance on the agreements was the main reason behind this delay. Firstly, unlike Britain, 
France was giving a priority to deepening the Community. For example, the French 
President Mitterrand asserted that “the strengthening of the EC by means of political and 
monetary union should take precedence over moves to admit new members from East 
Europe” (Eisenhammer, 1991). Secondly, France was reluctant to give trade concessions to 
those countries in the agricultural sector (Drozdiak, 1991). As a result, France slowed 
down the negotiations for the association agreements.  
When Britain assumed the EC Presidency in 1992, one of the main objectives of the British 
Presidency was to develop the EC’s relationship with the CEECs further (HC 205, 1992, p. 
                                                 
52 A failed Soviet coup in 1991 also showed how it was important to link the Central and Eastern European 
countries to the Western European security system (Cm 1857, 1992, p. 34). 
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80). In parallel with this purpose, as the EC president, Britain arranged a summit with 
Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia in October 1992 to enhance cooperation and political 
dialogue (Cm 2202, 1993, p. 10). Under the British Presidency, the Community also 
started to negotiate the Associate Agreements with Romania and Bulgaria53. Additionally, 
the Community signed the Trade and Cooperation Agreements with Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Albania (Cm 2065, 1992, p. 30).  
At the Copenhagen European Council (21-22nd June 1993), the member states agreed that 
the Central European Associate countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Bulgaria and Romania) should become members of the European Union once they could 
meet the economic and political conditions of membership (Cm 2369, 1993, p. 2, The 
European Council, 1993). In addition to this, the Conservative government continued to 
deepen the Community’s relationship with the CEECs.  For example, together with Italy, it 
launched an initiative in December 1993 with the aim to shape a framework that would 
give the CEECs a closer involvement into the EU’s intergovernmental pillars (the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Justice and Home Affairs), and this 
framework was accepted by the Foreign Affairs Council on 7th March 1994 (Cm 2675, 
1994, p. 5).  
At the Essen European Council (9-10th December 1994), the EU members adopted “a pre-
accession strategy” for the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe (The 
European Council, 1994a), which was one of the Conservative government’s foreign 
policy objectives in 1994 (Cm 3203, 1996, p. 25). Subsequently, at the Madrid Summit 
(15–16th December 1995), the EU leaders agreed to treat all the applicants equally to start 
accession negotiations54 and the negotiations with them could start six months after the end 
of the Inter-Governmental Conference (the 1996 IGC) (Smyth, 1995, Euro-East, 1995, The 
European Council, 1995). This decision also met the Conservative government’s demand 
to start the accession negotiations with all of the Eastern European applicants in addition to 
Cyprus as soon as possible (Hutton, 1995). This development was a success for the British 
government because when the negotiations started at the Madrid Summit, most of the 
members were reluctant to start the accession negotiations before clearly knowing the cost 
of the Eastward enlargement. For example, Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok argued that 
                                                 
53 According to the FCO, those agreements would bring Bulgaria and Romania closer to the EC and 
recognize their eventual full membership (HC 262, 1992, p. xxii). 
54 However, later on, differentiation might occur according to assessments of individual applicants’ capacity.  
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“[w]e need to know what Eastern Europe will cost us […]” (Ames, 1995). On the other 
hand, Germany intended to give a priority to its neighbouring countries: the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland, and the Scandinavian countries put an emphasis on the 
Baltic countries to start the accession negotiations55 (Agence France Presse, 1995, Smyth, 
1995).  
However, the process of the CEECs’ further integration into the EU started to become 
harder when the enlargement-related EU reforms started to come to the EU’s negotiation 
table, because as LI assumes, Britain and other members tried to defend their national 
preferences at the EU level negotiations. Firstly, the CEECs’ huge agricultural sectors were 
a big problem for further integration. In 1994, there emerged two proposals clashing with 
each other to deal with this problem. According to Britain, the CAP should be reformed to 
decrease the potential burden of the CEECs’ mass and poor agriculture sectors. However, 
France supported the proposal that the CEECs’ agricultural sectors should be made 
compatible with the existing CAP system. In this context, when the Commission proposed 
to extent the farming aids to the CEECs, the British government rejected this proposal 
(Robertson, 1994), and the CAP reform issue remained as a big problem in front of the 
Eastward enlargement. At this point, as noted above, many British interest groups in the 
agricultural sector were demanding a reform in the CAP prior to the Eastward enlargement, 
and as LI assumes, the British government’s rejection was in conformity with this domestic 
demand.  
Secondly, the discussions on the question whether the EU should be firstly deepened or 
widened were also stimulated in 1995. For example, the Commission President Jacques 
Santer warned the member states that a success of deepening was an important condition 
for a success of widening (Mackinnon, 1995). Although Britain rejected this argument, 
France strongly supported it (Frankland, 1995). On the other hand, Germany also 
supported the deepening of the EU in addition to its strong support for the Eastward 
enlargement. For example, the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl argued that  
I would regard it as a disaster if Europe's strength were to diminish with its enlargement. However, I would 
find it disastrous if Europe were only able to ensure its strength by keeping others out (Palmer, 1996). 
                                                 
55 At this point, as LI assumes, the Eastward enlargement was a rational issue for the members because 
geopolitical concerns affected their attitudes towards the enlargement. For example, both Germany and the 
Scandinavian countries tried to give a priority to their neighbouring countries in the enlargement process.  
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Therefore, the main position of the Conservative government was to encourage the 
widening of the EU but limit the deepening of it as much as possible when the 
Intergovernmental Conference (the 1996 IGC) started in Turin (Italy) on 29th March 1996. 
In this sense, the main concern of the Conservative government was that the QMV 
mechanism in the EU decision making system should not be expanded any further 
(Mackinnon, 1996). Particularly, as noted in the previous chapter, the Conservative 
government accepted to extend the QMV mechanism within the EU decision making 
system on the condition that it would be re-negotiated at the 1996 IGC. As a result of this, 
at the domestic level, as LI assumes, the Eurosceptics within the Conservative Party 
became highly sensitive to the issue of the QMV and put more pressure on the government 
not to give any further concession on the issue at the IGC56 (Mason, 1996). Therefore, the 
Conservative government reiterated that the QMV mechanism after the EFTA enlargement 
was an interim process, and the QMV should be discussed at the 1996 IGC again to make 
the EU system more democratic (HC 48-xiv, 1994, p. xix). Moreover, according to the 
British government, the upcoming Eastward enlargement would bring many small 
countries that would become net beneficiaries from the EU budget; but, they would outvote 
more populous member states (including Britain) that were net contributors to the EU 
budget under the existing QMV system. Thus, the over-domination of the small member 
states over the EU’s decision making system would undermine the democratic legitimacy 
of the EU. As a result, the Conservative government was determined to press at the IGC 
“for a reweighting of votes and an appropriate voting threshold” (Cm 3441, 1996, p. 4).  
However, the influence of the Conservative government was limited when the 1996 IGC 
started (Cm 3437, 1996, p. 8). As mentioned above, the Major government had a fragile 
majority in the parliament and the Eurosceptic Conservative members were putting a 
pressure on him (Hamilton, 1996). In this atmosphere, it was hard for the Conservative 
government to negotiate on sensitive topics like the issue of QMV just before the 
upcoming national election (1st May 1997) (Euro-East, 1996). Moreover, the Conservative 
government was also more isolated in the EU to find allies at the IGC negotiations. For 
example, its tough position against the extension of the QMV mechanism was seen 
contradictory with its pro-enlargement policy by other member states like Germany and 
France (Mackinnon, 1996). In addition to this, the mad-cow crisis also damaged already 
                                                 
56 This example confirms LI’s assumption that, if domestic groups are sensitive to a topic, the executive 
cannot easily negotiate it at EU level.  
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problematic British-EU relations (Associated Press, 1996). As a result, the Conservative 
government’s flexibility was limited during the IGC negotiations, and soon after the IGC 
started, it lost the national election on 1st May 1997.  
In conclusion, from an LI perspective, there was a common consensus among the main 
British actors on a pro-enlargement policy, which made the Conservative Party an 
influential initiator at the EU level to start the Eastward enlargement. However, regarding 
the 1996 IGC, the mentioned consensus collapsed and the domestic actors were highly 
sensitive to the negotiation topics. Therefore, from an LI perspective, the Conservative 
government lost its flexibility and influence at the EU level negotiations. Finally, it lost the 
1997 national election, and most of the Eastward enlargement negotiations were carried 
out by the forthcoming Labour government.  
5.3 The Labour Party Period (1997-2007) 
5.3.1 National Preference Formation 
5.3.1.1 Political Concerns 
The Labour government continued to support Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the 
CEECs. As LI assumes, despite the Labour government’s more pro-European rhetoric, 
Britain’s pro-enlargement policy was still an output of the national interest oriented 
evaluations. The chapter has found that the security concerns continued to dominantly 
affect the national preference formation process, but economic expectations and 
ideological motivations were also other significant variables affecting the Labour 
government’s position on the Eastward enlargement. As a result, it could be argued that the 
rationale behind Britain’s support for the Eastward enlargement did not change despite the 
governmental change in 1997.  
Firstly, the Labour government had an ideological motivation similar to that of the former 
Conservative government towards the Eastward enlargement. In particular, Tony Blair 
adopted the main neo-liberal tenets of Thatcherism into his “new Labour” doctrine 
(Kavanagh, 2005, p. 15, 2010, p. 19, Tonge, 2009, p. 302, Williams, 2005, Hall, 2003, 
Avis, 2005, p. 549, Painter, 2000, p. 230, Heath et al., 2001, p. 120). According to new 
synthesis, “a liberal global economy necessitated a neoliberal response” (Williams, 2005, 
p. 103), and related to this position, British foreign policy should be more multilateral (and 
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thus more European). In this context, Tony Blair had also an ambition to put Britain in a 
leading position within the EU (Buller, 2004, p. 198). However, like the former 
Conservative government, the Labour government needed an outward-looking 
intergovernmental European Union (Taylor, 2005, pp. 205-206). For example, Tony Blair 
openly argued that the driving force behind the European integration should not be supra-
nationalism, which would create an unaccountable power centre within the EU, but 
intergovernmentalism, which would create a Europe of sovereign nations (Cm 5763, 2003, 
p. 34). To this end, he followed a persuasive policy57, firstly to convince British people, 
secondly to increase British influence over the European integration process (Riddell, 
2005, p. 362). At this point, a pro-enlargement position towards the CEECs emerged as a 
strategic part of Blair’s persuasive European policy. To illustrate, Tony Blair argued that   
I believe that constructive membership of the European Union is in Britain’s fundamental national interest. 
That is why I wholeheartedly support the enlargement of the European Union, and the reforms necessary to 
bring it about (Cm 4595, 2000, p. 1). 
Moreover, the Labour government believed that the Eastward enlargement would make the 
reforms in the EU compulsory and those reforms would automatically give Britain a 
chance to shape the European integration process according to her national interests (Cm 
5763, 2003, p. 34). Particularly, the Eastward enlargement would make the reforms 
necessary in the EU’s decision making system, the EU budget, the CAP, and Structural 
Funds. Therefore, if the Labour Party became influential in the EU level negotiations, it 
could drive the European integration process towards an outward-looking and 
intergovernmental way (Cm 4609, 2000, p. 21).  
Secondly, the Labour government had also the security concerns over the Eastward 
enlargement similar to those of the former Conservative government. The Labour 
government believed that a political stability/security in Europe was the sine quo non of 
economic prosperity, and the Eastward enlargement was needed to maintain the mentioned 
political stability/security. That’s why; the Labour government continuously and strongly 
used the rhetoric showing the strong relationship between peace, prosperity and 
enlargement during the Eastward enlargement process (Cm 3603, 1997, p. viii, HC 155-
                                                 
57 According to Johnson and Steinberg (2004), Thatcherite neo-liberalism could be termed as social 
authoritarian neo-liberalism but Blairite neo-liberalism was statist/managerialist neo-liberalism depending 
on persuasion.   
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xix, 1998, p. xx, HC 23-i, 2000, p. xlv, HC 318, 2001, p. 64, Cm 5198, 2002, p. 3, Cm 
5934, 2003, p. 15, Cm 6174, 2004, p. 9, Cm 6450, 2005, p. 4).  
Like its predecessor, the Labour government also supported the idea that the CEECs 
should be integrated into the Western system not only via the EU enlargement but also via 
NATO enlargement. For example, Tony Lloyd argued that “the process both of European 
Union enlargement and the process of NATO enlargement was not only consistent with, 
but actually helpful towards developing a climate of greater security throughout the whole 
of Europe” (HC 138, 1998, p. 191).  
5.3.1.2 Economic Concerns 
The Labour government’s pro-enlargement policy had also an economic dimension. 
According to the Labour government, it was hard to make the exact cost-benefit 
calculation of the Eastward enlargement (HC 86, 1999, p. 3). However, like the 
Conservative Party, the Labour government had a tendency to evaluate the Eastward 
enlargement by considering Britain’s long-term economic interests. At this point, 
according to the British government, the discussions on the EU enlargement should be 
done by putting the principle of openness/liberalization at the centre, which would promote 
the trade both within the Single Market and with the rest of the World (Cm 3804, 1998, p. 
36). From this perspective, the Labour government (HC 86, 1999, p. 3) had a set of 
expectations from the Eastward enlargement as follows;   
 The Eastward enlargement would make the EU the largest single market for trade 
and investment in the world. An enlarged Single Market towards the East would 
stimulate demand, growth and jobs in the EU. Thanks to the enlargement, British 
business would have access to a new market with 100 million customers. Britain 
already started to export around £ 3 billion of goods and services each year to the 
first five Central European applicants. 
 The extending free trade and investment to the seven biggest Central European 
economies would raise overall incomes in the EU by about 0.2 per cent, of which 
Britain would get around a 14 per cent share. This meant that Britain would benefit 
roughly £ 1.5 billion a year according to 1999’s GDP. 
 A potential CAP reform in parallel with the Agenda 2000, which would decrease 
food prices, would provide £ 1 billion a year for British consumers. 
As a result of its long term positive expectations, like the former Conservative government, 
the Labour government gave a high priority to trade with the CEECs and launched 
initiatives to encourage British business to become more active in the region. For example, 
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in January 1997, the DTI launched the initiative: “Open for Business in Central Europe” 
(Cm 4348, 1999, p. 3). The main aim of the campaign was “to double UK exports to the 
region and to initiate 100 new investments in the agribusiness, automotive, consumer 
goods/retailing, electronics/telecoms and healthcare sectors” (MTI Econews, 1996). 
According to Richard Petersen from the journal of Retail Week, the government’s 
initiative paid off because the British retailers (e.g. Debenhams, BHS and Mothercare) 
started to invest more in the region even though they were lagging behind the German, 
French and Dutch retailers (Petersen, 1999). Subsequently, in 1999, the government 
launched its second initiative: “Opportunities in Central Europe” to help the British 
companies to find export and investment opportunities in specific sectors (Cm 4348, 1999, 
p. 3). Therefore, it could be argued that the British executive was still dominant while 
determining Britain’s economic policy towards the CEECs compared to British business.   
In terms of the costs of the Eastward enlargement to Britain, the Labour government 
argued that a potential cost could be calculated better after finalising the reforms in the 
CAP, the Structural and Cohesion Funds, and the EU budget (Britain’s budget 
rebate/abatement) (Cm 4348, 1999, p. 3). Thus, the Labour government perceived the 
Intergovernmental Conferences (the 1996/7 IGC and the 2000 IGC), which would reform 
the EU’s governance, the CAP, the Structural and Cohesion Funds, and the EU budget as a 
crucial negotiation platform to decrease the potential costs/negative externalities of the 
Eastward enlargement to Britain (Cm 3905, 1998, p. 27).  
Particularly, the Agenda 200058 prioritized the reforms in the CAP and the Structural and 
Cohesion Funds, and according to the Labour government, those reforms were essential for 
a successful enlargement (HC 155-xix, 1998, p. xx). Moreover, the Agenda 2000 aimed to 
carry out the mentioned reforms within the existing EU budgetary ceilings (1.27 % of 
GNP); in other words, the Eastward enlargement would not have a significant impact on 
the EC budget until the period after 2006. Thus, the Labour government supported this 
proposal outlined in the Agenda 2000 and declared that “it would not be acceptable to deal 
with the costs of enlargement by increasing the ceiling” (HC 155-ii, 1998, p. xviii). 
Furthermore, the Labour Party calculated that the enlargement would not affect the British 
abatement/rebate from the EU budget because “more prosperous states would probably 
                                                 
58 A package of proposals made by the European Commission in 1997 to prepare the EU and the applicant 
countries for the Eastward enlargement, (Cm 3905, 1998, p. 27) 
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still be contributing less to the budget than the UK” although Britain would become more 
prosperous than the Union average after the enlargement (HC 155-vi, 1998, p. xx). In 
addition to this, the unanimity rule in the EU’s Own Recourses should not be changed 
because the principles of the British abatement from the EU budget were set out in the 
Own Resources Decision, and the unanimity rule in its decision making procedure was a 
guarantee of the British abatement. 
Regarding the Structural and Cohesion Funds, although the Labour government accepted 
that it was too early to estimate the impact of the Eastward enlargement on Britain; it 
determined a position for the coming IGCs as follows (HC 155-vi, 1998, p. x): 
 The overall cost of the Structural and Cohesion Funds should be contained below 
0.46 % of EU GNP, both before and after the enlargement 
 The Funds’ effectiveness should be improved, and substantial administrative 
simplification is needed. 
 The reform of the Funds should be durable, and fair to acceding new Member 
States. 
 All existing Member States should expect cuts in their receipts if costs are to be 
contained 
 While recognising that there will be a drop in receipts, the new regime should be 
fair to the UK in comparison with other States 
On the other hand, the reform of the CAP was a top priority for the Labour government 
(Cm 3804, 1998, p. 36) because the government perceived the EU’s agriculture regime in a 
broader context. For example, according to Nicholas Brown, the Minister of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food, the reform of the CAP was a priority of the MAFF because the EU 
needed to meet its obligations to the WTO (HC 125, 1999, p. 72). Moreover, the Labour 
government expected that the prospective Eastward enlargement would create strong 
impetus for further change in the CAP (HC 34-xxiv, 1999) since a successful enlargement 
needed a reform in the CAP (HC 310, 1998, p. 17). Additionally, from an LI perspective, 
there was a clear consensus among British interest groups over the reform of the CAP, and 
this made the British government a persistent member demanding the reform of the CAP 
(HC 231-I, 2003, p. Ev4). For example, the NFU supported the reform of CAP as the 
leading interest group in addition to other small groups (e.g. the Crop Protection 
Association, Cadbury Schweppes) (HC 550-ii, 2002, p. Ev282). In this sense, MacShane, 
the Minister of State for Europe, even advised that the NFU could lobby its sister 
organisations in other member countries to implement necessary reforms in the CAP (HC 
231-I, 2003, p. Ev4). In addition to the NFU, the Food and Drink Federation also perceived 
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the enlargement-related reforms in the CAP as an opportunity to improve the 
competitiveness in the sector (HC 421, 2004, p. ev82).  
In particular, the Labour government wanted to improve the competitiveness of European 
farmers by making the sector more market-oriented and reducing dependency on subsidies 
(HC 907, 2000). Thus, regarding the reforms in the CAP, the Labour government (HC 34-
xxiv, 1999, p. xxiv) determined its objectives as follows: 
 a progressive reduction in beef and cereal support prices to –or close to- world 
levels with less than full compensation to farmers; 
 a reform in the dairy regime; 
 a reduction in the CAP direct payments over time (the principle of degressivity); 
 a more integrated policy approach to the agri-environment and rural development; 
 to stabilise the CAP spending at its present real-terms level by 2006; 
 to avoid measures which unfairly discriminate Britain. 
5.3.1.3 The Position of Other Domestic Actors 
After losing power in the 1997 national election, there happened a dramatic shift in the 
Conservative Party’s official position from pragmatic Europeanism to Euroscepticism 
(Crowson, 2007, p. 127, Lynch, 2003, p. 148). However, the party continued to support the 
Eastward enlargement despite this shift (Lynch, 2003, p. 153). For example, William 
Hague, as the new leader of the party, argued that enlargement was the key priority of the 
European Union, and it was a historic mission for the EU to accept the countries of Eastern 
Europe as new members (Agence France Presse, 1998b). However, the rhetoric behind the 
support for further enlargement mostly focused on the thesis that enlargement would dilute 
the supranational attempts within the EU (Leach, 2002, p. 230). For example, the delegates 
of the Conservative Party at Blackpool in 1997 agreed to struggle for a minimum control 
of Brussels over member states; and a potential Eastward enlargement would help this 
purpose (Johnson, 1997). In the same vein, Stephen Dorrell (1997) argued that Britain 
needed to be in favour of enlargement, and in terms of the EU arrangements for the 
Eastward enlargement, Britain needed to develop/propose more flexible 
(intergovernmental) structures despite the federalist tendencies because an enlarged EU 
cannot become as uniformed as the first Community with six members. In the 1999 
European Election Manifesto, the Conservative Party also declared that enlargement 
should be the top priority of the EU as “a historic opportunity to advance free trade, free 
markets, deregulation and co-operation” (Landale, 1999). In other words, at the end of the 
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1990s, the Conservative Party tried to use enlargement as an alternative policy to the 
deepening of the Union (Sylvester, 1998).  
However, when the reforms that were necessary for the Eastward enlargement began, the 
vertical integration of the EU became intertwined with the horizontal integration 
(enlargement), and this made the Conservative Party’s position towards the reform process 
more unstable. For example, Michael Howard, the shadow Foreign Secretary, criticized the 
Blair government for eroding British sovereignty in general and for side-lining 
enlargement for the sake of deeper integration in particular at the Amsterdam European 
Council (16-17 June 1997) (Johnson, 1997). William Hague also called for a referendum 
on the Amsterdam Treaty (Riddell, 1997). More dramatically, in October 1999, Hague 
increased his Eurosceptic tone and promised to renegotiate the terms of Britain's 
membership to secure an a la carte/intergovernmental European Union if he won the 
election. To achieve this goal, he declared that a new Conservative government would veto 
even the outcomes of the 2000 IGC, which were crucial for the Eastward enlargement59 
(Brogan, 1999, Jacobs, 1999, Wilson, 1999, Macintyre, 1999). As a result, from an LI 
perspective, the increasing Euroscepticism within the Conservative Party put a pressure on 
the Labour government at the EU level negotiations on the enlargement-related reforms.  
The CBI as a pro-European interest group continued to support the Eastward enlargement 
with the expectation that the enlargement would provide British exporters with new 
economic opportunities (The European Parliament, 1999). Moreover, the CBI expected 
that the enlargement of the Single Market would increase trade and the EU’s competition 
capacity in the world as well (Belfast News Letter, 2004). After the candidate countries 
began the accession negotiations at the Luxembourg European Council (12–13th December 
1997), the CBI (1998) also underlined the importance of the necessary reforms in the EU 
governance, the CAP, and the Structural Funds to realise the political and economic 
benefits of the Eastward enlargement. Thus, the issue of the EU reforms was one of the 
CBI’s five key business objectives60 in the second half of the 1990s (Bassett and Collcutt, 
1997). At this point, the CBI’s guiding principle was as follows: “the European Union 
                                                 
59 William Hague’s stronger Eurosceptic tone also worsened the ‘civil war’ between Eurosceptics and pro-
Europeans within the Conservative Party, and John Major, Michael Heseltine and Kenneth Clarke strongly 
criticized William Hague’s position (Wilson, 1999). 
60 “completing and enforcing the EU single market, redefining European social legislation priorities, 
preparing for European enlargement, reinforcing Europe's commitment to liberalising world trade, and 
preparing for EMU” (Bassett and Collcutt, 1997).  
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should have effective powers to deliver a truly Single Market,  but  action  beyond  this  
point  must  be  built  on  consensus  between  national governments an intergovernmental 
decision making mechanism” (The CBI, 2002). In the same vein, the Institute of Directors 
(IoD) also argued that the British government should support the Eastward enlargement, 
“but not at any price”, and its support for enlargement should be conditional on necessary 
reforms of the CAP and Structural Funds, the EU budget, and no extension of QMV 
(Leach, 2000, p. 7). Additionally, it warned that the actual benefit of enlargement might be 
less than the expectations (Walsh, 2003).  
The TUC also maintained its pro-enlargement position towards the CEECs in the Labour 
government era. It continued to use its “solidarity among workers” rhetoric to support the 
Eastward enlargement. For example, John Monks (2002), the head of the TUC, reiterated 
the TUC’s support for the Eastward enlargement because the enlargement would spread 
trade unionism in the CEEC. In this sense, as a part of the ETUC, the TUC highlighted the 
point that the applicant countries should meet social acquis to be able to become full 
members of the EU (The TUC, 1998). On the other hand, according to the TUC’s 
collective unionism understanding, the Eastward enlargement would also require “the 
gradual extension of QMV to all social issues (with the exception of social protection) 
together with EP co-decisions powers” (The TUC, 2001). Additionally, the TUC did not 
perceive any potential immigration influx from the CEECs after the enlargement as a threat 
against the British labour market (mostly because of the low unemployment rate at the 
beginning of the 2000s) (Davis, 2000, The European Parliament, 1999).  
As noted above, agriculture was one of the most complicated issues of the Eastward 
enlargement. Thus, as the main influential interest group in agriculture, the position of the 
NFU on the Eastward enlargement was also important. In this regard, the NFU had a 
tendency to rationally calculate the costs and benefits of the Eastward enlargement despite 
a lack of enough data to evaluate how the Eastward enlargement would affect the British 
farming sector (HC 421, 2004, pp. ev67-ev70). According to the NFU, the new members 
would not pose any significant direct competitive threat against British farmers because an 
acute lack of technology and know-how would prevent those countries from challenging 
British farmers despite their cheap land and labour in the short and mid-term. On the other 
hand, the expected high growth rates in those countries as a result of the EU membership 
might provide a new and growing market for British products. In the longer run, according 
to the NFU, the enlargement would result in a larger degree of specialisation within the 
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EU’s farming market and this might push British agriculture to specialise further as a result 
of the increasing competition in the EU; however, the NFU believed that “this structural 
change should improve rather than threaten profitability and farm incomes” (ibid.). In a 
similar vein, in 2004, the NFU president Tim Bennett also reiterated that the NFU 
perceived the Eastward enlargement as an opportunity rather than a threat against British 
farmers (The Journal, 2004). 
5.3.2 Intergovernmental Bargains 
The Eastward enlargement was achieved after a long and tough EU level negotiation 
process because it was a history-making issue, which would significantly affect the future 
of the European integration process. For example, the old members needed to organize two 
Intergovernmental Conferences to make the EU ready for the Eastward enlargement. That 
is, the Eastward enlargement process was intertwined with the enlargement-related reforms 
within the EU system, which would also deepen the integration. In this long process, the 
Labour Party carried out the negotiations from the Amsterdam European Council (16–17th 
June 1997), after winning the 1997 national election, to the Copenhagen European Council 
(12-13th December 2002), when the Eastward enlargement was achieved. Particularly, the 
Labour government tried to expedite the Eastward enlargement process despite the 
complexity of the negotiations on the enlargement-related reforms, but on the other hand, it 
also tried to defend the above-mentioned national preferences during the enlargement-
related reform negotiations.   
The Labour government regularly used the rhetoric: a strong Britain in a strong EU during 
the negotiations (Cm 3903, 1998, p. vii) and tried to play an active/constructive role within 
the EU to accelerate the Eastward enlargement process as much as possible. On the other 
hand, the Blair government was highly responsive to domestic Euroscepticism; thus, it 
cautiously behaved at the EU level negotiations in order to prevent any serious domestic 
criticism and electoral damage. In parallel with this, the Blair government determined well-
defined red-lines related to the reforms in the domestically sensitive issues (e.g. the QMV) 
and became tough on those issues during the negotiations. However, it tried to become 
more constructive on domestically non-sensitive reforms, which were necessary for the 
Eastward enlargement (see also: Nugent and Phinnemore, 2010, pp. 71-75). Additionally, 
the Blair government tried to find allies within the EU or benefited from the divisions 
between other members to achieve its goals.  
130 
 
At the Amsterdam European Council (16-17th June 1997), the Labour government 
determined a strong national position against the proposals for a deeper European 
integration and vowed “to keep sensitive areas such as foreign policy, immigration and 
defence under national control” (Meyer, 1997a). In this regard, Britain was against the 
proposal for a gradual merger between the EU and WEU, which would transform the EU 
into a defence club and would undermine NATO; thus, Britain cooperated with Denmark, 
Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden to block this proposal (Mackinnon, 1997, Meyer, 
1997c). Moreover, Britain allied with Ireland to be exempt from the common policy on 
asylum, immigration and visa (ibid.). On the other hand, Britain benefited from the dispute 
between France and Germany over the Employment policy and managed to put 
“flexibility” as a liberal term into the general objectives of EU’s employment policy at the 
Amsterdam Summit (Meyer, 1997b, Agence France Presse, 1997b, Cunningham, 1997, 
The Herald, 1997, Helm, 1997, Webster, 1997). 
However, the member states were far away from a consensus on the issue of the QMV at 
the Amsterdam Summit. As discussed in the previous chapter, the loannina agreement on 
the QMV mechanism paved the way for the EFTA enlargement; however, it was not a 
solution to the Eastward enlargement. As a result, at the Corfu European Council (24-25th 
June 1994), the EU leaders had decided to settle the EU institutional reform questions at 
the forthcoming IGC (Sedelmeier, 2000, p. 222). Despite this purpose, at the Amsterdam 
Summit, the EU leaders failed to agree on a new decision making system that was 
necessary for the Eastward enlargement (European Report, 1997). Particularly, there was a 
dispute between the big members (Germany, France, Britain, Italy and Spain) and the 
small members over the QMV system. Although the big members were willing to give up 
one of their two commissioners (mostly for the sake of the Eastward enlargement61), they 
insisted that the QMV system should be reweighed in favour of them (Bremner, 1997, 
Whitney, 1997).  In this context, reweighing the QMV was also a top priority for the 
Labour government. For example, the Labour government argued that the existing QMV 
was undemocratic and unsustainable mostly because “a majority of the population of 
Europe would not themselves be able to muster a blocking minority on the qualified 
majority weighing; therefore, it should be changed” (HC 305, 1998, p. 12).  
                                                 
61 They wanted to make room for the newcomers within the executive Commission system.  
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The EU leaders failed to agree on an institutional reform at the Amsterdam Summit as a 
result of the deep division between the big and small members. Therefore, they agreed that 
a new IGC to reform the EU’s governance should be organized at least one year before the 
Eastward enlargement (the 2000 IGC) (Cm 4595, 2000, p. 34). In addition to this, the 
differences between the member states’ preferences regarding the crucial issues: the EU’s 
financial system, the CAP, and the Structural and Cohesion Funds were also too deep to 
reach an agreement (Sedelmeier, 2000, pp. 218-221). As a result, the member states needed 
a special platform to negotiate those sensitive issues. At this point, the Commission 
published the Agenda 2000 in July 1997 as a roadmap of a series of reforms including the 
CAP, the Structural and Cohesion Funds, and future financing of the EU to prepare the EU 
for the Eastward enlargement (Cm 3961, 1998, p. 9, The European Commission, 1997), 
and the following negotiation sessions followed this roadmap.  
At the Luxembourg Summit in December 1997, the main position of Britain was to start 
accession negotiations with the applicant countries that were ready in the spring of 1998. 
Therefore, the Labour government supported the Commission proposal to start formal 
accession negotiations with only the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia 
and Cyprus, which had relatively better political and economic conditions compared to 
Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia, because as Robin Cook argued, to wait 
for the second track applicants would slow down the enlargement process (Wielaard, 
1997a, Xinhua News Agency, 1997). However, Denmark, Greece and Sweden opposed 
this proposal since it could discourage the second track applicant countries from continuing 
their political and economic reforms (Agence France Presse, 1997a). 
Regarding the enlargement-related EU reforms, the EU leaders could not reach a 
consensus on the reforms in the CAP, Structural funds and the EU’s decision making 
system at the Luxembourg Summit. For example, Spain and Portugal were less willing to 
start the accession negotiations with the CEECs because they were worried that they might 
lose the money from the EU funds to the CEECs; therefore, they tried to increase member 
states’ contribution to the EU budget from 1.27 per cent of each member’s GNP to 1.37 per 
cent (Associated Press International, 1997). However, Britain, the Netherlands and 
Germany favoured the existing percentage (1.27 per cent).  As a result of this difference 
between the member blocs, no progress on this issue could be achieved. However despite 
the stalemate in the negotiations on the EU reforms, the EU leaders agreed to open the 
accession negotiations with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and 
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Slovenia in March 1998 (HC 835, 2000, p. xiii, Wielaard, 1997, The European Council, 
1997). The summit also gave Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia a 
guarantee that “they would move on to the fast-track if they make sufficient progress in 
economic and political reform” (Agence France Presse, 1997d).   
As a result of the Luxembourg Summit, the Labour government achieved its aim to start 
accession negotiations with the CEECs under Britain’s EU Presidency in the first half of 
1998, and the British government devoted its Presidency to making important progress in 
the accession negotiations and to pushing the reform agenda forward (the Agenda 2000) 
(Agence France Presse, 1997c). Under the British Presidency, the EU opened the official 
accession negotiations with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovenia, and an examination of the acquis with Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Lithuania 
and Latvia to prepare them for the accession negotiations. However, there was little 
progress in the institutional reforms under the British Presidency even though the Blair 
government gave priority to the institutional reforms at the Cardiff European Council (15-
16th June 1998) (Burner, 1998, see also: The European Council, 1998). On the other hand, 
from an LI perspective, the slow progress in the EU reforms increased domestic pressure 
on the Labour government. Especially, the Conservative Party increased its pressure on the 
Labour government and criticized it for ruining Britain's Presidency of the European Union 
(Watts, 1998). Additionally, the European Central Bank was created under the British 
Presidency; thus, the Eurosceptic British tabloids also criticized the Blair government for 
focusing on the single currency rather than on its historic mission: “enlargement of the 
Union and the reform of its institutions” (Mcelvoy, 1998). 
In 1998, the enlargement process was slower than the planned schedule because of the 
difference between member states’ national preferences; thus, the final accession year was 
slipped from 2000 to 2002. For example, as of the late 1998, only Britain, Denmark and 
Sweden remained more enthusiastic about enlargement (Walker, 1998, Mackinnon, 
1998b). However, Greece, Spain and Portugal were worried that they would get less aid 
from Brussels as a result of the Eastward enlargement. France was considering the 
economic costs of the enlargement and the enlargement’s potential impact on the EU's 
cohesion. Austria, who was holding the EU Presidency, was also worrying about an 
immigration flow from neighbouring candidates like the Czech Republic and Hungary 
(Mackinnon, 1998b). Additionally, even newly elected social democrat German Chancellor 
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Gerhard Schroeder accepted that the enlargement process was "more difficult and more 
complicated" than the expected (Mackinnon, 1998b).  
As a response to waning enthusiasm for the Eastward enlargement among member states, 
the Labour government urged the other members to keep the EU's enlargement policy 
towards the CEECs, Cyprus, and Malta (Mackinnon, 1998a, Agence France Presse, 
1998c). In this sense, Robin Cook argued that enlargement was not a matter of altruism but 
a project for a bigger, stronger, and more globally effective Union whose growth would be 
in the interests of all members in the present and future (The Herald, 1998). However, 
when the discussions on the EU reforms started to cover the issue of the British rebate 
from the EU budget, the Labour government also got a tougher position, as the British 
rebate was a sensitive national issue. In particular, the Commission released a document in 
October 1998 arguing that the British rebate would be unfair after the Eastward 
enlargement and “demanded an end to Britain's special GBP 2 billion-a-year62 rebate from 
the European Union” (Byrne, 1998). In line with the Commission’s document, France, 
Germany, Spain and the Netherlands also demanded to open a question for Britain’s rebate 
from the EU budget at a finance ministers meeting in Luxembourg (12th October 1998) 
(Castle, 1998a). As a reaction to this demand, as LI assumes, the British national 
sensitivity on the issue increased. For example, the Conservative Party argued that the 
Labour government should veto any move to alter the existing rebate system gained by 
Thatcher (Castle, 1998b). As a result, the Blair government put the continuation of the 
British rebate on its red line list as an important national preference at the forthcoming EU 
level negotiations63.   
At the Vienna European Council (11-12th December 1998), the negotiations on the 
financial reform became tougher. Particularly, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer 
implicitly gave the message that Germany might hold up the process of the Eastward 
enlargement “if it did not get a deal to cut its payments to Brussels” (Mackinnon, 1998c). 
The German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder also argued that the financial problems related 
to the Eastward enlargement would not be solved with a German check book (Ulbrich, 
1998, Copley, 1998). As a result, Germany proposed to freeze the EU spending at the 
existing levels (1.27 per cent of GDP to the EU budget) until 2006, and this proposal was 
                                                 
62 In 1998, it was around £ 2.85 billion.  
63 This case also confirms LI’s assumption that if the domestic actors are sensitive to an issue, the executive 
cannot easily negotiate this issue at the EU level.  
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supported by Britain, France, Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden but opposed by the 
poorer members: Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland (Mackinnon, 1998c, Ames, 1998). 
On the other hand, France and Germany increased their pressure on Britain to renegotiate 
the British rebate from the EU budget (The Times, 1998, Castle, 1998c). As a reaction, the 
Labour government strongly vowed that the rebate gained by Thatcher was not negotiable 
and the government would keep its veto right as a last resort to prevent any change in the 
existing rebate mechanism (Aberdeen Press and Journal, 1998, Brogan, 1998, Smith, 
1998).  
In this political atmosphere, it was hard for the Labour government to balance the domestic 
expectations and its negotiation strategy at the EU level. At the EU level, Britain tried not 
to be isolated despite the harsh discussions on the British rebate issue (Walker, 1998). 
Particularly, Blair tried to side with Schroeder in order to implement the necessary 
financial reforms (ibid.). In parallel with this purpose, Blair pointed out that the problem of 
German contribution to Brussels could be solved through the stabilization of the EU 
budget and by radical reforms of the CAP64, which accounted for almost half of the EU 
spending, rather than reforming the British rebate mechanism (Agence France Presse, 
1998a). Additionally, Blair conceded that Britain was also ready to share the cost of the 
Eastward enlargement (Castle and Sylvester, 1998). Despite the Labour government’s 
negotiation attempts at the EU level, it continued to face strong criticisms at the domestic 
level. For example, the Conservative leader Hague accused Blair of failing to protect 
Britain's national interests at the Vienna Summit (White, 1998, Brogan and Watson, 1998, 
Watson, 1998). According to Hague, Blair’s EU policy failed three crucial tests; to create a 
flexible and unregulated EU, to make enlargement the EU’s priority, and to limit political 
integration of the EU (White, 1998).  
After getting the EU Presidency in January 1999, Germany aimed to complete the targets 
of Agenda 2000 (the enlargement-related reforms in the CAP, the Structural and Cohesion 
Funds, and future financing of the EU). However, the negotiations were highly 
complicated. Firstly, the social democratic German government aimed to decrease German 
contribution to the EU budget mostly because of the domestic pressure (Walker, 1999b). 
The Netherlands, Sweden and Austria were also pressing to decrease their payments to the 
EU budget as other net contributors (Castle, 1999a, Bates, 1999, European Report, 1999). 
                                                 
64 Despite the French rejection against the reform of the CAP 
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At this point, the German Presidency focused on three main options; to freeze EU spending 
until 2006 (85 billion euros a year), to introduce radical CAP reforms (national co-
financing65 and cutting farm subsidies), and to cut the British rebate from the EU budget 
(Agence France Presse, 1999b, Staunton, 1999). However, regarding those options, there 
were deep divisions between the members to reach a consensus. More specifically, France 
was against the radical CAP reforms, the poorer members (Greece, Portugal and Spain, and 
Ireland) were against freezing EU spending since this would decrease their benefit from 
aid funds, and Britain was against any change in the existing rebate mechanism gained by 
Thatcher in 1984 (Mackinnon, 1999a, Webster, 1999).  
In this political atmosphere, the Labour government continued to try not to isolate Britain 
within the negotiation process. Although Britain had a veto power to prevent any decision 
related to the British rebate, the Labour government primarily tried to convince other 
members about how the British rebate was fair and reasonable (The Herald, 1999). For 
example, at a finance ministers meeting (8th February 1999), when Oskar Lafontaine, the 
German finance minister, reiterated that the British rebate needed to be re-arranged in 
order to share the burden of the Eastward enlargement equally (Castle, 1999b), the British 
officials claimed that every British was already paying nearly a pound a week for Europe 
despite the rebate (Walker, 1999b). At the Petersberg Summit (26th February 1999), Blair 
also argued that even after the abatement/rebate, Britain was the second largest net 
contributor to the European Union, and after the enlargement, Britain would still be a very 
large net contributor despite the abatement (Agence France Presse, 1999c). In the 
following negotiations, the Labour government continued to use this argument to 
legitimize the British rebate. Moreover, the Labour government tried to convince Germany 
(and other members) that a sufficient CAP reform and freezing EU spending would be 
enough (without cutting the British rebate) to arrange the EU budget for the Eastward 
enlargement, through which the decrease in the payments of the net contributors to the EU 
budget would also become possible (Bates, 1999) because farm subsidies and regional aids 
already accounted for over 80 percent of the total EU budget (Wielaard, 1999).  
                                                 
65 According to Germany, responsibility for some parts of the agricultural budget should be transferred from 
Brussels back to national governments.  
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The Labour government also tried to find allies within the EU to manage to reform the 
CAP and the Structural and Cohesion funds. As a free-market oriented CAP reform was a 
historical ambition of Britain, the Labour government gave a priority to it during the 
negotiations. For example, at the Oxford Farming Conference (5th January 1999), Nick 
Brown, the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, argued that a more liberalised 
CAP would help the EU’s farming industry to become more competitive and prepared 
against the challenges that further global liberalism and EU enlargement would pose 
(Birmingham Post, 1999, Aberdeen Press and Journal, 1999b). The NFU also supported 
the Labour government’s aim to make the CAP more free market oriented. For example, 
Tony Pexton, the deputy president of the NFU asserted that “The NFU … has been at the 
forefront of calls for the CAP reform. Enlargement of the EU, liberalisation of world 
trade and growing surplus production mean that such changes are now urgently needed” 
(Aberdeen Press and Journal, 1999a). To achieve a sufficient reform in the CAP, the 
Labour government needed to ally with Germany (Watson, 1999b). Especially, the newly 
elected social democrat German government was a potential ally for the Labour 
government because the powerful Bavarian farm lobby was less influential on the Social 
Democrats unlike the Christian Democrats (the CSU/CDU) (Journal of Commerce, 1999, 
Walker, 1999a). In addition to Germany, Sweden, Austria, and the Netherlands also 
wanted to decrease the economic cost of the CAP to the EU budget. As a result, France 
needed to accept that the CAP should become more market-oriented to integrate the poorer 
Central and Eastern European countries despite France’s historic 
interventionist/protectionist position on the CAP (Casert, 1999). Particularly, France 
needed to make the concession that “the level of compensation paid to farmers should be 
progressively reduced after 2003”66 (Mackinnon, 1999).  
On 11th March 1999, the EU agriculture ministers also agreed on a draft that compromised 
to decrease the subsidies on beef, cereals (20 per cent cut) and dairy (15 per cent cut), and 
dairy quotas would also be phased out by 2006. However, direct aid payments would be 
arranged for farmers to compensate for those changes (Meade, 1999b, Meade et al., 1999). 
At this point, it should be underlined that global pressure/considerations also played a role 
in this compromise, which would make the CAP more market oriented. For example, 
agriculture would be on the agenda of the forthcoming WTO negotiations (Western 
                                                 
66 Despite this concession, France was strongly against the German proposal to increase national co-financing 
for the CAP 
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Morning News, 1999); and in this context, one of the aims of this reform was to make  
Europe's farmers more self-supporting and competitive in world markets “without the 
crutch of a farm policy currently costing Stg 30 billion ($ A77.02 billion) a year” (Meade, 
1999b). After the draft, Nick Brown argued that the Labour government protected national 
interests because the cutbacks would not unfairly target Britain’s relatively more efficient 
farming sector while making the CAP more market oriented. In parallel with this 
argument, Ben Gill, the President of the NFU, also supported the draft (Meade, 1999b, 
Meade et al., 1999, Western Morning News, 1999).   
Finally, at the Berlin European Council (25-26th March 1999), the EU leaders managed to 
reach a consensus on the necessary reforms in the CAP, the Structural and Cohesion 
Funds, and future financing of the EU (The European Council, 1999a). Therefore, the 
Agenda 2000 reforms, which were necessary for the Eastward enlargement, were 
completed after two years negotiations (Cm 4531, 2000, p. v, Ames, 1999), and the 
Amsterdam Treaty entered into force on 1st May 1999. 
In particular, at the Berlin Summit, the Labour government managed to convince Germany 
to preserve the British rebate from the EU budget despite France’s rejection67 (Meade, 
1999a, Walker and Traynor, 1999). As a result, the British government achieved to 
maintain the British abatement/rebate from the EU budget (worth about £ 2 billion a year) 
(Cm 4609, 2000, p. 90). Secondly, the EU leaders agreed to freeze EU spending until 
2006. To do this, the overall financial ceiling would remain as 1.27 percent of the EU GNI 
(the Own Resources ceiling) (Cm 4609, 2000, p. 90). In terms of the CAP, Britain pushed 
for further cuts in the CAP spending during the negotiations (Carrell, 1999), but France 
prevented a radical reform of the CAP (World Markets Analysis, 1999, Castle and Butler, 
1999). However, the EU leaders agreed that the EU would reduce spending on the CAP 
from 2002 onwards. According to the agreement, the prices of milk, cereals, and beef 
would be cut (to bring them to world level) and a new integrated rural development policy, 
including agri-environment measures to protect the countryside, would be introduced. 
                                                 
67 Just before the summit, there occurred two important resignations, which decreased the German 
Presidency’s governance capacity to end the Agenda 2000 negotiations before the Berlin European Council 
(25-26th March 1999). Firstly, the German finance minister Oskar Lafontaine resigned on 11 th March 1999 
(Agence France Presse, 1999a), and later Commission President Jacques Santer resigned together with his 
team (all the 20 European commissioners) as a reaction to fraud and mismanagement allegations on 16th 
March 1999 (Thompson, 1999, Walker, 1999c). As a result, it could be argued that the weakened German 
Presidency was also an advantage for the Labour government to keep the rebate from the EU budget at the 
Berlin Summit. 
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According to the Labour government, an average British household would save about £64 
per year as a result of the mentioned arrangements in the CAP (Cm 4609, 2000, p. 90). 
Last but not least, the Labour government argued that Britain “secured its best ever 
regional funding deal” at the summit (Cm 4609, 2000, p. 86). Particularly, the Structural 
Funds for 2000-2006 would provide over £ 10 billion for Britain. Thus, Britain would 
become the sixth largest beneficiary of the Structural Funds compared to the previous 
period (1994-1999) in which Britain was the seventh. To illustrate, the new deal increased 
the proportion of British population who lived in British regions covered by Objective 1 of 
the Structural Funds by two-thirds. The Labour government also managed a special deal 
for Northern Ireland and the Highlands and Islands through which the mentioned regions 
would be able to get funds at a level equivalent to Objective 1 (Cm 4609, 2000, p. 90) 
although they lost their Objective 1 status within the Structural Funds under the new rules 
(Watson, 1999a).  
Despite this progress in the enlargement-related reforms, the necessary reforms in the EU’s 
decision making system remained unresolved. Therefore, at the Cologne European Council 
(3-4th June 1999), the EU leaders agreed to start another intergovernmental conference68 
(the 2000 IGC) to achieve the necessary reforms in the EU’s governance prior to the 
Eastward enlargement (Agence France Presse, 1999, The European Council, 1999b). 
However, the reform of the EU’s decision making structure was a highly sensitive issue for 
member states. Particularly, the Labour government was under domestic pressure even 
before starting the negotiations because the Conservative Party leader, William Hague, 
strongly reacted against the 2000 IGC and declared that a Conservative Party would veto 
the outcomes of the 2000 IGC despite its support for the Eastward enlargement and 
pledged to renegotiate Britain’s terms of entry (Brogan, 1999b, Grice, 1999). William 
Hague also fiercely criticized the Labour government for selling Britain’s national interests 
in Brussels (Jacobs, 1999). Moreover, when the European Commission released a report on 
18 October 1999 arguing that the member states should give more power to the 
Commission to govern an enlarged EU, the domestic Eurosceptic pressure on the Labour 
government increased further (Castle, 1999c, Watson, 1999c).  
                                                 
68 The IGC would be convened in the first half of 2000 under the Portuguese Presidency.  
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At the Helsinki Summit (10-11th December 1999), the EU leaders confirmed that a new 
Intergovernmental Conference69 would be convened in February 2000 to solve the 
institutional issues which needed to be settled before the Eastward enlargement (the size 
and composition of the Commission, the weighting of votes in the Council, and the 
possible extension of qualified majority voting) (The European Council, 1999c). 
Additionally, the EU leaders decided to open the accession negotiations with further six 
candidate countries: Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria (Cm 4762, 
2000, p. 14). In other words, the Helsinki Summit accelerated the Eastward enlargement, 
and thus the enlargement-related negotiations on the EU’s decision making system. At this 
point, as LI assumes, since the British Eurosceptics were highly sensitive to any change in 
the EU’s decision making system, the Labour government needed to carefully prepare its 
position for the forthcoming IGC negotiations. Firstly, on 4th February 2000, the Labour 
government agreed with the Liberal Democrats to set out a common pro-European position 
for the coming IGC negotiations, and in this way the Labour government aimed to 
decrease the national Eurosceptic pressure (The Herald, 2000, Macleod, 2000, Macaskill, 
2000). However, according to this pro-European position, the extension of QMV should be 
done case by case, and the member states’ veto right should be retained for the key 
national issues: treaty changes, taxation, social security, defence, border controls, and own 
resources70. On the other hand, according to the Labour government, the extension of the 
QMV could be acceptable in other areas, if the extension would make the governance of 
them more liberal (Macaskill, 2000).  
However, when France took the EU Presidency in July 2000, there emerged a significant 
problem for the Labour government in the enlargement-related negotiations. In particular, 
France started to push for a two-tier European Union in which 11 members who adopted 
the single European currency might move to harmonise taxation and budgetary policy 
(Jackson, 2000, Black, 2000b). Especially, after the Danish rejection of euro on 28 
September 2000, the Franco-German ambition for a two-speed European Union arose 
(Castle, 2000, Mather, 2000). Alternatively, the Labour government tried to prioritize the 
                                                 
69 The 2000 IGC was a set of negotiations carried out from February 2000 to December 2000 (the Nice 
European Council).  
70 This position was also acceptable by other domestic actors except for the Eurosceptics. For example, the 
Head of European Affairs of the CBI, Karen Clements (1999, p. 24), argued that the extension of the QMV 
should be examined case by case and the extension should be done in the areas related to the effective 
working of the Single Market. In this regard, the QMV mechanism should not cover taxation. Moreover, 
David Owen, the Chairman of New Europe, also argued that Britain should retain “the national veto on 
taxation, social security, border controls, defence and treaty changes” (Kirk, 2000b). 
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Eastward enlargement over the issue of single currency in the EU agenda (Black, 2000c, 
Fletcher, 2000c). For example, in his visit to Poland on 5th October 2000, Tony Blair called 
for the acceleration of the Eastward enlargement (Agence France Presse, 2000b). In this 
regard, Tony Blair was the first EU leader demanding that the Eastward enlargement 
should be completed prior to the European Parliamentary elections in 2004 (HC 318, 
2001). In his speech, Tony Blair implicitly criticized France and Germany for slowing the 
enlargement process and warned that “[s]upporting enlargement in principle but delaying 
in practice is no longer good enough” (Black and Watt, 2000). Related to the enlargement 
issue, he also highlighted the importance of a multi-tier Union in which member countries 
could co-operate on a looser basis where they have a mutual interest instead of a two-tier 
Union with a “pioneer group” constituted by the euro-zone countries (mostly Germany and 
France) (Baldwin and Fletcher, 2000a, European Report, 2000b, Young, 2000). In his 
words; 
Europe is a Europe of free, independent sovereign nations who choose to pool that sovereignty in pursuit of 
their own interests and the common good, achieving more together than we can achieve alone. Such a Europe 
can, in its economic and political strength, be a superpower, not a superstate71 (United Press International, 
2000)72.   
At the Biarritz European Council (13–14th October 2000), the member countries tried to 
trash out the differences among themselves in order to complete the institutional reforms 
necessary for the Eastward enlargement. Firstly, Britain and France had a tendency to 
agree on the doctrine: ‘enhanced cooperation’ (Cook, 2000a, Fletcher and Webster, 2000, 
European Report, 2000a). For example, according to Tony Blair, flexibility within the EU 
governance system was needed under two conditions: “no two-track Europe and no 
undermining of the Single Market” (European Report, 2000a). Unlike the previous 
proposal: two-tier Europe that would contain a “pioneer group" within the EU, ‘enhanced 
cooperation’ model would permit any members to further cooperate in a field but this 
cooperation should not discriminate other members and would not constitute a part of the 
acquis73. In other words, this model was closer to the model of “multi-tier Europe” the 
                                                 
71 Blair’s definition of the EU as a superpower not a superstate could also be seen as an alternative policy 
against the Conservative Party’s Euroscepticism. As a reaction, Francis Maude, Shadow Foreign Secretary 
criticized Blair’s policy by arguing that “How can the EU be a superpower without being a superstate? This 
is dangerous, grandiose stuff from (him), it will damage our relationship with Nato, damage our relationship 
with the US and undermine our nation state” (Baldwin and Fletcher, 2000).   
72 At the domestic level, the Conservative Party negatively reacted to Blair’s plan by defining it as “a federal 
strategy for a federal EU superstate”. But, the CBI supported Blair’s plan because it did not want to be 
restrained by “unnecessary EU-wide legislation” (Rice-Oxley, 2000).  
73 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/enhanced_cooperation_en.htm, accessed on 20.07.2014. 
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Labour government wanted. On the other hand, at the summit, the division between 
smaller and larger members on the reweighing of votes in the European Council’s decision 
making system could not be settled. Briefly, the five largest members (France, Britain, 
Germany, Italy and Spain) demanded to strengthen their voting power within the Council’s 
decision making system in exchange for giving up one of their two commissioners, but the 
smaller members were not willing to accept this proposal (Kirk, 2000a, Agence France 
Presse, 2000d, Nacheman, 2000).  
As the Biarritz European Council failed to make an important progress on the EU reforms 
(Associated Press International, 2000), the Nice European Council (7–9th December 2000) 
emerged as the last chance to complete the 2000 IGC’s targets (the institutional reforms 
which were necessary for the Eastward enlargement) (HC 318, 2001). At this point, the 
Labour government (HC 23-xvii, 2000, p. xvii) determined its position as follows: 
 Size of the Commission: the British government was willing to give up its 
additional Commissioner (along with the other larger Member States) in exchange 
for a re-weighting of votes in the Council in larger Member States’ favour. 
  Re-weighting of votes: the voting system should not be proportional to population 
in order to maintain the sovereign equality of Member States. Moreover, the 
enlargement would include many smaller Member States within the EU; thus, a 
redistribution of votes should be done in favour of the more populous Member 
States. Otherwise, small Member States with less population might outvote the 
majority and this would result in a democracy deficit within the EU system. 
Therefore, the British government preferred a simple re-weighting of votes within 
the current system instead of a dual majority system. 
Furthermore, from an LI perspective, the Labour government continued its two-level game 
strategy to achieve its goals at the Nice Summit. At the domestic level, the Labour 
government formed a relatively more nationalist position74 (Fletcher, 2000d, Schofield, 
2000a) and guaranteed the British people that it would save Britain’s national interests. For 
example, Tony Blair announced that he would “fight to retain Britain's veto on tax, social 
security, defence, asylum and immigration, treaty changes and EU funding” at the Nice 
European Council (7-9th December 2000), and he would not give any concession on 
Britain’s veto right over the mentioned issues for the sake of the enlargement (Hughes, 
                                                 
74 In general, the British Eurosceptics strongly blamed the Labour government for having a secret agenda to 
establish a European superstate (Hibbs, 2000, The Guardian, 2000a). In particular, they harshly criticized the 
Labour government for giving up veto rights on a set of issues that would dilute Britain’s sovereignty (e.g. 
industrial policy) (Porter, 2000). Additionally, the coming general elections also played a role in the 
increasing tension between the pro-European Labour government and Eurosceptic Conservative Party and 
press.  
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2000). Additionally, the Labour government promised that it would only accept the 
extension of the QMV in the areas (e.g. world trade, financial services and free movement 
for professional workers) supporting further liberalization of the EU market (Grice, 2000).  
On the other hand, the Labour government tried to challenge the criticisms of the 
Conservative Party and Eurosceptic press at the domestic level (Schofield, 2000a). To 
illustrate, the Labour government correspondingly launched a propaganda against the 
Conservative Party and the Eurosceptic British press just before the Nice European 
Council and criticized them for focusing on the ideological myths (e.g. European super-
state) rather than the facts (Gow, 2000, Cook, 2000b, Webster, 2000). By using this 
propaganda, the Labour Party also aimed to win over the public opinion and decrease the 
Eurosceptic domestic pressure before the negotiations at the Nice Summit (Agence France 
Presse, 2000, Black, 2000a, Watson, 2000, Castle and Grice, 2000, Fletcher, 2000b). 
Additionally, there emerged an inner party division in the Conservative Party. Lord 
Brittan, Lord Hurd, Kenneth Clarke and Chris Patten (the party’s heavyweights) criticised 
William Hague’s Eurosceptic tactics for being useless (Percival, 2000, Mcelderry, 2000a), 
and this division within the Conservative Party also helped to decrease the domestic 
pressure on the Labour Party at the Nice Summit75.  
At the EU level, the British government tried to follow a balance of power strategy to 
achieve its national preferences. In this sense, firstly, Britain constituted a block with the 
rest of the larger members to demand more voting power in the QMV mechanism at the 
expense of the smaller members (Fletcher, 2000d). Secondly, Britain allied with the Nordic 
countries to prevent the doctrine of ‘enhanced cooperation’ from creating an inner-core and 
periphery structure within the EU (Schofield, 2000b). Thirdly, the Labour government 
tried to benefit from the division between France and Germany on the re-weighing voting 
system76. 
As a result of this strategy, when the summit ended, the Labour government declared that it 
achieved all of its goals and saved Britain’s national interests at the negotiations. 
Therefore, according the Blair government, the result of the Nice Summit was a victory for 
                                                 
75 For example, despite its strong position not to give up the veto in six key areas centred on taxation, social 
security, border controls and defence, the Labour government prepared itself to concede Britain's veto in 17 
other areas in favour of qualified majority voting (Agence France Presse, 2000c).  
76 Germany was demanding more power in the decision making system due to its higher population (83 
million), but France was resisting this idea (Adler, 2000, Kirk, 2000c). 
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Britain77 (Xinhua General News Service, 2000). Firstly, the Nice Treaty paved the way for 
the Eastward enlargement. Secondly, Britain increased her voting strength within the EU 
decision making system since Britain joined the EU. In detail, thanks to vote re-weighting, 
Britain gained more power in the European Council because Britain’s vote would increase 
from 10 to 29 (making Britain more powerful compared to the small and medium sized 
members). Within the QMV system, any decision would need 62 % of the EU’s population 
(without vote re-weighting, it would be just over 50 % after the enlargement). Therefore, 
the three largest members would have the ability to block any decision after the Eastward 
enlargement. Additionally, Britain managed to retain her veto power over the areas: social 
security, taxation, border controls, treaty change, own resources, and defence, which were 
crucial to Britain’s national interests. However, Britain accepted the extension of QMV to 
the areas like liberalizing external trade in services or industrial policy (Cm 5110, 2001, p. 
80). Furthermore, Blair managed to keep the issue of defence out of the ‘enhanced 
cooperation’ clause and the European rapid reaction force remained under the umbrella of 
NATO (Agence France Presse, 2000e, Mcelderry, 2000b).  
After concluding the enlargement-related EU reforms, at the Copenhagen European 
Council (12-13th December 2002), the EU leaders finally agreed that ten candidate 
countries (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia) would join the European Union on 1st May 2004, and  
Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 (The European Council, 2002). Therefore, the Labour 
government achieved its foreign policy objective, and the CEECs (plus Malta and Cyprus) 
became EU members before the 2004 European Parliament elections after a long and 
complex negotiation process (HC 151, 2003, p. 18).   
                                                 
77 Despite the Labour government’s “victory” rhetoric, the Conservative Party and Eurosceptic press 
criticized the results of the summit. For example, William Hague pointed out “three more major steps to a 
European superstate” by dropping several rights to veto, agreeing to a charter of fundamental rights and 
accepting the creation of a European army. Therefore, he declared that if the Conservative Party won the next 
election, it would not ratify the Nice Treaty. Additionally, he called on the Labour government to conduct a 
national referendum on ratification of the treaty (Xinhua General News Service, 2000, Agence France Presse, 
2000a, Smith, 2000). As an example to the position of Eurosceptic British press, the Daily Mail published 
several news items challenging the Labour Party’s victory rhetoric and arguing that what the Labour 
government called “victory” was actually “surrender” (Amory, 2000, The Daily Mail, 2000, Glover, 2000). 
As a result, the Nice Treaty became one of the hot topics of the coming general election (7th June 2001). 
Overall, the Nice Treaty was approved by the House of Commons by a vote of 392 to 158 on 17 th October 
2001 (Associated Press International, 2001). 
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5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the CEECs from an LI 
perspective. Compared to the previous enlargement cases, the Eastward enlargement was a 
more complex and longer process, as it went hand in hand with the important enlargement-
related reforms in the EU system (e.g. the EU’s budget, funds, governance system, and the 
CAP). In this regard, LI’s two-level game approach was useful in systematically analysing 
how Britain’s national preferences about the Eastward enlargement were determined at the 
domestic level, and how the successive British governments (the Conservative government 
and then the Labour government) defended them at the EU level negotiations. 
First of all, the findings support LI’s intergovernmental assumption that a pro-enlargement 
policy towards the CEECs was shaped according to Britain’s national interests. As noted 
above, there was a strong domestic consensus on a pro-enlargement policy towards the 
CEECs, which made the successive British governments influential initiators of the 
Eastward enlargement at the EU level. However, as LI assumes, this consensus did not 
mean that the successive governments were willing to sacrifice national interests for the 
sake of the Eastward enlargement. Particularly, the Eastward enlargement process went 
hand in hand with the two Intergovernmental Conferences (the 1996 IGC and the 2000 
IGC), owing to the need for the structural reforms of the EU in order to make the Eastward 
enlargement possible. Therefore, despite the domestic consensus on a pro-enlargement 
policy towards the Eastward enlargement, the British domestic actors (especially the 
British Eurosceptics) were highly sensitive to the outcomes/externalities of those 
enlargement-related reforms. As a result, as LI assumes, this domestic sensitivity narrowed 
the British governments’ room for manoeuvre at the EU level negotiations. For example, 
as noted in the previous chapter, the expansion of QMV method in the EU decision making 
system emerged as a negative externality of the EFTA enlargement to Britain, and as a 
result of this, the Conservative government was under the pressure of the Eurosceptic 
groups at the domestic level. Thus, when the 1996 IGC started, the main position of the 
Conservative government was to try to limit supranational proposals as much as possible 
and to prevent the expansion of the QMV method any further. In the same vein, in spite of 
its more active/constructive position within the EU, the Labour government was also 
responsive to the increasing Euroscepticism at the domestic level; thus, they tried to 
determine well-defined red-lines (saving national interests) in the enlargement-related 
reform negotiations (e.g. the QMV). To illustrate, when Germany and France demanded 
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the renegotiation of the British rebate from the EU budget in the negotiations on the EU 
financial system, the Labour government strongly declared that the rebate gained by 
Thatcher was non-negotiable. In addition to this, during the negotiations on the EU’s 
institutional reforms (the 2000 IGC), the Labour government gave the domestic groups a 
clear message that it would not give any concession on Britain’s veto right over the 
nationally important issues (e.g. tax, social security, defence, asylum and immigration, 
treaty changes and EU funding) for the sake of the enlargement. Additionally, both the 
Conservative and Labour governments considered Britain’s specific interests in the reform 
negotiations on the CAP, the EU’s budgetary system, and the Structural and Cohesion 
Funds. For example, they tried to convince other members to reform the CAP according to 
market economy principles (in compliance with the WTO agreements). Moreover, the 
Labour government negotiated to achieve Britain’s specific interests regarding those issues 
and declared that it saved the British rebate from the EU budget and arguably managed a 
better deal on the CAP (e.g. an average British household would save about £64 per year 
according to the new deal) and the Structural Funds (e.g. Britain would become the sixth 
largest beneficiary of the Structural Funds instead of being the seventh) at the end of the 
EU level negotiations. 
However, as found in the previous cases, the findings of this case have also showed that 
LI’s economic interest oriented rational choice and pluralistic decision making 
assumptions are limited in explaining Britain’s pro-enlargement policy as an output of the 
national preference formation process. Firstly, as noted above, the Eastward enlargement 
was a relatively complex issue for member states due to the complicated enlargement-
related reforms in the EU system (e.g. the EU’s budget, funds, governance system, and the 
CAP), and this complexity limited the British governments in making a clear cost-benefit 
calculation on the issue. To illustrate, the Labour government could not estimate the level 
of immigration influx from the new members to Britain; thus, they did not take any 
restrictive measure against it. In his memoirs, Jack Straw (2012, p. 423), the Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (2001-2006) confessed that a research paper 
of the Home Office on the potential immigration from the CEECs to Britain misguided the 
government; otherwise, they would have adopted a restrictive policy against the 
immigrants from the new members as many other members did. In the same vein, in the 
telephone interview, Charles Garret (19.11.2014), the Head of EU Enlargement Team in 
the FCO (2001-2005), also said that they did not estimate that immigration would become 
146 
 
a problem after the big bang enlargement. Secondly, unlike LI’s economic interest oriented 
assumption, the research has found that security concerns emerged as the main reason 
behind the successive British governments’ support for the Eastward enlargement under 
the situational condition of the enlargement. Particularly, both of the governments 
perceived the emerging power vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union as a crucial security problem. According to the Conservative government, 
any bilateral security measure might make the situation worse in the region; therefore, a 
multilateral framework immediately needed to be designed to integrate the region into the 
Western democratic system. Subsequently, the Labour government also strictly followed 
this strategy for the similar reasons.  
Moreover, the research has also found that the above-mentioned geopolitical concerns, as 
the main reason behind Britain’s pro-enlargement policy, were also interconnected with the 
ideological motivations and economic expectations of British actors. To demonstrate, 
several British societal/interest groups (e.g. the CBI, the NFU, The British Insurance and 
Investment Broker’s Association) agreed with the British governments on the expectation 
that liberalisation and modernization of the markets of the CEECs via enlargement would 
also offer new economic opportunities to Britain. In terms of ideological motivations, both 
of the successive British governments expected that the Eastward enlargement would help 
to drive the European integration process towards an outward-looking intergovernmental 
way. However, there was a subtle difference in the successive governments’ 
political/ideological motivations. In terms of the Conservative government, the Eastward 
enlargement also represented the expansion of Thatcherism further, since the Central 
European Countries sympathized with the Thatcherite economic model. Additionally, this 
reasoning would help the Major government to prevent any further division within the 
Conservative Party on the EU. On the other hand, the Blair government aimed to put 
Britain in a more central/leading position within the EU, and a strong pro-enlargement 
policy would help the Blair government to achieve this goal.  
By taking these points into consideration, as LI assumes, it could be argued that the British 
governments benefited from a multi-causal reasoning while developing Britain’s national 
preferences over the issue of the Eastward enlargement as they could make precise cost-
benefit calculations on it. However, as noted in the theory chapter, LI’s actor oriented 
theoretical position does not provide further explanation about this multi-causal reasoning. 
To further elaborate on this finding, as the literature review suggested, the British foreign 
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policy structure (e.g. the aims to strengthen Britain’s collective security and to expand 
liberal ideals) might have constituted a rational ground for Britain’s pro-enlargement 
policy towards the CEECs. More specifically, within the general British foreign policy 
framework, it might have been rational for the British actors to expect that the 
democratization/liberalization of the CEECs via enlargement would provide more security 
and wealth for Britain in the long-run. As a result of this expectation, the successive 
governments had even a tendency to tolerate any possible short-run economic cost of the 
enlargement. For example, to guarantee the democratization of CEECs, the Conservative 
government launched national assistance programmes for the CEECs in addition to the EU 
level economic aid. Additionally, the success in the Mediterranean enlargement to 
integrate the former authoritarian Mediterranean countries into the Western democratic 
system also empirically supported this expectation.  
Last but not least, as noted in the theory chapter, LI uses a pluralistic decision making 
approach while explaining national preference formation process. However, unlike this 
approach, this chapter has provided considerable evidence that both the Conservative and 
Labour governments were not only the dominant actors in the decision making process for 
a pro-enlargement policy, but also played an entrepreneurial role in encouraging British 
business to exploit the potential economic opportunities in the CEECs’ markets. For 
example, the Conservative government used the governmental institutions (e.g. DTI, FCO, 
and MAFF) to create an attractive atmosphere, through which British business would 
increase their investments in Central and Eastern Europe. The Labour government also 
launched two initiatives (namely, “Open for Business in Central Europe” in 1997 and 
“Opportunities in Central Europe” in 1999) to encourage apathetic British business to 
invest more in Central and Eastern Europe.   
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6 The Further Enlargement: The Western Balkans and Turkey 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses Britain’s policy on the EU’s further enlargement process towards the 
Western Balkans and Turkey from an LI perspective. The EU’s further enlargement 
process officially started at the beginning of the 2000s and was still an on-going process as 
of 2014. In this period, the Labour Party governed the EU’s further enlargement process 
until 2010, and the Coalition government was carrying out the process as of 2014, when 
the research ended. To clearly analyse this long period, the chapter separately focuses on 
the Labour government and the Coalition government periods.   
As found in the previous cases, LI’s two-level game approach provided a sufficient 
analytical perspective to explain Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the Western 
Balkans and Turkey. Particularly, this case has also confirmed LI’s intergovernmental 
assumption that a pro-enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans and Turkey was 
shaped according to Britain’s national interests. The chapter has found that the Labour 
government did not face any significant domestic challenge while determining its pro-
enlargement policy at the beginning of the 2000s; therefore, it was highly active at the EU 
level in launching/stimulating the enlargement process towards the Western Balkans and 
Turkey. However, when the British people became increasingly more sensitive to the issue 
of enlargement-related immigration, the Labour government lost its room for 
manoeuvre/effectiveness at the EU level. Subsequently, although the Cameron government 
started with a vigorous pro-enlargement policy in 2010, the increasing anti-immigration 
sentiments at the domestic level forced the government to demand an EU level structural 
reform to limit the EU’s free movement of people principle. To this end, in 2014, David 
Cameron even declared that the British government would veto any further enlargement 
without solving the enlargement-related immigration problem.   
As with the previous cases, this case has also showed that LI’s economic interest oriented 
rational choice and pluralistic decision making assumptions are limited in explaining the 
national preference formation process for a pro-enlargement policy towards the Western 
Balkans and Turkey. Firstly, unlike LI’s economic interest oriented assumption, the 
research has found that security/geopolitical concerns were the main driving force behind 
the successive British government’s pro-enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans 
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and Turkey. For example, as found in the Eastward enlargement case, both of the 
governments perceived that Britain’s security and prosperity depended on the prosperity 
and stability of Europe; and in this regard, the EU’s further enlargement towards the 
Western Balkans and Turkey was essential to maintain perpetual peace and prosperity in 
Europe in the globalized world. Moreover, according to the British governments, Turkey’s 
EU membership also gained a special meaning in the era of War on Terror. Additionally, 
the governments also expected that the further enlargement towards the Western Balkans 
and Turkey would make the EU more Atlanticist in line with Britain’s collective security 
understanding. However, economic expectations and ideological motivations were also 
intertwined with the above-mentioned security concerns. To illustrate, not only the 
successive British governments but also British business (including the CBI, NFU and 
TUC) agreed on the expectation that the liberalization of Western Balkans and Turkey’s 
markets would provide further economic opportunities for British business. At this point, 
British business (e.g. the CBI and Balfour Beatty Plc) also perceived Turkey not only as a 
geopolitical but also as an ‘economic bridge’ to access the new markets surrounding 
Turkey (e.g. the Middle East).   
On these grounds, as LI assumes, it could be argued that despite the dominance of 
geopolitical concerns, a multi-causal reasoning (containing geopolitical concerns, 
economic expectations and ideological motivations) affected British actors' attitude 
towards the EU’s further enlargement as it was hard to clearly calculate the costs and 
benefits of this open-ended process. However, as it has been repeatedly argued, LI’s actor 
oriented logic does not provide deeper explanation for this multi-causal reasoning. At this 
point, as the literature review suggested, the British foreign policy structure might have 
provided British actors with a rational ground for the expectation that the EU’s further 
enlargement would offer greater security and prosperity to Britain. In addition to this, the 
success of the Mediterranean enlargement and the Eastward enlargement waves in 
expanding democracy and market economy principles to authoritarian European countries 
also empirically supported British actors’ expectation that the EU’s further enlargement 
would provide Britain with greater security and prosperity in the long-run.   
The findings have also showed that the successive British governments (the Labour and the 
Coalition governments) were the main actors in forming Britain’s pro-enlargement policy 
unlike LI’s pluralistic decision making assumption. However, as noted above, they were 
also responsive to the domestic demands at the EU level negotiations. For example, the 
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Labour government was attentive to British companies’ demands (e.g. the Scotch Whisky 
Association) that Turkey should adopt the acquis communautaire in full in order to 
liberalize the Turkish market in its accession process. As a more prominent example, both 
of the successive governments were sensitive to the increasing enlargement-related anti-
immigration sentiments at the domestic level and the Cameron government even issued the 
solution of the immigration problem as a condition for its support for the EU’s further 
enlargement.   
To systematically present the analyses/findings in detail, the chapter firstly focuses on the 
Labour government era, and then on the Coalition government era. In both cases, the 
chapter analyses the collected data from an LI perspective to answer the questions: how the 
British governments and the relevant societal groups determined Britain’s national 
preferences about the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey, 
and how political and economic concerns affected the national preference formation 
process. Subsequently, the research focused on the question: how the British governments 
defended Britain’s national preferences at the EU level negotiations. At this point, as noted 
above, the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey did not have 
a clear negotiation framework and timescale as of 2014; therefore, the EU’s further 
enlargement process was generally carried out as a part of broader structural negotiations 
(e.g. the Lisbon Treaty) at the EU level.  
6.2 The Labour Party Period (2004-2010) 
6.2.1 National Preference Formation 
6.2.1.1 Political Concerns 
The research has found that the concerns driving the Labour government to form a pro-
enlargement policy towards the CEECs also constituted the main reason behind the Labour 
government’s pro-enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans and Turkey. As 
happened in the Eastward enlargement case, security concerns played a dominant role in 
the Labour government’s forming a pro-enlargement policy; however, this security 
understanding had ideological and economic dimensions as well.  
As found in the previous chapter, according to the Labour government, a peaceful and 
prosperous Europe was an essential condition to underpin Britain’s security and prosperity 
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(Cm 5934, 2003, p. 9). In this regard, the democratization of Europe was an essential 
necessity, and the EU’s enlargement policy was an efficient tool to achieve this goal. For 
example, the Mediterranean enlargement guaranteed the democratization of Greece, 
Portugal and Spain. The Eastward enlargement also achieved the democratic 
transformation in the Central and Eastern European countries. Thus, it was possible that 
the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkan countries78  and Turkey would 
guarantee the democratization of those countries.   
Particularly, the Western Balkans remained highly unstable and was posing a serious threat 
to the continent’s peace since the early 1990s (HC 507, 2000, p. 58, Cm 4209, 1999, p. ix, 
Cm 6413, 2005, p. 36). As a result, after the integration of the CEECs into the EU, the 
further enlargement towards the Western Balkans emerged as the best strategy to solve 
Europe’s Western Balkans problem. For example, Tony Blair argued that the Western 
Balkans should be transformed in a place “where rising prosperity, economic 
interdependence, diversity and tolerance make war almost unthinkable” (HC 23-xv, 2000, 
p. 81). However, unlike the CEECs, the Western Balkan countries were mostly the failed 
states, which were heavily suffering from ethnic conflicts. Under this condition, it was 
impossible to implement the standard enlargement policy, which was implemented to the 
CEECs, to those countries. Thus, the Labour government formed a security framework to 
achieve democratization and integration of the Western Balkans into the EU system at two 
levels.   
Firstly, ‘Euro-Atlantic structures’ would be used to maintain stability in the region, through 
which the Western Balkan countries were able to make necessary political and economic 
reforms. In other words, cooperation between NATO and the EU was needed to stabilize 
the region79. Secondly, the EU’s pre-accession policy would be implemented, and as a 
result of it, the region would finally be integrated into the EU (HC 23-xv, 2000, p. 52, Cm 
5220, 2002, p. 16, HC 1195-i, 2003, p. ev19, HC 87, 2005, p. ev58, Cm 6533, 2006, p. 50, 
Cm 7305, 2008, p. 22).   
                                                 
78 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and 
Montenegro. 
79 For example, when NATO decided that its Stabilisation Force (SFOR) had achieved its mission of 
ensuring stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU agreed to replace SFOR with an EU Force (EUFOR) 
(Cm 6533, 2006, p. 50). 
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This framework was also in conformity with the Blair government’s new security 
understanding. As noted in the previous chapter, according to the Blair government, 
Britain needed not only “hard power” but also “soft power”80  to maintain her security and 
prosperity in the newly emerged global system81 (Cm 7291, 2008, Dorman, 2009, p. 10, 
Brown, 2013, p. 70). In this sense, as Nye (2006, p. 33) argued, the EU emerged as a big 
soft power in the flux of the post-Cold War period, and its soft power could be used to help 
the NATO’s hard power. Thus, the Blair government tried to form a security policy that 
would benefit from both the EU’s soft power and the NATO’s hard power (Hodge 2006, p. 
146, Seldon, 2007, p. 616).  In parallel with this security understanding, a combination of 
hard power and soft power would firstly stabilize the Western Balkans, and then the EU’s 
soft power would be used as a carrot and stick to totally integrate the region into the EU 
system. Additionally, to guarantee peace and prosperity in Europe, it was also necessary to 
make the Western Balkan countries NATO members in addition to their EU memberships 
(HC 16-xxii, 2008, p. 68).   
Moreover, according to the Labour government’s security understanding, the EU’s 
enlargement was not only a successful instrument to democratize the Eastern European 
countries (Cm 7340, 2008, p. 62) but also an opportunity to make the EU more Atlanticist, 
which was another security ambition of the Labour government. In this regard, Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, the Baltic States had a strong Atlanticist outlook (Liddle, 2014, 
p. 226). For example, Treverton (2006, p. 45) argued that the 2004 enlargement increased 
the number of the countries in the EU who had greater tendency to cooperate with the 
USA. For example, unlike the Franco-German axis, the whole of Eastern and Central 
Europe and much of the Balkans (Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Macedonia, and Albania) 
supported the Anglo-American military campaign against Iraq and “pledged to take part in 
military action to disarm Saddam Hussein” (Evans-Pritchard, 2003). Therefore, the EU’s 
enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey would also strengthen the increasing 
Atlanticist tendency within the EU in line with Labour government’s new security 
understanding. 
                                                 
80 In Joseph Nye’s (2004) words, soft power was as important as hard power within the complexity of an 
interdependent world for the nation state. Therefore, a successful security policy should be supported by “soft 
power” oriented measures like economic measures. 
81 According to Clarke (2007, p. 643), the global interdependence meant that the West could no longer ignore 
chaos and inhumanity beyond its border and this reality was understood by Blair better than most of his 
colleagues. In this general framework, the Blair government immediately replaced the Major government’s 
non-involvement/appeasement policy over the Western Balkans with a pro-active/interventionist foreign 
policy after coming to power (Bogdanor, 2005, p. 447, Dyson, 2009, p. 240). 
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This security reasoning also ascribed a special meaning to Turkey’s EU membership. As 
the Foreign Secretary Jack Straw argued, enlargement was not only an internal issue but 
also EU's “single most successful external policy” through which security, prosperity and 
democracy could be spread further (Agence France Presse, 2004). In this sense, Turkey’s 
EU membership would significantly become important to export democratic principles to 
the Middle East, especially at a time when ‘War on Terror’ was declared against Islamic 
radicals. Therefore, the Labour government repeatedly highlighted the point that Turkey as 
an EU member would play the role of a bridge between the West and the Muslim world 
(Associated Press International, 2004, Cm 6823, 2006, p. 48, HC 768, 2006, p. 12, HC 
606, 2002, p. ev56). In addition to this, Turkey would also strengthen the EU’s energy 
security as an important energy corridor (HC 166, 2006, p. ev6, HC 367-ii, 2008, p. ev5, 
HC 367-i, 2008, p. 33).   
The Labour government’s security framework for the further enlargement had also an 
ideological background. If the EU’s enlargement policy would be used to democratise the 
Western Balkans, the democratic norms needed to be institutionalized in the region during 
the pre-accession process. Therefore, the punishment of the war crimes in the Western 
Balkans was highly important to achieve this aim. As a result, the Labour government 
repeatedly argued that the countries in the region must fully cooperate with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as a condition to start 
the accession negotiations (Cm 6735, 2006, p. 27). For example, Britain refused to start the 
accession negotiations with Croatia before the country surrendered the war criminal Gen. 
Ante Gotovina to the ICTY (Harding, 2003). Furthermore, as noted in the previous 
chapter, the Blair government adopted the main neo-liberal tenets of Thatcherism. 
Therefore, the Labour government also supported privatisation as a means to transform the 
Western Balkan countries into liberal democratic systems (HC 87, 2005, p. ev103). 
Additionally, the Labour government reiterated that Britain aimed to achieve “a modern, 
outward-looking European Union, enabling member states to respond to the challenges of 
globalisation and deliver opportunity, fairness and prosperity for all [European] citizens”. 
In this regard, enlargement was still an effective tool to create an outward-looking EU, 
which would enable member states to deal with the challenges of globalization (The House 
of Lords, 2007).  
As LI assumes, by taking those political concerns into account, the Labour government 
tried to make a rational decision. In particular, it had a tendency to tolerate the short-run 
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costs82 of the further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey by considering 
its higher alternative costs. For example, Jack Straw argued that “[w]e have to spend a bit 
but we get much more back” regarding the EU’s further enlargement (HC 768, 2006, p. 
ev16). Otherwise, according to Blair, “[…] western Europe would always be faced with 
the threat of instability, conflict and mass migration on its borders” 83 (Rice-Oxley, 2000, 
The Guardian, 2000). In line with this calculation, the Labour government also supported 
the EU’s financial assistance to the Western Balkans and Turkey via the Instrument for 
Pre-Accession (IPA), which delivered € 11.5 billion in assistance to the Western Balkan 
countries and Turkey for the period from 2007 to 2014 “to support economic and social 
development and assist in implementing the necessary reforms to move closer towards EU 
membership” (HC 19-i, 2009, pp. 28-29).   
6.2.1.2 Economic Concerns 
The process of the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey did 
not have a definite timescale and was open-ended; thus, it was hard for the British actors to 
clearly estimate the economic impact of the enlargement. For example, the Department for 
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR)84 acknowledged that the lack of a 
definite timescale for the Turkish accession was a big problem to predict the precise 
economic impact of Turkey’s EU membership on Britain (HC 367-i, 2008, p. 10, see also: 
HC 42-xxxiv, 2004, pp. 10-11). Despite this complexity, the economic concerns of the 
British actors also played a role in determining a pro-enlargement policy towards the 
Western Balkans and Turkey.  
From an LI perspective, as discussed in the previous chapters, both the Labour government 
and the former Conservative government had a tendency to behave as an absolute gain 
oriented rational egoist while determining their position towards the EU’s enlargement 
                                                 
82 As noted in the previous chapter, the short-run costs of the EU’s eastward enlargement present extra 
burden on the EU budget, as the Western Balkan countries and Turkey would become net receivers from the 
EU budget (via the CAP and the Structural and Cohesion Funds), and would result in procedural costs 
regarding the governance of the EU (especially Turkey). In addition to this, they (especially the Western 
Balkan countries) needed significant economic help from the EU even at the pre-accession level (Sarisoy-
Guerin and Stivachtis, 2011, p. 8).  
83 From this point of view, the Blair government also initiated to form a European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) because the new EU after the Eastward enlargement also needed to encourage its new periphery to 
make democratic political and economic reforms if Europe would become a peaceful and economically 
prosperous continent (Cm 6174, 2004). 
84 The department was created on 28th June 2007 after the disbanding of the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI).  
155 
 
waves, and they expected that the extension of the liberal Single Market via enlargement 
would result in a positive-sum effect for all the member states including Britain. With 
regard to the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey, this 
reasoning continued to be influential in the national preference formation process. For 
example, the Foreign Secretary Jack Straw argued that Britain would gain in the future 
from the EU’s further enlargement like what happened after the Mediterranean 
enlargement. For example, according to him, Britain’s trade with Spain increased 400 per 
cent since the accession of Spain to the EEC/EU, and the immigration flow from the 
Iberian Peninsula to the richer members reversed in time (Hansard, 2002, p. 169). The 
early outputs of the Eastward enlargement also supported the Labour government’s 
positive attitude towards the EU’s further enlargement. For example, the Labour 
government indicated that British merchandise trade with the CEECs (except Bulgaria and 
Romania) increased by 392 per cent between 1992 and 2005, which was “nearly ten times 
as fast as with the rest of the world” (The House of Lords, 2007, p. 6). Moreover, 
according to the Department of Work and Pension, the impact of the Eastward enlargement 
on the British labour market was positive, because as a research of the Bank of England 
also confirmed, it boosted the available pool of labour and helped to ease the shortage in 
the British labour market (ibid.).   
British business had also a similar tendency to perceive the EU’s further enlargement as an 
opportunity. To illustrate, a survey carried out by the Business for Europe showed that 64 
per cent of the British companies joined the survey thought that the Eastern European 
countries offered “the potential for high economic growth and a skilled labour force for the 
EU”, and 67 per cent of them declared their support for the EU’s further enlargement (e.g. 
Turkey) (Essen, 2008).  
More specifically, the Western Balkan countries had many economic and political 
problems; thus, they could not provide stable and working markets for British business in 
the short-run (Hc 87, 2005, p. ev63). However, according to the Labour government, 
Turkey offered significant opportunities for British business because of the fast growth in 
the Turkish economy, its need of infrastructure investment as a result of the fast growth, 
and the privatization of the key sectors in the Turkish economy (HC 360, 2001, pp. 1-5, 
HC 197, 2002, pp. xliv-xlvii). In line with this expectation, the British Trade 
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International85 (BTI) also launched a three year business campaign in 1998 to encourage 
British business to invest more in the Turkish market (ibid.). The CBI also expected that 
the Turkish membership to the EU would offer significant economic opportunities for 
British business in the sectors: environment, water, education and training, financial and 
legal services, police and security, power, transport infrastructure, 
ICT/Telecommunications, and agribusiness (HC 367-ii, 2008, p. ev101). According to the 
CBI, Turkey could also become a bridge for British business to access new markets in the 
Middle East, the North Africa, the Black Sea area, and the Central Asia by forming 
trilateral collaborations among  British companies, Turkish companies, and the local 
companies of those regions (HC 367-ii, 2008, p. ev102). In line with this expectation, for 
example, Balfour Beatty Plc stated its intention to use Turkish contractors as its arm “for 
attacking opportunities in Bulgaria, Romania and neighbouring former CIS states” (HC 
360, 2001, p. 28). Therefore, from an LI perspective, this finding shows that the definition 
of Turkey as a ‘bridge’ by the British government presented not only the security concerns 
but also the economic ambitions of British business.   
However, some of the British interest groups (e.g. the UK Steel Association, the British 
Music Rights, the Scotch Whisky Association-the Gin and Vodka Association of Great 
Britain, and the Publishers’ Association) also warned that Turkey needed to adopt/ 
implement the acquis communautaire in full in order to create a fair competition 
environment in the Turkish market; thus, that the British government should strictly screen 
the adaptation of the acquis by Turkey in the accession process (HC 360, 2001). As a 
response to this request, the British government also accepted that the structural reforms in 
Turkey in line with the Community’s acquis would create a more fair competition 
environment and more opportunities for British business, 330 of which including the major 
British companies such as BP, Shell, Unilever and Lucas Industries, were already 
operating in the Turkish market (HC 197, 2002, p. xliv). In terms of the discussions on a 
potential mass immigration influx from Turkey to Britain after Turkey’s accession to the 
EU, both British government and the Business and Enterprise Committee agreed on the 
point that “it was too early to make any robust assessment of the impact of the free 
movement of Turkish workers to the rest of the EU” (HC 1070, 2008, p. 4).  
                                                 
85 The joint DTI and FCO body,  responsible for helping UK business trade overseas. 
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On the other hand, the British actors took lessons from the Eastward enlargement about the 
fact that British business needed to be more active in pre-accession processes to exploit the 
emerging economic opportunities in applicant countries. For example, the Trade and 
Industry Select Committee argued that British business was relatively slow to take 
advantage of the opportunities as an output of the liberalization of the Central and Eastern 
European markets compared to its competitors like those in Germany, France, Italy and 
Spain; thus, it argued that the same mistake should not be repeated regarding the EU’s 
further enlargement (HC 592, 2007, pp. 26-27). In this regard, the British government also 
took into account that the competitors of British business might use their historical links 
with Turkey (as happened in the CEECs). To deal with this potential problem, the Labour 
government decided to use the UKTI as much as possible to raise the awareness of British 
business of the opportunities in Turkey and to determine the most profitable sectors in the 
Turkish market for British business (HC 1070, 2008, p. 11). British companies were also 
aware of this problem. For example, Stephen Radley, the chief economist of the EEF (the 
Manufacturers’ Organization), acknowledged British companies’ mistake in the Central 
and Eastern European markets and argued that British business should be more active in 
the pre-accession processes of the Western Balkan countries and Turkey, because those 
countries needed to make essential restructuring and liberalization reforms, which would 
offer significant opportunities for British business (HC 592, 2007, p. ev7).  
6.2.1.3 The Position of Other Domestic Actors 
As LI assumes, the domestic consensus on a pro-enlargement policy towards the Western 
Balkans and Turkey continued among the main British actors, and this consensus helped 
the Labour government to become more active in stimulating the enlargement process 
towards the Western Balkans and Turkey at the EU level. However, the increasing anti-
immigration sentiments among the British people gradually decreased/limited the Labour 
government’s capacity to accelerate the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western 
Balkans and Turkey.  
First of all, as the main opposition party, the Conservative Party continued its support for 
the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey despite its 
increasing Euroscepticism. As Michael Ancram, the Shadow Foreign Secretary from 2001 
to 2005, and Richard Spring, the Conservative MP, argued, the Conservative Party 
continued to perceive enlargement as a great way to promote peace and prosperity in 
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Europe (Hansard, 2003, p. 1113). In this sense, the party’s experiences from the 1990s also 
solidified this perception (Hansard, 2002, p. 172). For example, when David Cameron 
became the new leader of the Conservative Party, Douglas Hurd (2005) advised him that 
the Conservative Party needed to continue to support the EU’s further enlargement because 
from a Thatcherite perspective, a pro-enlargement policy was still important to create a 
liberal Single Market in Europe. Subsequently, David Cameron, as the new leader of the 
Conservative Party, also declared his support for the EU’s further enlargement (Associated 
Press International, 2007a).   
However, when a mass influx of immigration from the East Europe to Britain started after 
the 2004 enlargement, the situation started to change. Particularly, the Labour government 
expected that around 13,000 workers would come from the CEECs per year after the 2004 
enlargement, but 600,000 workers came between 2004 and 2006 (Kirk, 2006, Kubosova, 
2006b, Agence France Presse, 2006b). As a reaction to this, a strong anti-immigration 
sentiment emerged among the British people, which started to negatively affect Britain’s 
pro-enlargement policy (Agence France Presse, 2004d, Agence France Presse, 2004a). For 
example, in August 2006, a Mori poll for the Sunday Times revealed that 77 per cent of the 
British people wanted strict annual limits on the immigration from the Eastern members of 
the EU (Woodward, 2006). On the other hand, the increasing anti-immigration feelings 
started to strengthen UKIP in the British political arena and the party gradually became 
more influential in domestic politics by using an anti-immigration rhetoric (Agence France 
Presse, 2006a). For instance, UKIP increased its seats in the European Parliament from 3 
to 12 in the 2004 European Parliament election. Unlike the consensus among the 
mainstream British parties (the Conservatives, the Labours and Liberal Democrats) on a 
pro-enlargement policy, UKIP had also a tendency to see/present the EU’s further 
enlargement as a growing immigration threat to Britain (Herald Express, 2004). In parallel 
with this perception, the UKIP MEPs even voted against the 2004 enlargement at the 
European Parliament unlike the Conservative, the Labour and the Liberal Democrat MEPs 
(Express & Echo, 2004). As a result of the increasing anti-immigration sentiments among 
the British people and the increasing power of UKIP at the expense of it, the Conservative 
Party also started to put more pressure on the Labour government to limit the immigrants 
from Bulgaria and Romania when those countries got their EU membership in 2007 
(Associated Press International, 2006b, Kubosova, 2006b). In addition to the Conservative 
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Party, the Liberal Democrats also supported a transitional arrangement to control the 
immigration from the new members to Britain (Macleod, 2006, Millar, 2006).  
The issue of immigration also made the EU’s further enlargement a topic causing a split 
within the Labour Cabinet, namely, between the Home and Foreign Secretaries. While the 
Home Secretary John Reid and the Work and Pensions Secretary, John Hutton were 
supporting putting a limit on the immigrants from Bulgaria and Romania when those 
countries became EU members on 1st January 2007, the Foreign Secretary, Margaret 
Beckett, and the Europe Minister, Geoff Hoon were against any radical protective measure 
in the British labour market against the Bulgarian and Romanian immigrants because this 
could damage Britain’s leadership in the EU’s enlargement process (Murphy, 2006). The 
former Europe ministers, Denis MacShane and Keith Vaz, were also against any limitation 
on the EU’s free movement of labour/people principle (Hinsliff, 2006, The Guardian, 
2006). Finally, the Home Secretary won the Cabinet dispute and the Labour government 
officially decided to put a restriction on the immigration from Romania and Bulgaria in 
October 2006 (Webster, 2006). According to the decision, high-skilled professionals, such 
as doctors or computer scientists from Bulgaria and Romania were welcomed but unskilled 
jobseekers could only work in the food processing and farming sectors (Kubosova, 2006a). 
As a result, although Tony Blair reiterated that Britain would continue to support the EU’s 
further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey (Associated Press 
International, 2006a), he (2006) also needed to accept that the increasing British concern 
over the immigration from the new members would put the EU’s further enlargement (e.g. 
Turkey) in a fragile position. As a result, as LI’s two-level game approach assumes, 
increasing anti-enlargement sentiments among the British people, as a significant domestic 
change, directly affected the Labour government’s pro-enlargement policy although the 
rationale behind this policy still existed.   
The CBI also maintained its pro-enlargement position towards the Western Balkans and 
Turkey in this period. In particular, the CBI continued to perceive the EU’s further 
enlargement as further extension of the Single Market (The CBI, 2007a). Regarding the 
discussion about the immigration issue, the CBI remained “fully supportive of the free 
movement of workers within the European Union” (The CBI, 2007). For example, the CBI 
Director-General Richard Lambert (2007) argued that a very rapid increase in the 
immigration from the EU to Britain after the big bang enlargement had “a strongly positive 
effect on Britain’s macroeconomic performance, helping to boost output and eliminate 
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bottlenecks in the labour market”. However, the CBI also accepted that there might be a 
limit on the immigration from the new EU members to Britain “in the interests of 
maintaining a balance between integration and economic performance” (The CBI, 2007). 
In addition to the CBI, the British Chambers of Commerce (the BCC) also called for a 
limit on the immigrants from the forthcoming EU members. For example, the Director 
General of the BCC, David Frost, argued that "[w]e need a pause after the huge influx 
from Poland and the significant impact it has had” (Fagge and Whitehead, 2006).  
As another influential British interest group, the TUC supported Blair’s ambition to expand 
democratic zone by using the EU’s soft power towards the Western Balkans and Turkey. 
At this point, the TUC supported not only the EU’s further expansion but also a closer 
relationship with the Mediterranean area and Ukraine (The TUC, 2006). For example, the 
TUC (2013) argued that: 
Enlargement has expanded the internal market and extended the reach of EU rules to new countries; with it 
came economic growth and opportunities for business to access new markets. These are the reason why the 
UK has supported enlargement and should continue to do so. 
Regarding the immigration problem, the TUC argued that if the EU strengthened its social 
dimension, the unfair competition in the labour market would be demolished and that all of 
the EU citizens could benefit from the wealth created in the EU. Thus, the TUC was 
against any limit on the immigration from other EU countries to Britain and supported the 
EU’s free movement of people/labour principle (ibid).  
All in all, as LI argues, this section has showed that Britain’s pro-enlargement policy 
towards the Western Balkans and Turkey was an output of a national preference formation 
process, which was shaped by a multi-causal reasoning. In particular, security concerns 
played a dominant role in the decision making process; however, economic expectations 
and ideological motivations also affected the British actors’ attitude towards the EU’s 
further enlargement. Moreover, there was a common consensus among the main British 
actors on a pro-enlargement policy. However, unlike the previous enlargement cases, the 
British people’s support for a pro-enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans and 
Turkey gradually decreased due to the increasing anti-immigration sentiments. Therefore, 
although the Labour government was initially influential in accelerating EU’s enlargement 
towards the Western Balkans and Turkey, it gradually lost its effectiveness at the EU level 
negotiations towards the end of its term of office.  
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6.2.2 Intergovernmental Bargains 
In parallel with the above-mentioned national position, the Labour government tried to 
play a leading role in the stabilization of the Western Balkans, and then in the acceleration 
of the enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey. However, the research has 
found that the Labour government gradually lost its effectiveness as a driving force behind 
the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey despite its initial 
success in the stabilization of the Western Balkans. From an LI perspective, according to 
the findings of this chapter, in addition to the decreasing domestic support for a pro-
enlargement policy, France and Germany’s relatively less enthusiasm for the EU’s further 
enlargement was another reason behind the decline of the Labour government’s 
effectiveness at the EU level negotiations. More specifically, as the EU’s further 
enlargement intertwined with the deepening of the EU, it was really hard for the Labour 
government to separately achieve any development in the issue of the further enlargement 
without any progress in the deepening of the EU. Moreover, France and Germany had a 
tendency to use the deepening of the EU as a condition for the further enlargement. 
However, the high domestic sensitivity to the issues related to the deepening of the EU 
limited the Labour government in making any concession to France and Germany in order 
to accelerate the further enlargement. Last but not least, as LI assumes, member states’ 
varied and sometimes contradictory national interests in the EU’s further enlargement 
towards the Western Balkans and Turkey were another important factor slowing the 
enlargement process.   
Firstly, the stabilization of the Western Balkans was a crucial priority for the Labour 
government, and it effectively implemented its above-mentioned stabilization policy at the 
EU level. Particularly, in addition to the EU’s failure in the Bosnian War, the USA’s 
reluctance to use its ground forces in the Kosovo conflict convinced the Blair government 
that the EU needed a new defence initiative (Feedman, 2007, p. 625, Dover, 2007, p. 27). 
As a result, Tony Blair tried to form a security framework for the region as a synthesis of 
hard and soft power measures. In line with this aim, he focused on forming a defence 
capacity for the EU (in conformity with NATO) to intervene in any potential conflict and 
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to maintain stability in the Western Balkans 86(Wall, 2008, p. 169). Consequently, the Blair 
government achieved this aim with the establishment of the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP), which would be under the CFSP pillar governed according to 
intergovernmental principles (Jones, 2007, p. 72). Moreover, as the Blair government 
aimed, the new security structure would stabilize the Western Balkans in cooperation with 
NATO (Sjursen, 1998).  
After taking necessary measures to guarantee the stabilization of the Western Balkans, the 
Blair government focused on the question: how to integrate the Western Balkans into the 
EU system deeper. At this point, the British government perceived the Stabilisation and 
Association Process (SAP), which was launched in 1999, as an important step to increase 
the EU’s influence over the Western Balkans (HC 28, 2000, p. 176). Especially, the SAP 
would be designed as a carrot and stick policy to encourage and help the Western Balkan 
countries to make deep and painful structural changes, which were necessary to integrate 
the region into the EU system (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). More specifically, the EU 
would firstly carry out its bilateral relations with the Western Balkan countries on a 
contractual basis (the Stabilisation and Association Agreements). Secondly, the EU would 
provide trade concessions and financial assistance to these countries, which would increase 
the dependency of the region on the EU. Thirdly, the EU would improve interdependence 
among the Western Balkan countries, through which they would need to develop good 
relations with each other87.  
In this regard, the Thessaloniki Summit (20-21st June 2003) became a historical turning 
point in the European integration process. Firstly, the EU leaders promised the Western 
Balkan countries full membership when they fulfilled the necessary reforms to meet the 
Copenhagen criteria88. Secondly, they agreed on a Draft Constitution to make the EU’s 
governance easier after the big bang enlargement (the EU’s enlargement towards the 
CEECs, Malta and Cyprus) (The European Council, 2003). As a result, the EU’s widening 
and deepening processes intertwined with each other again after the Thessaloniki Summit 
(Jenny et al., 2006, p. 200, De Sousa and Moury, 2009, p. 4, Piris, 2006, p. 40, Castiglione 
                                                 
86 According to Wall (2008, p. 172) and Hodge (2006, p. 146), the failure to enter in the EMU limited Blair’s 
ambition to get a leading role in the EU; at this point, the defence issue emerged as another chance for Blair 
to get a leading role in the EU.  
87 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/sap_en.htm. Accessed on 30.08.2014. 
88 This promise was a good indicator showing that the EU’s approach towards the region shifted from “post-
conflict stabilisation (security) to European integration (enlargement)” (Prifti, 2013, p. 7). 
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et al., 2008, p. 67, Carbone, 2010, p. 2, Church and Phinnemore, 2006, p. 9), and the EU 
level complex negotiation process covering both deepening and widening issues started.  
In this complex negotiation process, it was hard for the Labour government to achieve 
progress in the EU’s further enlargement without any development in the deepening of the 
EU. In this sense, France emerged as a major obstacle to the further enlargement. 
Particularly, a majority of the French (about 55 %) were opposing the Eastward 
enlargement and the 66 per cent of them were against Turkey’s EU membership 
(Gentleman and Black, 2004). In addition to the immigration influx from the new 
members, their being more pro-American (e.g. the Iraq invasion) also decreased France’s 
willingness for the further enlargement (Agence France Presse, 2004b, Agence France 
Presse, 2004e). As a result, France gave priority to the Draft Constitution over the further 
enlargement, and according to it, the finalization of the EU Constitution was a condition 
for the EU’s further enlargement. On the other hand, at the domestic level, the intertwining 
of the deepening and widening of the EU with each other also made the British 
Eurosceptics more sensitive to the EU level negotiations. For example, when the Labour 
government accepted that a reform might be needed in the EU’s governance as a result of 
the big bang enlargement, the domestic Eurosceptic pressure on it automatically increased 
although the government tried to guarantee that the EU Constitution would not threaten 
Britain’s national interests within the EU system (Johnson, 2004, Webster, 2004, The 
Guardian, 2004, Auger, 2003). For example, the Conservative Party declared its strong 
objection against the Draft Constitution and even tried to find allies within the EU to 
increase its Eurosceptic influence at the EU level (Hughes, 2003).  
In 2004, the Labour government tried to shift the EU’s focus from the deepening to the 
widening, and launched a vigorous campaign to start the accession negotiations with 
Turkey (Agence France Presse, 2004c). However, the Labour government faced a strong 
resistance at the EU level. At the Brussel Summit (16-17th December 2004), a sceptical 
group, led by France and Austria (including Cyprus, Denmark, Slovakia and Hungary), 
demanded that the accession negotiations with Turkey start at the end of 2005 and be 
“open ended”, which might pave the way for a “privileged partnership” rather than full 
membership (Bianchi, 2004a, The Irish Times, 2004). In addition to them, the German 
opposition (the CDU would take power in November 2005) also supported the privileged 
partnership with Turkey instead of full membership (Bianchi, 2004b). As a result, Britain 
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needed to make some concessions to encourage France to give the green light on the 
accession negotiations with Turkey (Maddox, 2004, Watt, 2004).  
At this point, unlike France, there was not intense resentment in Britain against the EU’s 
further enlargement (Maddox, 2004). For example, according to a European Commission 
opinion poll, the majority was in favour of Turkish membership in Britain in 2004 
(Harding, 2004), but a Figaro poll showed that 67 percent of the French voters were 
against it (Watt, 2004). Additionally, the British media was also supporting Turkey’s 
accession to the EU (Carmichael, 2005). As a result, from an LI perspective, the British 
government was more flexible compared to the French government at the EU level 
negotiations to make concessions; thus, the British government made some proposals to 
France. Firstly, Britain offered a get-out clause in the negotiations instead of “privileged 
partnership”89. Secondly, Britain accepted to start the accession negotiations in the second 
half of 2005; thus, France could hold its referendum on the EU Constitution prior to this. 
Thirdly, Britain promised to reform the EU’s governing system to ensure that Turkey 
would not dominate the EU’s chambers (ibid.). However, the French (29th May 2005) and 
Dutch (1st June 2005) rejections of the Constitutional Treaty dramatically impaired the 
Labour government’s plan to shift the EU’s agenda towards the further enlargement. 
Particularly, the French government associated the increasing anti-enlargement sentiments 
in the EU with the French and Dutch rejections90; thus, it suggested that the EU should 
slow the speed of the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey.  
Despite this unexpected problem, the Labour government put enlargement at the centre of 
its EU presidential agenda (July-December 2005), and Blair argued that Europe needed to 
see enlargement “not as a threat, as if membership were a zero sum game in which old 
members lose as new members gain, but an extraordinary opportunity to build a greater 
and more powerful union […]”91 (Agence France Presse, 2005c). To achieve its 
presidential goal, the British Presidency arranged an EU foreign ministers meeting on 2nd 
October 2005 “to remove the final hurdle to opening membership negotiations with Turkey 
on October 3 2005” (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2005d). From an LI perspective, this 
                                                 
89 According to the Labour government, the EU would start the accession negotiations with Turkey; however, 
if Turkey failed to meet the acquis during the negotiations, the EU would have the right to stop the 
negotiations.  
90 There was a positive correlation between the NO votes and anti-enlargement sentiments (particularly 
against Turkish membership) (Piris, 2006, p. 22).  
91 This speech could also be seen as a response to France’s unwillingness to the EU’s further enlargement. 
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meeting was a good case showing how member states’ national interests shaped their 
position towards enlargement. Particularly, Austria insisted that a privileged partnership be 
negotiated with Turkey instead of full membership (Popham, 2005). Furthermore, it used 
the French and Dutch rejections as a proof showing how “quickness” of enlargement 
increased anti-enlargement sentiments among EU people (Stoullig, 2005). However, 
beyond this rhetoric, according to Austria’s position, restarting the accession negotiations 
with Croatia92 was a condition to start the accession negotiations with Turkey (Deutsche 
Presse-Agentur, 2005a, The Irish Times, 2005b, Agence France Presse, 2005e, The Daily 
Telegraph, 2005b, Brcic, 2005a). However, the accession negotiations with Croatia were 
frozen in March 2005 due to its failure in the cooperation with the UN war crimes tribunal 
in The Hague93. In this sense, Britain was against resuming the accession negotiations with 
Croatia without its full cooperation with the UN94 (Watt and Smith, 2005). To break the 
deadlock in the negotiations, the International War Crimes Tribunal confirmed that Croatia 
accepted a full cooperation with the UN on 3rd October 2005, and this confirmation made 
the reopening of the accession negotiations with Croatia possible95. Therefore, Austria 
agreed to start the accession negotiations with Turkey (Watt and Smith, 2005, Castle, 
2005a, Browne, 2005, Smyth, 2005b), and Britain achieved one of her most important EU 
Presidency goals.  
However, starting the accession negotiations with Turkey triggered the discussions about 
the deepening of the EU. Particularly, France perceived the progress in the enlargement 
process towards Turkey as “an example of the increasing dominance of a British-led vision 
of the EU” (an outward-looking liberal EU as an alternative to France’s inward-looking 
social model) (Agence France Presse, 2005i, Ash, 2005). For example, the former French 
president Valery Giscard d'Estaing argued that “further enlargements [...] are obviously 
going to transform Europe into a large free trade zone. That's what I regret”. At the same 
time, France reopened the row with Britain over the British rebate from the EU budget, and 
                                                 
92 From a geopolitical perspective, Austria perceived Croatia “as a country within its own sphere of 
influence” unlike Turkey (The Irish Times, 2005a).  
93 The EU members cancelled the start of membership negotiations with Croatia on 17th March 2005 
following a report by Del Ponte criticising Croatia for failing to hand over war crimes suspect Ante Gotovina 
to the UN war crimes tribunal in The Hague (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2005d).  
94 As noted above, Britain wanted to use the EU’s enlargement as a “soft power” to further extend liberal 
doctrines. At this point, the EU should not make any concession regarding the accession conditionality (the 
Copenhagen Criteria and cooperation with the UN war crimes tribunal for the Western Balkan countries).  
95 The war criminal Gen. Ante Gotovina was finally arrested on 8 December 2005, which removed a major 
obstacle to Croatia’s accession to the EU (Brcic, 2005b).  
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reiterated that Britain should give up the rebate to share the enlargement burden on the EU 
budget (Agence France Presse, 2005g, Xinhua General News Service, 2005b). Particularly, 
France demanded to firstly freeze the British rebate (around 4 billion euro) and then phase 
it out. However, the Labour government declared that it could negotiate the British rebate 
on condition that there was a complete budget overhaul including a big cut in the CAP 
spending (as a quid pro quo ) (Staunton, 2005). As a response, France blocked the FYR of 
Macedonia’s getting candidate status by showing the stalled negotiations on the EU budget 
2007-2013 as an excuse in December 2005 (Euronews, 2005, Xinhua General News 
Service, 2005a, Castle, 2005b, Agence France Presse, 2005h).  
Therefore, the EU budget issue emerged as another obstacle to the EU’s further 
enlargement process (Waugh, 2005, Rennie and Helm, 2005, Smyth, 2005a). As LI 
assumes, member states’ national interests dominated the negotiations on the EU budget. 
In particular, the Labour government was in a relatively weak position at the EU level 
negotiations on the 2007-2013 EU budget (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2005b), because 
most of the EU members supported the idea that Britain needed to share the burden of 
enlargement by accepting to decrease the amount of the British rebate from the EU budget 
(Gow, 2005). Even the Eastern European members allied with France in order to get more 
money from the EU budget, although they were a natural ally of Britain on foreign policy 
(pro-American) and against the Franco-German domination over the EU. More 
specifically, they allied with France in order to put pressure on the Blair government to 
make it accept a cut in the British rebate as an alternative to the potential reductions in the 
EU budget (from 1.06 per cent of the EU's gross national income to 1.03 per cent), which 
would mean fewer financial resources for them from the CAP and Social Cohesion Funds 
(Simon, 2005, Tammerk, 2005, Castle and Brown, 2005, Agence France Presse, 2005a). 
After the tough negotiations at the December 2005 summit, Tony Blair needed to accept a 
cut in the British rebate in exchange for other members’ commitment to reform expensive 
farm subsidy system, which France was staunchly defending for the 2007-2013 EU Budget 
(Agence France Presse, 2005f, see also: The European Council, 2005).  
The agreement on the 2007-2013 EU budget alleviated the EU level problems in the 
enlargement process; however, it increased the domestic pressure on the Labour 
government. Although Blair tried to convince the domestic actors about the fact that all the 
richer members would pay their fair share of costs to integrate the CEECs into the EU (e.g. 
British contribution by 63 per cent, the French contribution by 116 per cent, and the Italian 
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by 130 per cent would increase) and that a compromise on the budget was also needed for 
the further enlargement, the agreement was not welcomed at the domestic level (Agence 
France Presse, 2005b, Cracknell and Smith, 2005, Cusick, 2005). The Conservative Party, 
UKIP, and the Eurosceptic media accused Blair of surrendering to France at the summit 
and defined the deal as a defeat for British interests (Agence France Presse, 2005d, 
Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2005c, Agence France Presse, 2005b, The Daily Telegraph, 
2005a, Grice and Castle, 2005, Watt, 2005).  
Angela Merkel’s coming to power in Germany in November 2005 changed the power 
dynamics within the EU. In addition to France, the German Chancellor Merkel had also a 
tendency to give priority to the deepening of the EU (the Constitutional Treaty) over the 
further enlargement (Islam and Mangasarian, 2006, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2007). For 
example, at the December 2006 EU summit, in addition to France, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg, Germany also insisted that the Constitutional Treaty be completed before 
any further enlargement, that the accession criteria for the applicants be stricter, and that 
the absorption capacity of the EU be considered before any further enlargement (The Irish 
Times, 2006a). Moreover, Merkel declared that starting accession negotiations with a 
candidate was “no guarantee for later membership” (Ames, 2006).  
At the December 2006 summit, it was also decided that the EU’s enlargement process 
would be made tougher (The Irish Times, 2006b, The European Council, 2006). Firstly, 
setting a target date for a candidate's admission was dropped because as it would diminish 
the EU’s ability to enforce reforms in the candidate countries96. Secondly, the EU leaders 
agreed to implement justice and corruption tests for EU candidates at the early stages of 
their accession negotiations97. Finally, the EU would also implement ‘an absorption 
capacity test’98 to accept new members (Watt et al., 2006, Islam and Mangasarian, 2006). 
In parallel with the EU’s new tougher enlargement policy, the EU leaders also endorsed 
freezing the eight chapters of the accession negotiations with Turkey to punish it for 
refusing to open its ports and airports to Cyprus at the summit (Sliva, 2006). 
                                                 
96 Setting a target date was implemented in the 2004 Eastward enlargement, Romania and Bulgaria.  
97 There was a belief that Romania and Bulgaria had been accepted before those subjects were clearly 
examined.  
98 According to this principle, even though a candidate successfully completed the accession negotiations, it 
would not get an automatic accession right. However, the European Commission would evaluate whether the 
EU could absorb it or not, and if the result of the evaluation was positive, the applicant would become a 
member. 
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In this regard, despite the Labour government’s continuous support for the further 
enlargement; the support for enlargement was also waning at the domestic level. 
According to a survey of the Eurobarometer, the level of support for the EU’s further 
enlargement among the British people dropped from 44 per cent to 36 per cent in 2006 
(Triomphe, 2006, Waterfield, 2006). Therefore, from an LI perspective, the decreasing 
popularity of enlargement at the domestic level also drove the Labour government to 
accept a tougher policy on the EU’s further enlargement (Waterfield, 2006). 
In addition to Angela Markel, Nicholas Sarkozy’s coming to power in France in May 2007 
significantly limited the Labour government’s ambition to accelerate the EU’s further 
enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey. Particularly, Sarkozy became a 
powerful ally of Merkel to prevent Turkey’s full accession to the EU (Hughes, 2007, 
Mahony, 2007, Associated Press International, 2007b). Moreover, Sarkozy was also 
sceptical about the liberal Anglo-American economic model for the European integration 
(The Daily Telegraph, 2007b). For example, in his election campaign in May 2007, he 
declared that the EU needed to be a protection against globalization, not a Trojan horse 
posing neoliberal doctrines to member states (Freedland, 2007). As a result of his ambition 
to establish a more inward-looking EU, it would be hard for the Labour government to find 
common points with him in the forthcoming negotiations. 
When Germany assumed the EU Presidency, it launched a new campaign for a new EU 
treaty at the June 2007 EU summit (The European Council, 2007).  Correspondingly, the 
Labour government formed a set of “red lines” to protect Britain’s national interests at the 
summit. Firstly, the British government was against the federal vision of the former 
Constitutional Treaty. Thus, it persisted in maintaining Britain’s national sovereignty over 
foreign affairs, labour and social legislation, social security system, common law system, 
police and judicial processes, and taxation (Miliband, 2007, Hurst, 2007, The Business, 
2007, The Times, 2007, Cm 7174, 2007, p. 7). In the same vein, the new treaty should not 
have any inward-looking tendency. For example, according to the new British Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown, the EU leaders should end inward-looking institutional debates on 
the new treaty (the Reform Treaty), and focus on creating an “open and flexible Europe” 
and making the EU “a genuinely global player” (Agence France Presse, 2007a, Smith, 
2007). The Foreign Secretary David Miliband also argued that the EU should be a model 
power for the rest of the world (not a super state) by becoming open to the world; thus, he 
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argued that the further enlargement should continue to become a top priority for the EU 
(Penketh, 2007, Traynor, 2007).  
When the EU leaders agreed on a final draft of the treaty at an informal EU summit  on 18-
19th October 2007, David Miliband declared that all of the above-mentioned red lines were 
achieved in the final draft (HC 16-iii, 2007, p. ev57). According to him (2007a); the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy guaranteed foreign policy “as a matter for 
unanimous decision-making”, the European Court of Justice would not have a jurisdiction 
over national security issues, Britain would have the right to choose whether or not to 
participate in justice and home affairs measures (to protect Britain common-law system 
and criminal and judicial processes), the Charter of Fundamental Rights would not change 
the status quo in Britain (to protect Britain’s social and labour legislation), and Britain 
would be able to reject any social security measure, which she did not want. Although the 
Labour government tried to present the results of the EU level negotiations as a big success 
at the domestic level, the British Eurosceptic press and the Conservative Party put strong 
pressure on the government to conduct a national referendum on the new treaty (The Daily 
Telegraph, 2007a, Agence France Presse, 2007b, Thurston, 2007). A YouGov poll also 
showed that 69 per cent of the British people wanted a referendum as well (The Guardian, 
2007). Furthermore, some of the Labour backbenchers (e.g. Kate Hoey) also wanted to 
conduct a referendum on the Reform Treaty (Kirkup and Waterfield, 2007, Peev, 2007b, 
Traynor and Wintour, 2007). However, despite the strong domestic pressure, Gordon 
Brown signed the Reform Treaty at the EU summit in December 2007 and ruled out a 
referendum on the Reform Treaty by arguing that Britain’s national interests had already 
been secured; thus, there were not "fundamental changes" or a constitutional idea in the 
new treaty that might make a referendum necessary (Meade and Churcher, 2007, Peev, 
2007a, Stringer, 2007).    
After the agreement on the Lisbon Treaty (the Reform Treaty) in December 2007, France 
swiftly changed its negative position against the EU’s further enlargement in 2008 (except 
for Turkey) (Agence France Presse, 2008c). Therefore, the Labour government had a 
chance to achieve progress in the further enlargement; however, different national 
preferences on the enlargement issue prevented the EU members from taking effective 
decisions. For example, the EU leaders concentrated on the Kosovo problem (European 
Report, 2008, Agence France Presse, 2008b), but could not develop a common EU policy 
on it due to their different national preferences. While Britain, France, Germany and Italy 
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supported the independence of Kosovo from Serbia; Spain, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Greece, 
Romania, and Slovakia did not want an independent Kosovo due to their own territorial 
integrity concerns (Harrington, 2008, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2008). On the other hand, 
the difference between France and Britain on Turkey’s bid for full membership continued. 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy released a “Mediterranean Union” plan as an alternative 
project against Turkey’s full membership; however, the British Foreign Secretary David 
Miliband refused this plan and reiterated that the accession negotiations with Turkey 
should continue with full momentum (Agence France Presse, 2008a, Fraser, 2008).    
In addition to the different national preferences, the Irish rejection of the Lisbon/Reform 
Treaty in June 2008 became another factor preventing satisfactory progress in the 
enlargement process. In the wake of the Irish rejection, French President Sarkozy declared 
that any further enlargement would be impossible without the Lisbon Treaty, and his 
position was supported by the German Chancellor Merkel at the EU Summit on 19-20th 
June 2008 (Cook, 2008, Smyth, 2008a). At the summit, Poland was the main opponent 
against Germany and France’s anti-enlargement position, and the Polish Prime Minister 
Donald Tusk was strongly against any linkage between enlargement and “the fiasco of the 
referendum” (Rigillo, 2008, Smyth, 2008a).  
Interestingly, despite the Blair government’s strong ambition to make Britain ‘the main 
initiator of enlargement’, the new Labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown followed a 
midway position between that of France and of Poland at the summit. To illustrate, Brown 
argued that enlargement could still proceed despite the Irish rejection but the EU needed 
the Lisbon Treaty, which would make provisions for the enlargement and other 
surrounding arrangements (Federal News Service, 2008). On the other hand, the 
Conservative Party started to become more influential at the EU level. The party was 
against the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty although Sarkozy and Merkel imposed the 
same on the EU’s further enlargement as a condition (Hennessy and Stares, 2008). Just 
before the European Parliament election (4th June 2009), David Cameron increased his 
Eurosceptic tone and argued that the Conservative Party would withdraw its members from 
the main centre-right bloc in the EU parliament, which contained Sarkozy’s and Merkel’s 
parties, and that it would form new Eurosceptic allies with the Czech and Polish parties99 
                                                 
99 It is highly possible that the increasing Euroscepticism in Britain played an important role in increasing the 
Eurosceptic tone of the Conservative Party. For example, according to an Economist magazine/YouGov poll 
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(Triomphe, 2009). He also declared that if the Conservative Party won the national election 
in 2010, they would hold a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty although it was ratified by the 
House of Commons (if the treaty was not yet enacted by all the members). Additionally, 
Cameron reiterated the Conservative Party’s full support for Turkey’s EU membership, 
which Sarkozy and Merkel were opposing100 (Vucheva, 2009, Agence France Presse, 
2009a). As a result, Merkel strongly reacted against Cameron’s tough stance by arguing 
that “[w]e refuse to stretch out our hand to those who oppose the Lisbon Treaty […]” 
(ibid.).  
Finally, Ireland (via a second referendum) and the Czech Republic approved the Lisbon 
Treaty, and it entered into force on 1st December 2009. In this period, the EU members 
also negotiated on the key posts created by the Lisbon Treaty. In this regard, according to 
the Labour government, the new EU President and High Representative should try to make 
the EU a global actor and avoid any inward-looking policy in the EU foreign affairs 
(Woodcock, 2009); therefore, they were important posts. After the negotiations, Britain 
guaranteed the new High Representative post, and the Labour government welcomed the 
appointment of Cathy Ashton as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy because the government hoped that Ashton would put a global agenda 
for the EU foreign policy and “she would also shape the EU's voice on the bloc's 
enlargement in the Balkans and Turkey” (Agence France Presse, 2009). 
 After breaking the stalemate on the Lisbon Treaty, some progress in the EU’s further 
enlargement towards the Western Balkans was achieved. For example, Serbia, Montenegro 
and Macedonia got a visa-free travel right within the Schengen zone in December 2009 
(Pop, 2009b). Serbia also submitted its application for the EU membership in December 
2009 (Marier, 2009). However, different national preferences were still a big obstacle to 
the further enlargement. To illustrate, although the FYR of Macedonia had met all the 
criteria for opening the EU accession negotiations, Greece blocked the negotiations due to 
                                                                                                                                                    
in May 2009, just 31 per cent of the British people believed that the EU was a good thing (Triomphe, 2009). 
The result of the EU Parliament election in May 2009 also proved this argument because UKIP became the 
second party with 13 seats after the Conservative Party by using a strong anti-EU membership rhetoric.  
100 As Korski (2009) argued, the enthusiasm for further enlargement was also waning in Britain due to the 
fear of immigration influx. Even the Minister for Europe Glenys Kinnock confessed that the British people 
were not convinced of the benefits of the EU’s enlargement (States News Service, 2009). In other words, in 
addition to federalism, immigration became another important factor increasing Euroscepticism in Britain. 
However, it is highly possible that, just before the national elections in 2010, Cameron preferred to 
“widening” over “deepening” to form an alternative discourse to Sarkozy and Merkel’s discourse demanding 
a deeper EU.  
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a dispute on the name: ‘Macedonia’, which was also a Greek region’s name (Deutsche 
Presse-Agentur, 2009). Cyprus also tried to block the opening of the negotiations with 
Turkey on the environment chapter, which was an important positive step after the EU’s 
freezing the eight chapters in 2006 over Turkey's refusal to open its ports to Cypriot 
vessels (Pop, 2009a). Last but not least, Germany and France were still strongly against 
Turkey’s full membership. As a result, although the Labour Party aimed to accelerate the 
further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey, the EU was facing an 
“enlargement fatigue” just before the Labour Party lost power in the May 2010 national 
election.  
6.3 The Coalition Government (2010-2014) 
6.3.1 National Preference Formation 
6.3.1.1 Political Concerns 
When the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats formed a coalition government in 
2010, those parties had different positions towards the EU. The influence of pro-European 
figures (Heseltine, Clarke and Patten) waned in the Conservative Party and David 
Cameron consolidated Euroscepticism as the mainstream position of the party; however, 
the Liberal Democrats maintained their pro-European position (Gifford, 2014, p. 155). 
Despite this difference, they continued Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the 
Western Balkans and Turkey. The research has found that the reasoning behind the new 
government’s pro-enlargement policy was similar to that of the former Labour 
government. As LI assumes, national interests dominated the decision making process, and 
security concerns played a dominant role in the Coalition government’s support for a pro-
enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans and Turkey; however, this security 
understanding also had ideological and economic dimensions as well.   
The Coalition government continued the assumption that Britain’s security and prosperity 
depended on the prosperity and stability of Europe in a globalized era. In this sense, the 
EU’s further enlargement (towards the Western Balkans and Turkey) was essential to 
maintain perpetual peace and prosperity in Europe (HC 83-xx, 2013, p. 60, Daily Hansard, 
2012b). In parallel with this understanding, according to the Cameron government, the 
EU’s enlargement towards the Western Balkans needed to be supported by the NATO’s 
enlargement towards the region as well. At this point, Turkey was already a NATO 
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member; however, according to the British government, its EU membership was still 
geopolitically important for Britain because “Turkey has a strong network of relationships 
and inﬂuence in regions where UK interests are signiﬁcant: North Africa, the Middle East, 
Afghanistan-Pakistan and the Western Balkans” (HC 1567, 2012, p. ev52). For example, 
Turkey within the EU could become a geopolitical bridge for the Western powers to access 
the Islamic World, which was important at a time when the Western world was struggling 
with the radicalization of Islam (Hague, 2010). The British government also highlighted 
that Turkey within the EU could become a regional energy hub and energy transit corridor 
to the other EU members101 (HC 83-xx, 2013, p. 75).  
As LI assumes, the Coalition government also learned lessons from the previous big bang 
enlargement. For example, it supported the idea that the conditionality of enlargement 
should become tougher and institutionalization of “rule of law” in the applicant countries 
of the Western Balkans should be at the heart of the accession process (HC 83-xx, 2013, 
pp. 60-61, HC 83-xxx, 2014, p. 90). Moreover, after the 2004 enlargement, the 
immigration from the new members started to become an important problem for the old 
members. Correspondingly, the Coalition government strongly supported the idea that the 
EU should put some restrictions on the free movement of people across the EU to control 
the immigration from the new members, which also became the main reason behind the 
tension between the British government and other members in the forthcoming EU level 
negotiations. Furthermore, the immigration control needed to be implemented for the 
future enlargements. For example, the Coalition government supported transitional 
immigration controls on the Croatian nationals after Croatia’s EU membership in 2013 
(Daily Hansard, 2012a). Additionally, the British government called for the applicant 
countries' consolidated efforts “to tackle illegal migration and improve border 
management” (HC 219-xvi, 2014, p. 32). However, the British government did not 
perceive the EU’s further enlargement as a threat with regard to the trans-national issues 
like illegal migration and cross-border crimes. Contrary to this, according to the British 
government, the enlargement process was an effective tool to tackle such trans-national 
issues because the EU accession process was helping to form better functioning candidate 
states around the EU (HL Paper 129, 2013, p. 62).  
                                                 
101 Turkey’s importance as an alternative energy corridor increased when the EU-Russian relationship started 
to deteriorate because of the dispute over Georgia and then Ukraine.  
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6.3.1.2 Economic Concerns 
As the previous British governments did, the Coalition government also expected that the 
further extension of the Single Market would bring more prosperity for all the EU 
members. To illustrate, David Lidington, the Minister for Europe, (2011), argued that 
enlargement was a clear way of strengthening the Single Market from which British 
economy would benefit. More specifically, according to the British government, Britain’s 
exports of goods and services to the twelve new member states increased from £ 4.5 billion 
to £ 11.6 billion in ten years (as of 2011) and the further enlargement would support this 
positive trend. Furthermore, even the pre-accession procedure of the EU’s enlargement 
towards the Western Balkans and Turkey would provide new opportunities for British 
business because the necessary reforms that should be made according to the acquis would 
make investments in the candidate countries easier and more profitable (HL Paper 129, 
2013, p. 61). 
In addition to this general expectation, the British government had also specific economic 
concerns. For example, although the Western Balkan countries were a small market, the 
rapid growth potentiality in their GDP could make this market more profitable for British 
business. In this sense, Lidington argued that Croatia’s integration to the EU Single Market 
could provide British business with more trade and investment opportunities in the fields 
like; port sector, tourism, and agriculture (Glaze and Hughes, 2011). However, the slow 
reform progress in the Western Balkans was a problem for British business to invest in the 
region102. For example, Sir John Randall, the Conservative MP and an expert on the region, 
argued that the Western Balkan countries did not have well-functioning company laws, 
which might discourage British business from investing in the region (Daily Hansard, 
2014).  
On the other hand, according to the Coalition government, the Turkish membership would 
be significantly beneficial to the old members at a time when the EU was facing  severe 
economic problems, because Turkey became the World’s 18th largest economy with a rapid 
GDP growth in 2011; thus, “Turkish membership would boost the European Single Market 
and would play a major part in Europe’s long term prosperity by adding significant clout to 
its common external trade policy” (HL Paper 129, 2013, p. 121, see also: Cm 8370, 2012, 
                                                 
102 The European Commission’s progress report (2014) also confirmed that 2014 was a year of fitful progress 
in the region in terms of the necessary reforms to strengthen the rule of law (HC 219-Xvi, 2014, p. 24).  
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p. 17). More specifically, according to the UKTI, the Turkish membership would also 
provide best export and high value opportunities for British business in the sectors such as 
energy and environment, information and communications technology, infrastructure, 
financial and professional services, education services, life sciences, and defence and 
security (Cm 8370, 2012, p. 16). In addition to this, the British government also expected 
that Turkey would provide new economic opportunities in the energy sector for British 
companies (especially for BP) as an energy corridor country (HC 1567, 2012, p. ev56).     
British business had also some economic expectations about the EU’s further enlargement 
similar to that of the British government. For example, the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills (2013) carried out a survey in 2013 asking British business groups 
about their ideas regarding the EU’s further enlargement, and many business groups 
defined the EU’s further enlargement as an opportunity for British business (e.g. the NFU, 
TheCityUK, the TUC, Llyods’, and the CBI), and the main reason behind this support was 
that an enlarged Single Market would create a more competitive EU in the global market, 
which would boost growth and jobs in Britain. Additionally, according to Business for 
New Europe (BNE) (2013), “[t]rade between the old and new member states grew almost 
threefold in less than 10 years (from € 175 billion in 1999 to approximately € 500 billion in 
2007)”; thus, it also expected that the further enlargement would have a positive 
contribution to the increasing trade volume within the EU, in which British business would 
greatly benefit.  
As found in the previous section, British business also continued its special interest in 
Turkey. For example, “the CBI has designated Turkey as a priority market for increasing 
UK exports and for attracting inward investment into the UK economy” (HC 1567, 2012, 
p. ev137). The CBI also perceived Turkey as a bridge for business to access the 
abovementioned regions. For example, the CBI pointed out that one in four of the largest 
companies in the Middle East and North Africa was Turkish, and that Turkish contractors 
were amongst the biggest companies across the Middle East, North Africa and former 
Soviet states. Under these circumstances, it was attractive for the CBI to form trilateral 
business networks among British, Turkish and the local companies of these regions (the 
Middle East, North Africa and former Soviet states) in order to access those markets (HC 
1567, 2012, p. ev138). Moreover, the CBI also highlighted the importance of Turkey as an 
energy corridor country; thus, the energy sector was one of the key sectors to collaborate 
with Turkish companies (HC 1567, 2012, p. ev137). In the same vein, TheCityUK also 
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declared Turkey as one of its priority markets in the world, not only because of the big size 
and scale of the Turkish economy but also because of Turkey’s dynamic private sector 
offering significant opportunities for British business (HC 1567, 2012, p. ev135). As a 
result, as LI assumes, these findings clearly show that not only geopolitical but also 
economic concerns shaped Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards Turkey.  
6.3.1.3 The Position of Other Domestic Actors 
In the Coalition government era, the Labour Party’s Europeanism was muted and became 
more pragmatic compared to that of the Blair government (Gifford, 2014, p. 168). 
Moreover, the Labour Party, in the opposition, continued to support the Coalition 
government’s pro-enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans and Turkey. For 
example, Keith Vaz, the former Minister for Europe and Emma Reynolds, the Shadow 
Minister for Europe defined Britain’s pro-enlargement policy as an output of the cross-
party consensus (Daily Hansard, 2011). Moreover, the Labour Party also supported the 
Coalition government’s position that the enlargement conditionality should be tougher (e.g. 
the institutionalization of the rule of law) (ibid.).  
In addition to the Labour Party, the CBI (HC 1567, 2012, p. ev138), the TUC (The TUC, 
2006), and the NFU (HL Paper 129, 2013, p. 269) as the main influential interest groups 
also continued to support the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and 
Turkey. Therefore, from an LI perspective, the continued consensus among the British 
actors on a pro-enlargement policy helped the Coalition government to continue Britain’s 
pro-enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans and Turkey when it came to power. 
In this regard, William Hague, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs, also argued that the national consensus on a pro-enlargement policy played a 
crucial role in Britain’s being one of the main initiators behind the EU’s further 
enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey (Daily Hansard, 2010).   
However, the increasing Euroscepticism among the British people started to dominate the 
British political landscape. For example, according to an ICM poll conducted in 2001, 68 
per cent of the British people were in support of EU membership and 19 per cent were 
against; however another ICM poll conducted in 2011 showed that 49 per cent were 
against EU membership and just 40 per cent were for it (Alexander, 2011). In parallel with 
the change in the British peoples’ attitude towards the EU, the United Kingdom 
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Independence Party (UKIP) gradually increased its power in British politics at the expense 
of the Conservative Party by using an anti-immigration rhetoric, which was also covering 
an anti-enlargement position (Cohen, 2014). For instance, UKIP effectively used a 
propaganda about a potential immigration influx from Bulgaria and Romania both in the 
local and EU Parliament election campaigns in 2014 (both held on 22nd May 2014) 
(Morris, 2013). Consequently, at the EU Parliament elections, while UKIP became the first 
party with 24 seats, the Conservative Party lost its 7 seats (BBC, 2014b). On the other 
hand, at the local elections, UKIP won 163 seats but the Conservative Party (-236 seats) 
and the Liberal Democrats (-310 seats) suffered from a big loss (BBC, 2014a). 
Subsequently, UKIP won its first Parliamentary seat at the Clacton by-election (at the 
expense of the Conservative Party) on 9th October 2014 and the second one at the 
Rochester and Strood by-election on 20th November 2014 (BBC, 2014d, BBC, 2014c). 
Additionally, the increasing anti-immigration sentiments in Britain even forced the Labour 
Party to take a tougher position against the immigration from the new EU countries (Settle, 
2014, Grice, 2014, Chorley, 2013, Dannreuther and Lightfoot, 2014, p. 176).  
As a result of the increasing anti-immigration sentiments among the British people and the 
increasing power of UKIP, the Coalition government needed to formulate a more 
Eurosceptic and anti-immigrant policy towards the EU (Richards et al., 2014, p. 259), and 
gradually become less supportive of the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western 
Balkans and Turkey (The Economist, 2014, Ker-Lindsay, 2014). In other words, as LI 
assumes, the Cameron government needed to respond to the changing domestic 
preferences by shifting its focus from enlargement to immigration at the EU level 
negotiations.  
6.3.2 Intergovernmental Bargains 
In its first year, the Coalition government tried to follow an active role within the EU to 
accelerate the EU’s further enlargement. For example, after taking power in 2010, David 
Cameron strongly urged the EU to speed up the accession negotiations with Turkey 
(Meade, 2010). Moreover, the Foreign Minister William Hague (together with his 
colleagues: Carl Bildt, Franco Frattini, William Hague and Alexander Stubb) launched a 
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campaign to change the inward-looking tendencies in the EU103 and to revitalize “the 
vision of an open Europe”. To achieve this goal, the foreign ministers also urged the EU 
leaders to restate their “strong commitment to further enlargement” (Bildt et al., 2010, 
Agence France Presse, 2010, Pop, 2010). In parallel with this aim, when the EU decided to 
put Iceland on its enlargement agenda in June 2010, the British government did not 
consider blocking the accession negotiations with Iceland despite the dispute between 
Britain and Iceland over the compensation of the British savers’ money in the bankrupt 
Icelandic banks (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2010, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2010a).  
However, the year 2011 became a turning point in the relationship between the British 
government and the EU when a new wave of deepening negotiations started to dominate 
the EU’s agenda at the expense of the enlargement, and the enlargement issue mostly 
became a part of those negotiations. Particularly, in November 2011, as a result of the 
Eurozone crisis, France revived the proposal for a “two-speed Europe”, in which there 
would be a “federal” Eurozone as a core and the rest of the members might constitute a 
“confederation” around it (Agence France Presse, 2011). The Coalition government 
immediately refused this proposal but reluctantly accepted that a narrow treaty change 
might be acceptable if it was agreed by all the 27 members and if it did not threaten the 
City of London’s financial interests. In this discussion, Germany located itself between 
France and Britain and supported the idea that there should be a deepening in the EU 
finance system but that it should be agreed by all the 27 members (Watt, 2011). On the 
other hand, although the non-Euro members (mostly new members from the East Europe) 
were allies of Britain related to the issue that if there would be a financial change in the 
EU, it should be decided by all the members (as an alternative to France’s “two tier” plan), 
unlike Britain, they had a tendency to become a part of a deeper financial system. Thus, 
they supported Germany’s above-mentioned position (Euobserver.com, 2011, BBC, 2011, 
Castle, 2011). As a result of the negotiations, the British Prime Minister Cameron vetoed a 
full treaty proposal applying to all the 27 members104; however, the other 26 members 
agreed to negotiate to deepen the EU’s financial system according to the German proposal 
relying on a more central oversight over national budgets to enforce greater fiscal 
discipline (Erlanger and Castle, 2011). 
                                                 
103 The failure of the Constitutional Treaty and the financial crisis highly triggered inward-looking tendencies 
within the EU.  
104 Because there was not a sufficient guarantee saving the City of London’s financial interests.  
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In addition to the increasing tendency among member states to deepen the EU, the anti-EU 
sentiments among the British people also started to significantly increase in 2012. Thus, 
the Eurosceptic Conservative backbenchers increased their pressure on David Cameron to 
promise a referendum on Britain’s EU membership (Grice, 2012). For example, in June 
2012, 100 Conservative backbenchers signed a letter to the Prime Minister Cameron 
demanding an EU referendum after the next general election (Kirkup and Waterfield, 
2012). As a response to this pressure, David Cameron promised to re-shape the British-EU 
relations in a way that would support Britain’s national interests (e.g. free market)105 
(Prince, 2012). Therefore, David Cameron (2012) focused on a potential new settlement 
with the EU and increased the Eurosceptic tone of his voice at the forthcoming 
negotiations (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2012). On 23rd February 2013, David Cameron 
declared that he would renegotiate the British-EU relations, and in the wake of the re-
negotiations, a referendum would be held by the end of 2017 to give the British people the 
choice of staying in or leaving the European Union if the Conservative Party won the next 
election in 2015 (Agence France Presse, 2013d). At this point, the main purpose of the re-
negotiations would be to push the European integration towards an outward 
looking/intergovernmental/liberal democratic way (Cameron, 2013). From an LI 
perspective, with this re-negotiation plan, David Cameron aimed to appease the 
Eurosceptic concerns at the domestic level. In addition to this, British business also mostly 
supported Cameron’s demand to renegotiate the British-EU relations after the continental 
attempts to deepen the Eurozone. For example, John Cridland, the CBI Director General, 
argued that “[t]he EU single market is fundamental to Britain's future economic success, 
but the closer union of the Eurozone is not for us […] (Wintour, 2013, The Independent, 
2013).  
In the beginning, David Cameron’s re-negotiation plan was in conformity with the EU’s 
four freedoms principle (the free movements of goods, services, capital, and people across 
the EU) (Mailonline, 2013, States News Service, 2013). Therefore, despite France’s 
rejection of it, Germany was willing to discuss Cameron’s re-negotiation plan (Agence 
France Presse, 2013c, Agence France Presse, 2013e). However, the increasing anti-
immigration sentiments in Britain forced Cameron to put the EU’s free movement of 
                                                 
105 However, he also left an open door for a referendum on the new EU that would be decided according to 
the results of the deepening attempts of the other members in banking, fiscal and political union (Grice, 
2012). 
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people principle in his re-negotiation agenda, and he argued that it should be changed to 
solve the immigration problem106 (Gradner, 2013). In concrete terms, in November 2013 
just before lifting the restriction on the Bulgarian and Romanian peoples’ right of free 
movement across the EU, David Cameron outlined a proposal which suggested a ban on 
the claims of people from new EU members (especially from Bulgaria and Romania) for 
housing benefit, a three-month wait before the claim for jobseeker's allowance and then 
only for six months, and the deportation of beggars/homeless immigrants and one year 
restriction on their return to Britain (Mason, 2013, Agence France Presse, 2013a). 
Moreover, according to Cameron, a prospective new member state's GDP, income or wage 
level should be used as a condition for its workers to get the right to work in other EU 
countries (Grice and Mcdonald-Gibson, 2013).  
From an LI perspective, there was also a strong domestic pressure behind this proposal. 
For example, the Fresh Start group of Conservative backbenchers issued a manifesto 
demanding “to limit the free movement of people across the EU” (Winnett and Kirkup, 
2013, Agence France Presse, 2013b). Theresa May, the Home Secretary, also warned 
about another potential immigration influx from Bulgaria and Romania when the limits on 
the movement of Romanian and Bulgarian workers were lifted in January 2014 (Savage 
and Gray, 2013). In addition to the Home Secretary, the Eurosceptic Conservative 
members also put a strong pressure on Cameron to limit welfare benefits before Bulgarian 
and Romanian workers started free travel across the EU in January 2014 (Singh, 2013, 
Chapman, 2013). On the other hand, UKIP started to use a potential immigration influx 
from Bulgaria and Romania in its election campaigns (the local and the EU parliament 
elections in 2014). For instance, it argued that an influx of 350,000 to 400,000 Romanians 
or Bulgarians might come to Britain (Morris, 2013).   
To put this plan into practice, Cameron needed the consent of the other members. Thus, he 
tried to ally with Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, which had also a positive 
tendency towards a more intergovernmental regulation on the issue of immigration 
(Coates, 2013, Hope and Dixon, 2013, Shipman, 2013, Brown, 2013). However, Germany, 
the Netherlands and Austria were not willing to accept Cameron’s plan because according 
to them, the free movement of people was one of the untouchable principles of the EU 
                                                 
106 From an LI perspective, this case is a good example showing that national sensitivity is highly influential 
in the foreign policy making process.  
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(Grice and Mcdonald-Gibson, 2013). Moreover, the Central and Eastern European 
countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania) also 
criticized Cameron’s restrictive plan on immigration and declared that they would be 
against any change in the EU’s free movement of people principle (Kennedy, 2013). 
Additionally, the Scandinavian countries also perceived the free movement of people as a 
core EU principle; therefore, they did not support Cameron’s plan, either (Tisdall, 2014). 
As a result of his failure to find allies within the EU, Cameron toughened his position at 
the December 2013 EU summit and declared that he would veto any further enlargement 
unless the other  EU members agreed to reform the EU’s free movement of people 
principle to prevent “benefit tourism” from poorer members to richer members107 (Meade, 
2013, Waterfield, 2013).  According to Cameron (2013), the EU’s enlargement towards the 
East was a success but transnational controls were needed to cope with the side effects of it 
such as uncontrolled immigration (see also: Waterfield, 2013, Savage and Bremner, 2013). 
Therefore, this case confirms LI’s assumption that national interests were the main driving 
force behind Britain’s pro-enlargement policy. In concrete terms, when the EU’s further 
enlargement’s negative externality (e.g. uncontrolled immigration) became intolerable at 
the domestic level, the British government correspondingly decreased its support for the 
EU’s enlargement, and the solution of it (uncontrolled immigration) became a condition 
for a stronger support.  
Furthermore, Cameron’s failure to achieve a reform in the EU’s free movement of people 
principle to cope with the uncontrolled immigration problem increased the domestic 
pressure on him. For example, 95 Conservative MPs wrote a letter to Cameron and 
demanded a legislation change that would “re-establish a national veto over current and 
future EU laws and enable Parliament to disapply EU legislation, where it is in Britain’s 
vital national interests to do so” (The Telegraph, 2014). However, the Cameron 
government did not support this unilateral “zero-sum” game tactic. According to the 
Foreign Secretary William Hague, this proposal would make the Single Market 
unworkable (and everybody would lose in it) (The Guardian, 2014). Therefore, the British 
government continued to try to convince its partners within the EU to reform the principle 
                                                 
107 It was highly possible that Cameron’s anti-enlargement position was more of an output of his short-run 
tactic to force other members to accept a reform in the principle of free movement of people to control inner 
immigration within the EU. For example, despite this tactical position, he reiterated that there was not any 
change in his support for Britain’s longstanding pro-enlargement policy towards Turkey when he visited 
Turkey in December 2014 (Cohen, 2014).  
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of the free movement of the people. For example, David Cameron continued to look for 
Germany’s support to make an EU level reform in the EU’s inner immigration policy in 
the first half of 2014 (Sky News, 2014). 
In the second half of 2014, UKIP’s significant success in the EU Parliament elections and 
the local elections and winning two seats in the House of Commons via the by-elections 
shocked the Conservative Party and highly limited David Cameron’s freedom of 
manoeuvre at the EU level negotiations. Correspondingly, at the domestic level, Cameron 
made a major cabinet reshuffle to form a more Eurosceptic Cabinet before the 2015 
national election. For example, arch-Eurosceptic Philip Hammond was appointed as the 
new foreign secretary (Agence France Presse, 2014a, Agence France Presse, 2014b, 
Morris, 2014). At the EU level, Cameron increased his voice about the necessity of a 
reform in the EU’s free movement of people principle (Maddox, 2014) and also suggested 
an “emergency brake” mechanism108 to control the inner immigration movements within 
the EU (Chapman, 2014). Moreover, he reiterated that the British government would veto 
any further enlargement unless a new deal on the immigration issue was renegotiated 
(Chapman, 2014, Waterfield, 2014, Chorley, 2014). Interestingly, the Eurosceptic 
Conservatives also started to strongly associate enlargement with immigration as of 2014. 
For example, Cameron’s support to start the accession negotiations with Albania was 
criticized by the Eurosceptic Conservatives (Shipman and Grimston, 2014). 
However, the other members were strongly against any change in the EU’s free movement 
of people principle despite the Cameron government’s increasing efforts to achieve it 
(BBC, 2014e). For instance, France and Germany repeatedly declared that the EU’s free 
movement of people principle was at the core of the EU and was non-negotiable 
(Dominiczak, 2014, Islam, 2014, Elks, 2014, Pancevski and Shipman, 2014).  
In conclusion, from an LI perspective, the domestic consensus on a pro-enlargement policy 
collapsed in Britain due to the increasing anti-immigration sentiments, and the domestic 
demand for a solution to the uncontrolled immigration from the EU members forced the 
Cameron government to attempt to renegotiate one of the EU’s core principles (free 
movement of people) with other members. However, this demand was non-negotiable for 
the other members. Therefore, this unsettled problem might trigger a bigger crisis in the 
                                                 
108 This mechanism would also help the Conservative Party to reduce net migration to under 100,000 people 
by 2015, which was a big promise given in its 2010 general election manifesto.  
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British-EU relations if the Conservative Party, who already promised an EU referendum, 
won the general elections in May 2015.  
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans and 
Turkey from an LI perspective. As found in the previous enlargement cases (the 
Mediterranean, the EFTA, and the Eastward), this case has also showed that LI’s two-level 
game approach was useful in systematically analysing Britain’s national preferences over 
the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey, and the British 
governments’ defence of them at the EU level negotiations. As with the previous chapters, 
the findings of this chapter also confirm LI’s intergovernmental explanation that Britain’s 
support for the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey was 
mainly shaped according to her national interests.  
The existing national consensus on the support for the EU’s enlargement process continued 
for the further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey at the beginning of 
the 2000s, and this national consensus made the Labour government one of the main 
initiators of the EU’s further enlargement at the EU level. The Labour government was 
highly active to achieve the stabilization of the Western Balkans and to stimulate the 
enlargement process towards the Western Balkans. For example, at the Thessaloniki 
Summit, the Labour government tried to convince the other members to promise the 
Western Balkan states EU membership if they fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria despite 
France’s reluctance. In 2004, the Labour government also aimed to shift the EU agenda 
from the deepening of the EU (the Draft Constitution) to the widening of it, and launched 
an EU level campaign to start the accession negotiations with Turkey. As a more 
prominent example, the Labour government did not need to take a measure to restrict any 
potential immigration flow from the new members at the accession negotiations. However, 
the increasing anti-immigration sentiments at the domestic level started to limit the Labour 
government’s pro-enlargement policy after the Eastward enlargement. In 2007, this 
domestic pressure even resulted in a split within the Labour Cabinet (between the Home 
and Foreign Offices) while taking an immigration restriction measure against Romania and 
Bulgaria. More dramatically, when the Coalition government came to power in 2010, it 
energetically tried to stimulate the EU’s further enlargement; however, the increasing 
domestic pressure on it to find a solution to the immigration influx from the new members 
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forced David Cameron to demand to renegotiate the EU’s free movement of people 
principle. Subsequently, as other members (e.g. France and Germany) rejected this 
demand, Cameron declared that the British government would veto any further 
enlargement unless a permanent solution to the immigration problem was found. As a 
result, as LI assumes, the successive British governments (the Labour and the Coalition 
governments) did not sacrifice any significant British interest (or any significant domestic 
demand) for the sake of the EU’s further enlargement.    
As found in the previous cases, this case has also found that LI’s economic interest 
oriented rational choice approach was limited in explaining Britain’s national preference 
formation process for a pro-enlargement policy. Firstly, the EU’s further enlargement 
towards the Western Balkans and Turkey began as an open-ended process. As of 2014, 
most of the applicants (except Croatia) had failed to meet the Copenhagen criteria. In 
addition to this, after the big bang enlargement, the EU started to suffer from an 
‘enlargement fatigue’. In addition to this, the further enlargement process was regularly 
connected to further deepening projects (e.g. the Lisbon Treaty) (mostly initiated by 
France), which posed complicated externalities to member states. As a result of these 
factors, it was hard for the British governments to clearly estimate the costs and benefits of 
this open-ended process. Secondly, unlike LI’s emphasis on economic reasons, the chapter 
has found that geopolitical/security concerns were the main reason behind Britain’s 
support for the EU’s further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey. 
According to the successive British governments, the EU’s further enlargement towards 
the Western Balkans would be a real solution to the Balkans conflict, which was 
threatening peace and prosperity in Europe. On the other hand, attaining EU membership 
would consolidate the institutionalization of democracy in Turkey, and a democratic 
Turkey would become a geopolitical bridge to access the Islamic world, which was 
strategically important for the British governments in a time when Britain was involved in 
the ‘War on Terror’ against Islamic radicals. Additionally, the British governments hoped 
that the EU’s further enlargement would make it more Atlanticist in line with Britain’s 
NATO centred collective security understanding.  
Despite the domination of the security concerns in the national preference formation 
process, ideological motivations and economic expectations, intertwined with those 
security concerns, also affected the decision making process. There was a common 
consensus among many British actors (the Labour government, the Coalition government, 
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and several British interest groups) on the expectation that the EU’s further enlargement 
would strengthen the EU’s Single Market in the globalized competitive world market. In 
addition to this, they also anticipated that the further expansion of the market economy 
principles in Europe via the EU’s enlargement would create more prosperity for the entire 
continent in the long-run. More specifically, the Western Balkans’ markets were not so 
attractive due to governmental/structural problems in the region; however, the booming 
Turkish market was attractive to British business. For example, as noted above, the CBI 
argued that Turkey’s EU membership would provide significant economic opportunities 
for British business in many sectors (environment, water, education and training, financial 
and legal services, police and security, power, transport infrastructure, 
ICT/Telecommunications, and agribusiness) (HC 367-ii, 2008, p. ev101). British business 
also perceived Turkey as an economic bridge to access the markets surrounding the 
country (e.g. the Middle East, North Africa, the Central Asia).   
Therefore, as LI assumes, it could be argued that Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards 
the Western Balkan countries and Turkey was an output of a multi-causal reasoning, 
covering economic, geopolitical and ideological concerns, as it was a complex issue to 
make clear-cut cost-benefit calculations on. However, as repeatedly argued in the previous 
chapters, LI does not propose any further explanation about this multi-causal reasoning. In 
this sense, as the literature review suggested, Britain’s foreign policy structure might have 
provided a rationale for the successive British governments’ support for the EU’s further 
enlargement. More specifically, the British governments’ pro-enlargement policy towards 
the Western Balkans and Turkey depended on their expectations rather than precise cost-
benefit calculations, but those expectations might have been rational within the broader 
British foreign policy framework. For example, the expectation to institutionalize 
democracy and market economy principles in the Western Balkans and Turkey via 
enlargement was in parallel with the broader British foreign policy objective aiming to 
create a global market economy. As another example, the expectation to solve the Western 
Balkans security problem via enlargement was also in compliance with Britain’s collective 
security strategy. Additionally, the positive feedback from the Mediterranean and Eastward 
enlargement waves also empirically supported the British governments’ expectations about 
the EU’s further enlargement.  
The findings have also showed that LI’s pluralistic decision making assumption is limited 
in explaining this case. Similar to the previous cases, this case has also showed that the 
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British governments were the dominant actors in the national preference formation process 
for a pro-enlargement policy on the EU’s further enlargement. For example, the British   
Trade International (a joint DTI and FCO body) launched a campaign in 1998 to encourage 
British business to invest more in the Turkish market. In addition to this, after the failure of 
British business to sufficiently benefit from the opportunities in the CEECs, the Labour 
government employed the UKTI to raise the awareness of British business of the 
opportunities in Turkey. Despite the domination of the British executive/governments in 
the decision making process, as LI assumes, the British interest groups which were 
sensitive to the enlargement also tried to affect the British governments according to their 
specific interests. For example, several interest groups (e.g. the UK Steel Association, the  
British Music  Rights,  the  Scotch  Whisky  Association-the  Gin and Vodka Association 
of Great Britain, and  the Publishers’ Association) asked the Labour government to strictly 
screen Turkey’s adaptation of the acquis, which would further liberalize the Turkish 
market and thus British business would more easily enter this market. More notably, as 
noted above, the increasing enlargement-related anti-immigration sentiments among the 
British public limited the British governments’ autonomy/flexibility in the decision making 
process for a pro-enlargement policy on the EU’s further enlargement. As a result of this 
domestic pressure, David Cameron even declared that Britain would veto any further 
enlargement unless the immigration problem was solved. Therefore, these findings support 
LI’s assumption that the British governments could not ignore increasing/significant 
domestic demands even if the EU’s further enlargement was desirable in terms of the 
British foreign policy objectives. 
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7 Conclusion 
7.1 The Summary of the Findings 
The European Union is not a fully-fledged system but still an ongoing process, which is 
continuing through deepening its organizational system and through widening its borders 
towards new members. Within this complexity, as discussed in the first chapter, the 
literature on the Britain-EU relations defines Britain as a Eurosceptic member by placing 
the deepening dimension of the integration process at the centre of its focus. On the other 
hand, when the widening dimension of the integration process is considered, Britain, as a 
leading Eurosceptic member, emerges as a staunch supporter of the EU’s enlargement 
waves from 1975 to 2014. At this point, Britain’s continuous support for the EU’s 
enlargement waves emerged as an interesting academic case to study (especially to 
understand a Eurosceptic member’s behaviour within the EU system). In addition to this, 
the literature review showed that there is not any direct research on this topic; thus by 
studying it, the research also filled a gap and contributed an original study to the literature. 
To develop a deeper analytical framework, firstly, the research extended the literature 
review on Britain’s relations with EU (including related studies on EU enlargement). 
According to the existing literature, the main reason behind Britain’s continuous support 
for the EU’s enlargement might be her ambition to dilute supranational attempts in the 
European integration process. While this argument is plausible bearing in mind Britain's 
traditional concerns about the integration process, there are two reasons why we should not 
be satisfied with this explanation and why we need to further probe the reasons for this 
policy. Firstly, even a cursory knowledge of the EU reveals that at times, the enlargement 
process has acted as a catalyst for the deepening of the EU. For example, the EU needed to 
make structural reforms to prepare itself for the Eastward enlargement, which also 
deepened the EU’s governance (e.g. QMV). To put it another way, Britain's support for 
enlargement, certainly over the last twenty-five years, has ended up producing the sorts of 
outcomes that British governments were trying to avoid. Why persist with enlargement if it 
was having these counter-productive results? Secondly, the dilution of integration 
argument suggests that Britain supported enlargement over a forty year period for largely 
the same reasons. However, the different waves of EU enlargement took place in widely 
different international contexts and were supported by British governments with varied 
ideological and political complexions. Therefore, it is highly possible that these changes 
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had an effect on Britain’s pro-enlargement policy, and that different British governments 
supported enlargement at different times for different reasons. Additionally, the literature 
review showed that Britain aimed to drive the European integration process towards an 
outward looking intergovernmental way in line with her foreign policy objectives as an 
alternative to the inward-looking supranational projects. Thus, this finding from the 
literature suggested that EU enlargement might have become a tool for Britain to achieve 
her broader foreign policy objectives rather than a simple dilution tool used solely to 
prevent supranational tendencies within the EU. As a result, the literature review showed 
that it would be scientifically interesting to study the question: why Britain as a leading 
Eurosceptic member continuously supported the EU’s enlargement from 1975 to 2014.   
To systematically answer this question, the research benefited from a hypothetico-
deductive reasoning. In concrete terms, the research used a set of theoretical assumptions 
as a potential answer to the research question and then tested their correctness in the four 
different enlargement cases (the Mediterranean, the EFTA, the Eastward and the Western 
Balkans/Turkey) by analysing the empirically collected data. In this regard, Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism (LI) emerged as a potential theory, which could make the research 
question more knowable and methodologically more workable. First of all, as noted above, 
the literature review showed that Britain is a leading Eurosceptic member with a tendency 
to take decisions on the EU related issues according to her national interests. Therefore, 
LI’s member state centred intergovernmental approach would be helpful. Secondly, it is 
highly possible that a pro-enlargement policy for every enlargement case might have been 
shaped according to their situational conditions (according to different domestic and 
international dynamics). In this regard, LI’s methodological individualism made it possible 
to separately study Britain’s pro-enlargement policy on every single enlargement wave in 
the relevant situational conditions/historical contexts (British actors’ positions towards the 
EU’s enlargement waves). Thirdly, LI’s two-level game approach provided an analytical 
framework, through which potential reasons behind Britain’s pro-enlargement policy 
became more knowable, since this approach enabled the researcher to study how a pro-
enlargement policy for every enlargement wave emerged as an output of a national 
preference formation process and how successive British governments defended 
domestically determined preferences at EU level negotiations.  
LI also helped to develop a methodological framework to collect empirical data. Firstly, in 
line with LI’s methodological individual approach, the research was designed as a 
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qualitative case study, through which every enlargement wave was separately analysed by 
focusing on relevant British actors’ positions on the EU’s enlargement waves. Secondly, 
Moravcsik gathered historical evidence while formulating his LI. For example, in his 
prominent book: ‘the Choice for Europe’, Moravcsik (1998) analysed five  historical  
cases: the  Rome  Treaty,  the Common  Market,  the  EMS,  the  SEA,  and  the  
Maastricht  Treaty. In line with this method, this research also collected historical evidence 
as the studied enlargement cases are historical phenomena as well. More specifically, 
archival research was chosen as the main data collection method, and thanks to this 
method, extensive in-depth data was collected about the British governments’ and 
numerous British societal groups’ positions on the EU’s enlargement waves. In the data 
collection process, the research mainly benefited from the publications of the House of 
Commons (the documents starting with the abbreviations: HC, CM, Cmnd), which 
provided comprehensive empirical data about the official positions of the successive 
British governments, other British political parties and societal groups towards the EU’s 
enlargement waves (via http://parlipapers.chadwyck.co.uk). Moreover, Hansard 
(http://hansard.millbanksystems.com) was another source providing official documents 
about the parliamentary discussions on enlargement. Additionally, further data about the 
CBI’s and TUC’s positions towards the EU’s enlargement waves was acquired through 
visiting the Modern Records Centre (The University of Warwick) and the Trades Union 
Congress Library Collections (London Metropolitan University).   
The research also considered the criticisms on Moravcsik’s methodology. As noted in 
chapter 2, the main point of the critiques is that Moravcsik’s historical evidence selection 
is theory-biased (that he mainly collected data that supported his own theory) (see: Kaiser, 
2007, 2009, 2010, Lieshout et al., 2004, Kaiser et al., 2009). To deal with this drawback, 
the research tried to analyse all of the enlargement-related EU level summits/meetings 
(from 1980s to 2014) to as great an extent as possible. In this regard, factual news reports 
from the print media appeared as a rich data source of the enlargement-related EU level 
negotiations, and the research accessed this data via LexisNexis, a rich print media online 
dataset (http://www.lexisnexis.com). To strengthen the validity of the data collected from 
LexisNexis, the researcher strictly evaluated news reports by crosschecking the news 
reports obtained from different sources (e.g. newspapers or news agencies). In addition to 
this, the research also benefited from the officially released conclusions of the EU summits 
(via the Archive of European Integration (http://aei.pitt.edu) and the official website of the 
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European Council (www.consilium.europa.eu)). In doing so, this research synthesised a 
new/original data collection method to deal with the LI’s above-mentioned methodological 
limitation. Additionally, as Moravcsik had also done, the research also tried to collect data 
via interviews and memoirs/biographies/autobiographies of the leading British actors; 
however, the collected data via those methods was limited and became only supplementary 
data for the research.  
After collecting comprehensive data on Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the EU’s 
four enlargement cases (the Mediterranean, the EFTA, the Eastward and the Western 
Balkans/Turkey), the research had sufficient empirical evidence to test LI’s assumptions on 
Britain’s pro-enlargement policy. Firstly, all of the cases confirmed LI’s intergovernmental 
approach that Britain’s pro-enlargement policy for every enlargement case was shaped 
according to her national interests. In other words, the British governments did not 
sacrifice significant national interests for the sake of the EU’s enlargement waves, and 
whenever the prospect of enlargement put Britain’s national interests at risk, the successive 
British governments tried to guarantee significant British interests at EU level negotiations. 
For example, in the case of the Mediterranean enlargement, the Thatcher government did 
not tolerate the increasing burden of the EU budget on Britain for the sake of the 
enlargement and strongly negotiated to get the British rebate at the Fontainebleau Summit 
in 1984. In the EFTA enlargement case, the Conservative government refused to give any 
derogation from the acquis to the EFTA countries at the negotiations on the EEA. In the 
Eastward enlargement case, the Labour government tried to save Britain’s national 
interests at the enlargement-related reform negotiations despite having a more pro-
European position than its predecessor. In terms of the EU’s further enlargement towards 
the Western Balkans and Turkey, the Cameron government even declared that it would 
veto any potential EU enlargement unless the immigration problem was solved, because 
the enlargement-related immigration problem began to be seen as a big problem at the 
domestic level. This finding also supports the argument that LI’s two-level game approach 
is highly effective in understanding member states’ behaviour within the EU system, and 
that as LI argues, domestic consensus/consent is still dominantly influential over member 
states’ behaviour within the EU, unlike other approaches which give more importance to 
the EU level dynamics.  
Secondly, as noted in the theory chapter, LI assumes that economic concerns might have 
become the main driving force behind Britain’s pro-enlargement policy. However, none of 
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the four cases could access any significant empirical data supporting this assumption. To 
demonstrate, it has been found that geopolitical concerns were the dominant factor behind 
Britain’s support for the Mediterranean enlargement, the Eastward enlargement, and the 
further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and Turkey. In terms of the EFTA 
enlargement, ideological concerns were the dominant factor behind Britain’s pro-
enlargement policy. Despite this finding, the empirical evidence has also showed that 
economic concerns were still an important variable affecting British actors’ attitudes 
towards the EU’s enlargement waves in all of the four cases. More specifically, in all four 
cases, it has been found that economic, geopolitical and ideological concerns, which 
affected British actors’ attitudes towards the EU’s enlargement waves, were actually 
intertwined with each other, and it is hard to totally separate them from one another. For 
example, if geopolitical concerns alone are used to explain Britain’s pro-enlargement 
policy towards Spain, it is hard to explain why Britain did not use her veto power against 
Spain in order to gain advantage over the Gibraltar dispute, which was one of the most 
crucial geopolitical/security concerns of Britain in the 1980s. If economic concerns alone 
are used to explain Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the neutral EFTA countries, it 
is hard to explain Britain’s reduced enthusiasm for their EC membership in the Cold War 
context. If geopolitical concerns alone are used to explain Britain’s pro-enlargement policy 
towards the Eastward enlargement, it is hard to explain why Britain did not perceive 
Germany’s having greater economic and geopolitical gains as a threat. Additionally, the 
research has found that many British actors perceived Turkey as a bridge between the West 
and the Middle East not only because of geopolitical reasons but also because of their 
expectations of economic benefits; therefore, the arguments using only geopolitical reasons 
to explain Britain’s support for Turkey’s EU membership are deficient and oversimplified.   
In addition to this finding, the research has also showed that LI’s microeconomics oriented 
rational choice logic is limited in explaining Britain’s national preference formation 
processes at the every enlargement wave. In concrete terms, the enlargement cases were 
too complex for the British actors to make precise cost-benefit calculations on. All of the 
cases have showed that Britain’s pro-enlargement policy actually depended on British 
actors’ expectations rather than being an output of a precise cost-benefit calculation. From 
time to time, the British governments even faced unexpected externalities of the 
enlargement waves. For example, the Major government could not clearly anticipate the 
increasing power of QMV mechanism in the EU decision making system as a negative 
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externality of the EFTA enlargement. More dramatically, the Blair government 
miscalculated the effect of immigration on Britain as a side effect of the Eastward 
enlargement. However, this logic sufficiently explains why Britain did not perceive 
Germany’s having more economic and geopolitics gains from the EFTA and Eastward 
enlargement as a threat although the successive British governments were already aware of 
this fact.  
Related to this limitation, the research has also found that the successive British 
governments were the main actor in the national preference formation process and even 
played an entrepreneurial role through encouraging British business to exploit economic 
opportunities in the new member states, unlike LI’s pluralistic decision making 
assumption. Especially in the 1990s, both the Conservative and Labour governments tried 
to attract the attention of British business to the economic opportunities stemming from the 
EFTA and the Eastward enlargement waves. However, as noted in the theory chapter, to 
compensate for this limitation, LI argues that if a member state needs to decide on a 
complex issue, its government might be more dominant in the national preference 
formation process compared to societal groups because societal groups are limited in 
making decisions on complex issues. Related to this argument, the research has also 
observed that there was a general consensus on a pro-enlargement policy between the 
successive British governments and societal groups. However, whenever societal groups 
perceived any of the enlargement waves as a risk to their specific interests, they tried to 
affect the successive British governments and the governments were responsive to those 
demands. For example, the Conservative government considered the British horticulture, 
textile, steel, and fishery sectors’ concerns at the EEC level negotiations on the 
Mediterranean enlargement. In parallel with the CBI’s demand, the Conservative 
government also refused to give any privilege to the EFTA countries during the 
negotiations on the EEA.  In terms of the Eastward enlargement, there was a consensus 
between the Labour government and several societal groups (e.g. the CBI, the Institute of 
Directors, and the NFU) on the point that the EU needed structural reforms including the 
CAP, the Structural and Cohesion Funds and the EU governance system prior to the 
enlargement. Therefore, the Labour government strictly followed EU level negotiations to 
achieve those reforms. As for the further enlargement towards the Western Balkans and 
Turkey, as noted above, the Cameron government was highly responsive to the increasing 
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enlargement-related anti-immigration sentiments at the domestic level; thus, this issue 
became one of the main points on its EU agenda (as of 2014).  
To deal with its above-mentioned limitations, as noted in the theory chapter, LI proposes a 
multi-causal reasoning, containing economic, geopolitical and ideological concerns, which 
might affect British actors’ attitudes towards the EU’s enlargement waves. More 
specifically, despite LI’s logic of micro-economics, Moravcsik (1995, p. 612, 1998, p. 7, 
together with Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 68) accepted that if actors cannot make a clear 
cost-benefit calculation on an issue, geopolitical and/or ideological concerns can affect 
their decisions on it, to an equal or greater extent than economic concerns would. 
However, although Moravcsik’s multi-causal reasoning is useful in understanding the 
(more) specific reasons behind Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards every 
enlargement wave in practice, his adaptation of multi-causal reasoning in LI also contains 
some theoretical problems. On the one hand, although Moravcsik accepted that ideological 
motivations might influence economic and geopolitical concerns, especially under 
uncertainty, he defined them just as a “transmission belt” for economic and geopolitical 
interests (see: Moravcsik, 1999b, p. 675); however, this attempt still seems descriptive and 
cannot satisfactorily explain how ideological motivations might affect actors’ attitudes. On 
the other hand, it could be argued that it undermines the parsimony and arguably the 
distinctiveness of LI. If rational decision making capable of identifying the overall material 
gains/losses from a particular decision is not possible (because of its complexity), and LI 
then falls back on other factors (political and/or ideological), what are the limits to LI as an 
explanatory theory? Under what conditions might we be able to specify that LI (or at least 
its rational choice assumption) is not that helpful, or is falsifiable? Put a different way, is 
LI really a theory in the way that it wants to claim? Is it just another political science 
approach which, because of the complicated nature of life in politics, is only really capable 
of ‘thick description’? 
One criticism of LI that appears to have real resonance is its neglect of the importance of 
structure. Many of the case studies have stressed the importance of broader foreign policy 
principles/objectives rooted in the past that have influenced Britain’s stance towards 
enlargement. In particular, as noted in chapter 1, British foreign policy was 
institutionalized on a logic aiming to strengthen Britain’s collective security policy and to 
expand democracy and market economy principles further as it is believed that it provides 
more prosperity and peace to Britain; therefore, within this framework/structure, it might 
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have been rational for British actors to expect that the EU’s enlargement waves, which 
would unify Europe and expand democracy and market economy principles further, would 
provide Britain with more prosperity and peace. Moreover, the British foreign policy 
objectives as a structure might have helped the successive British governments (actors) to 
evaluate the EU’s enlargement waves according to the “situational conditions” surrounding 
the waves (see also: Tversky and Kahneman, 1990, p. 85). In this regard, it is not clear how 
LI, with its stress on actors and their preferences, can accommodate the importance of this 
ideational structure, yet it has proved to be influential throughout the forty years of British 
diplomacy in this area.  
In this context, it could be argued that Paul Pierson’s historical institutionalist arguments 
might aid our understanding of this structure and its influence on British policy towards 
EU enlargement (see: Pierson, 1998, 2001, 2000, 2003, 2004). As noted in the theory 
chapter (chapter 2), this approach argues that if actors cannot make precise cost-benefit 
calculations on a complex issue, they might benefit from the structure/institution in which 
they exist. From this perspective, the findings from the case studies support the argument 
that the historically institutionalized British foreign policy principles (liberal ideals) 
supported British actors’ economic and geopolitical expectations as they could not make 
clear cost-benefit calculations on the enlargement waves, and in this way it is highly 
possible that those principles (ideological beliefs) affected British actors’ attitudes towards 
the enlargement waves.   
As Pierson (2004, p.126) argued, the research has showed that all of the enlargement 
waves were exogenous developments to which Britain needed to respond. In other words, 
the applications of the Mediterranean countries, EFTA countries, the CEECs, the Western 
Balkan countries and Turkey were not an output of Britain’s national preferences, but 
rather, Britain needed to react to their applications. To put it another way, the EU’s 
enlargement waves started with other European countries’ applications; thus, old members 
were under a selection pressure (either to support or veto). Therefore, this selection 
pressure might have limited the British governments’ rational choices about the 
enlargement waves and driven them to choose the best one among the existing options. For 
example, Germany and France tried to develop a privilege membership formula regarding 
Turkey’s integration to the EU, which would become alternatively the optimum option 
regarding their national interests. However, when this option was brought to the EU’s 
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agenda, Turkey strongly refused it and it failed. Yet, Britain was against this option (see: 
HC 367-i. 2008, p. 19).   
Pierson’s (1998, p. 39, 2004, p. 125) historical Institutionalist approach also argues that if 
the gap between an action and its outcome is wide regarding a political issue, it will be 
harder for actors to precisely estimate outcomes and externalities at an initial stage. In line 
with this argument, the research has found that it took years to complete the enlargement 
waves, and this might have made it harder for the British governments to make a precise 
cost-benefit calculation while developing Britain’s national preferences over the 
enlargement waves.  As a result, from this point of view, it is highly possible that the 
successive British governments might have benefited from historically institutionalized 
British foreign policy priorities/principles, covering geopolitical, economic and ideological 
concerns, to develop an optimal response (national preferences) to those waves. For 
instance, the Conservative government perceived the EFTA enlargement as a part of its 
bigger project to design the European integration according to neoliberal principles in the 
wake of the global/post-Cold War era. Both Conservative and Labour governments tried to 
use the Eastward enlargement to institutionalize liberal democracy and market economy 
principles in Europe to maintain perpetual peace and economic prosperity in the continent 
in the post-Cold War era. In a similar vein, the EU’s enlargement towards the Western 
Balkans was perceived by the successive British governments (Labour and Coalition 
governments) as a permanent solution to institutionalize democracy and peace in the 
continent. More interestingly, according to them, Turkey’s EU membership was very 
important for the West to access the Islamic world in the era of the ‘War on Terror’. 
Additionally, according to Pierson’s historical institutionalist assumption, positive 
feedback from previous experiences (historical learning) might affect actors’ future 
decisions in uncertainty (see: Pierson, 2004). In this regard, the research has found that 
while evaluating the Eastward enlargement, the success in the democratization of the 
Mediterranean countries via enlargement became a positive feedback for the British 
governments and then the Eastward enlargement for the Western Balkans.   
According to Pierson (1998, 2004), the gap between action and outcome not only makes 
rational calculations harder but also it results in unanticipated consequences in time. In this 
sense, the research has found that the EU negotiations on the enlargement waves had ‘high 
issue density’, which increasingly covered other issues like the EU budget, the CAP, the 
Structural and Cohesion Funds, the EU’s decision making mechanisms, and immigration. 
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Therefore, according to this assumption, it is highly possible that the successive British 
governments could not estimate all the possible negative externalities of the enlargement 
waves to Britain although they might have had a tendency to eliminate any potential 
externality that they detected. For example, as noted above, the increasing power of the 
QMV mechanism was an unanticipated consequence of the EFTA enlargement for the 
Major government, and the immigration flows from the new members was an 
unanticipated consequence of the Eastward enlargement for the Blair government. 
However, unlike Pierson’s (1998) arguments, those unanticipated consequences in the 
enlargement process did not lead to a ‘path-dependence’, but as LI assumes, the British 
governments tried to eliminate those unexpected negative externalities at the forthcoming 
EU level negotiations. To illustrate, as of 2014, the Cameron government had a 
renegotiation agenda, containing the above-mentioned unanticipated consequences, and 
Cameron also promised to hold an EU referendum on the outcomes of these renegotiations 
with the EU (see: chapter 6).  
In a nutshell, HI (particularly Paul Pierson’s historical institutionalist approach) has 
provided further explanations for the points where LI’s rational choice assumption is 
limited. More specifically, it contributes further explanations about how/why the issue of 
enlargement is a complex issue (its being an exogenous development and relatively a long 
process) and how the British foreign policy structure might help British actors to make 
decisions on this complex issue as they cannot make precise cost-benefit calculations on it. 
However, this does not make HI a better theoretical approach than LI to explain the 
research case. Put in another way, HI has its own limitations in explaining this case.  
Firstly, as noted in the theory chapter, if this case is studied through a ‘structure’ centred 
approach (HI); it methodologically needs to put more emphasis on the EU as a structure 
and less on Britain as an actor; thus, it is highly possible that it might miss/omit some 
important findings revealed via LI’s intergovernmentalist approach. More specifically, if 
Britain’s pro-enlargement policy is mainly defined as an output of the British foreign 
policy structure, this perspective cannot answer the question: why/how did Cameron as an 
actor swiftly change Britain’s pro-enlargement policy in the same foreign policy structure? 
Alternatively, rational choice institutionalism (including LI) also accepts that actors 
deliberately/strategically benefit from ‘structure’ (as a ‘strategic context’) in the pursuit of 
their interests (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p. 7, Checkel, 2001, p. 20). From this point of 
view, British actors might deliberately have benefited from the British foreign policy 
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structure to decide on the complex enlargement issue for a long time as enlargement did 
not actually pose any significant threat to British actors’ interests (or the successive British 
governments successfully eliminated them at EU level negotiations). However, when 
British actors started to perceive the immigration influx from new members to Britain as a 
significant threat and the Cameron government failed to eliminate this problem at EU level 
negotiations, the government could change its behaviour even in the same structure. From 
this perspective, therefore, the swift change in Cameron’s enlargement policy as a reaction 
to the immigration problem is more explicable.  
Secondly, as noted above, thanks to LI’s two level game approach, the research has found 
that the successive British governments not only formed a pro-enlargement policy as a 
domestic position but also they were highly effective actors at EU level in 
accelerating/achieving the EU’s enlargement waves. For example, Tony Blair was the first 
EU leader who declared that the Eastward enlargement should be completed before the 
2004 European Parliamentary elections. As another example, the Labour government 
played an influential role at EU level by convincing other members to start the accession 
negotiations with Turkey. However, a structure centred HI approach might omit these 
important findings (related to actors’ behaviour). In  addition to this, as HI cannot 
sufficiently explain ‘change’ in actors’ behaviour (see: Schmidt, 2010, p. 50, Mahoney and 
Thelen, 2009, p. 1, Peters, 2011, p. 77), it may not clearly explain tactical changes in 
member states’ behaviour at the EU level negotiations, but LI’s two-level game approach 
sufficiently presented them in all of the four enlargement cases. In addition to its two level 
game approach, as noted above, LI’s intergovernmental approach was highly effective in 
explaining how a pro-enlargement policy for every enlargement wave emerged as an 
output of a national decision making process. In this regard, the influence of the British 
foreign policy, as a structure, in Britain’s pro-enlargement policy might challenge LI’s 
rational choice assumption; however, as a domestic factor affecting Britain’s position 
towards EU enlargement, it cannot refute LI’s state-centric intergovernmentalist position 
(realist side of LI)109. 
As a result, the author defends his use of LI as a theory for explaining British policy 
towards EU enlargement. As noted in chapter 2, all theoretical approaches have their 
                                                 
109 As noted in the theory chapter, LI is a synthesis of state-centric intergovernmentalism, rational choice 
institutionalism and liberal IR theory (Schimmelfennig and Rittberger, 2005, p. 79).  
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detractors: no theory is perfect. What matters is that the choice of theory was appropriate at 
the time it was made (i.e. before the research for the case studies was conducted). As noted 
in chapter 2, because LI’s analytical focus was on member states and their role within the 
EU, LI was deemed suitable as a theory for a thesis that was also focusing on a member 
state (Britain) and its policy towards the EU (specifically enlargement). In addition to this, 
the findings from the four enlargement cases have also clearly confirmed that LI’s two 
level game approach and intergovernmental assumptions are sufficiently explanatory in 
this research. However, the findings have also showed that LI’s economic interest oriented 
rational choice logic and pluralistic decision making understanding were limited in 
explaining the research case. At this point, the research welcomes more research utilising 
HI in this area, which might compensate for LI’s above-mentioned limitations (in this 
regard, as noted in the theory chapter, the attempt to integrate HI into the theoretical 
framework was far beyond the scope of this problem oriented PhD project).  
7.2 Further Implications of the Findings  
As noted above, the European integration is still an ongoing process, which makes it hardly 
predictable, but at the same time, an interesting case for political scientists. Therefore, 
there are numerous studies trying to understand/explain this process from different 
theoretical perspectives. At this point, two basic questions are still important in the EU 
studies; namely, whether the European integration is reversible or irreversible and whether 
member states are melting/will melt in a European supranational pot or not. Many brilliant 
studies were devoted to answering these questions, and several theoretical approaches were 
developed to answer them. For example, according to Haas and Lindberg’s 
neofunctionalist assumption, the European integration process was irreversible (Börzel, 
2006, p. 29); however, Stanley Hoffmann’s intergovernmentalist approach challenged this 
assumption by arguing that the integration process was actually reversible (Hoffmann, 
1966). The acceleration of the integration process after the late 1980s also heated up the 
discussions on these questions (Tallberg, 2003). As deeply discussed in chapter 2, LI 
continued Hoffmann’s intergovernmental approach (e.g. Moravcsik, 1998, see also: 
Bomberg et al., 2015 ), but there emerged an influential supranational/constructivist block 
arguing that the European integration was becoming increasingly irreversible (via 
Europeanization) and that member states were melting in the EU’s supranational pot (e.g. 
Hooghe and Marks, 2001, Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989). However, recent developments 
such as the euro crisis, the decreasing popularity of the EU among its nations, and the 
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increasing power of the far right parties in the member states using an anti-EU rhetoric 
have opened another phase in the discussions on these questions in the literature. 
Particularly, the popularity of supranational arguments has been in decline after the euro 
crisis (2008) (Blavoukos and Oikonomou, 2012, Coman and Crespy, 2014). For example, 
even Hooghe and Marks (2009), who could be considered as the founders of the Multilevel 
Governance approach, accepted that there happened a shift in the EU nations’ attitudes 
from “permissive consensus” to “constraining dissensus”; thus, domestic concerns have 
become a more constraining/influential factor in member states’ behaviour at the EU level. 
Moreover, new theoretical syntheses have emerged in the literature, putting more emphasis 
on member states and intergovernmentalism in their arguments (Bickerton et al., 2015, 
Puetter, 2014). For example, according to Uwe Puetter’s (2012a, p. 161) deliberative 
intergovernmentalism, member states “have resisted the further transfer of formal 
competences to the EU level” in spite of the growing interdependence among themselves 
and aimed to achieve “greater policy coherence through intensiﬁed intergovernmental co-
ordination”. In the same vein, Chris Bickerton (2012) argued that there are no “grand leaps 
towards supranationalism” in the European integration process despite the deepening 
cooperation between member states. Additionally, there are several studies, published after 
the euro crisis, arguing that the European integration might be reversible (e.g. 
Zimmermann and Dur, 2012, Hayward and Wurzel, 2012, Zielonka, 2014, Webber, 2014, 
Giddens, 2013).   
Regarding this long-lasting discussion, the empirical findings of this research support the 
argument that the European integration is reversible once the outputs of it turn negative 
regarding member states’ significant national interests although the complex 
interdependence  among member states and global uncertainty, pushing them to cooperate, 
make this option less possible. To put it another way, the research has provided 
considerable evidence supporting the assertion that the European integration is a 
deliberative process for member states despite the complex interdependence among them. 
Therefore, member states and their national interests are still the main factor shaping the 
future of the integration process. At this point, it is highly possible that their attitudes 
towards the integration might change from one case to another in line with their changing 
national interest priorities according to different situational conditions, and this makes the 
European integration not only an ongoing but also an open-ended/unpredictable process 
(see also: Zimmermann and Dur, 2012). As a result of this, it is hardly possible to develop 
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a theoretical approach overgeneralizing member states’ behaviour within the integration 
process. For example, the empirical findings from this research do not support Frank 
Schimmelfennig’s (2001) community trap/rhetorical action approach, which tries to 
generalize old members’ attitudes towards the EU’s enlargement in the case of the 
Eastward enlargement. In particular, by synthesizing a mid-way between LI and SI (the 
constructivist approach), Schimmelfennig argued that the member states supporting 
enlargement (drivers) used and manipulated liberal norms to force the opponent member 
states (brakemen) to accept new comers by criticizing them for diminishing liberal norms 
to achieve their narrow self-interests. As a response to this criticism, the opponent 
members did not want to behave against the liberal community values, and the Eastward 
enlargement was achieved (Schimmelfennig, 2001, see also: Lazea, 2011). However, after 
analysing the four enlargement cases, this research has argued that Schimmelfennig’s 
‘rhetorical action’ approach is not generalizable to explain member states’ behaviour 
towards enlargement, because according to the findings, not only Britain but also other 
members did not hesitate to block EU level enlargement negotiations to protect their 
significant national interests for the sake of the EU’s common values. To illustrate, France 
implicitly or explicitly issued its veto threat several times in different enlargement cases, 
Greece used veto threat against the Iberian enlargement in 1984, and Spain did against the 
EFTA enlargement in 1992. Austria used its veto power against Turkey’s membership in 
order to force other members to resume the accession negotiations with Croatia as its 
membership was more important for Austria. More dramatically, in 2014, the Cameron 
government swiftly changed Britain’s long-lasting pro-enlargement policy, when domestic 
dynamics pushed it to solve the immigration problem, which started to be seen as one of 
the most significant negative externalities of the EU’s enlargement to Britain. In parallel 
with these findings, Icener and Phinnemore (2015, p. 47) also argued that “[m]ember 
[s]tates are feeling free to express their reservations and opposition and to act accordingly”. 
Additionally, Lasas (2010, p. 6) also argued that the EU’s democratic ideals/norms (or the 
Copenhagen Criteria) might also be used by reluctant members as a strategic tool to slow 
down new members’ enlargement via extending accession negotiations. 
As a result, the research suggests that future studies on the European integration process 
should give more attention to member states (their national interests/structures). In other 
words, the EU studies need more case studies putting different member states at the centre 
of their analyses from different perspectives (e.g. security, trade, environment) to provide 
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more empirical data on the member state behaviour within the EU because the 
accumulation of this empirical data might make the ongoing and open-ended European 
integration process more knowable.  
7.3 Scientific Concerns and Limitations 
This study was designed to explore an intellectual puzzle, namely, why Britain as a leading 
Eurosceptic member continuously supported the EU’s enlargement process from 1975 to 
2014. To scientifically answer this question, the research formulated a set of theoretical 
assumptions as a potential answer to this question, and then tested them via empirically 
collected data. In this sense, the findings are not unquestionable ‘absolute truths’, but they 
represent one possible scientific answer to the research question, which is not perfect and 
might change (see also: Audi, 2003, Rescher, 2003). However, the findings are an output of 
a scientific research process and comply with the main scientific criteria. That said, the 
findings depend on comprehensive empirical data, and this makes them replicable. In this 
way, the findings are also falsifiable because any political scientist could replicate the 
research by using the collected empirical data to test the theoretical assumptions derived 
from LI. Moreover, this empirical data was systematically analysed and this systematic 
analysis process also benefited from the previous findings in the relevant literature. 
Therefore, in addition to its replicability, the systematic analysis of the empirical data by 
considering the previous findings in the literature also strengthens the reliability and 
validity of the research (Pennings et al., 2006, Yin, 2003, Neuman, 2014, Newman and 
Benz, 1998, Berg, 2007). Nevertheless, as the research was designed as a case study deeply 
focusing on Britain’s pro-enlargement policy towards the EU’s enlargement waves, the 
generalizability of the findings might be limited (see: Yin, 2003). In concrete terms, the 
findings of this case study might not be applied to specifically explain other member states’ 
enlargement policies although these findings improve our knowledge of the complex 
behaviour of member states within the EU. Therefore, as noted above, this research 
suggests that the EU studies literature needs more case studies focusing on different 
member states to develop a more comprehensive understanding of member state behaviour 
within the EU system.   
The research also accepts that social life is highly complex and human being’s cognitive 
capacity is limited in fully comprehending this great complexity. Thus, social theories 
could be useful tools to make social phenomena more knowable and social research more 
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workable. However, none of them is a panacea for a full understanding of social life, and 
all have their limits in explaining a social phenomenon. Therein; this research accepts that 
Hegelian epistemological dialectic might be helpful to know social phenomena better (see: 
Westphal, 2003). In other words, if a social phenomenon is studied through a theoretical 
thesis and its anti-theses, the accumulation of the findings of these different studies 
(potential syntheses) could help to consolidate and increase our knowledge on this 
phenomenon. Therefore, as noted above, this research welcomes new studies trying to 
analyse Britain’s pro-enlargement policy from an HI perspective since they might discover 
new findings that this research has not detected and the accumulation of the findings from 
this research and these future studies can provide us with a deeper knowledge on this topic. 
In general, this research also welcomes other studies producing counter arguments against 
intergovernmentalism in terms of the future of the European integration. For example, 
Jurgen Habermas (2012) insisted on the necessity of a cosmopolitan integration model for 
Europe after the euro crisis. As another example, Jolyon Howorth (2012) argued that the 
decision making in the EU’s security and defence policy, which is legally under the 
intergovernmental rules, is actually close to a supranational model in practice (an intensive 
network of expert committees in the EU’s security and defence policy). Thus, according to 
Howorth (2010), “[a] supranational culture is emerging from an intergovernmental 
process”, and he conceptualized this finding with a new term, namely, ‘supranational 
intergovernmentalism’.   
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